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 PREFACE
 
The history of Colonial American currency is changed
 
by each generation's interpretation.  Eighteenth century
 
colonialists viewed paper currency as essential and
 
successful.  Historians Charles J. Bullock and Andrew
 
MacFarland Davis, writing at the end of the 19th century,
 
greatly influenced modern thought by suggesting that
 
inconvertible paper currency of any other era was
 
destructive. They came to this conclusion through the
 
biased perspective of their own gold standard generation.
 
It was not until the 1940s that historians such as Leslie
 
Brock began objective research into the currency
 
experience of the American colonies.  Research has
 
continued to this day and has determined that each colony
 
had its own unique currency experience.
 
After examining Pennsylvania's currency, I was
 
impressed by the remarkable success of the colony's
 
currency policy.  Paramount were conservative political
 
and fiscal creation and management, little overall
 
depreciation, and, finally, a functional and essential
 
mechanism for colony growth and prosperity.  Although this
 
system functioned superbly, the two periods under
 
consideration are markedly different.  Both merit close
 
investigation.  Pennsylvania went from a strict
 
economically driven issuance caused by depression to a
 
public finance need driven by war.  In this transition,
 
Pennsylvanian's were compelled to change the way currency
 was issued.  The new method involved an increase of over
 
£500,000 which did not harm the overall integrity of the
 
financial system.
 
This study will trace Pennsylvania's experience with
 
paper currency through two crucial phases that allowed for
 
the development of a modern monetary system.  Chapter 1
 
analyzes the reasons Pennsylvanians thought the issuance
 
of paper money was necessary.  Chapter 2 examines the
 
first paper money issuances in 1723 and 1729.  Chapter 3
 
concentrates on war finance during the French and Indian
 
Conflict.  Chapter 4 attempts to account for
 
Pennsylvania's  exceptional history of paper money.
 
Chapter 5 concludes the study with an analysis of the
 
repercussions of paper money in Pennsylvania.
 
The research materials used for this thesis include a
 
combination of primary documents and contemporary
 
publications, as well as secondary monographs, and journal
 
articles.
 
At each stage, certain bibliographical references
 
served as invaluable guides.  I would like to acknowledge
 
my debt to several students.  Leslie V. Brock can be
 
considered the father of modern thought regarding colonial
 
currency.  Paton W. Yoder proved indispensable in guiding
 
me through the Pennsylvania Archives, Eighth Series, which
 
contain the colony's legislative records.  Richard A.
 
Lester illuminated the details of Pennsylvania's economic
 
depression between the years 1723 and 1730.  E. James
 Ferguson helped to show the link between currency and
 
public finance.  Theodore Thayer explained the importance
 
of land banks while illuminating the depth and dimensions
 
of Pennsylvania's politics.  I especially value the recent
 
work of Edwin Perkins and his penetrating analysis of
 
currency history.  Finally, I would like to thank Eric
 
Newman for the illustrations of each currency.
 THE MATUREST DELIBERATION:  COLONIAL PENNSYLVANIA CURRENCY
 
IN DEPRESSION AND WAR.
 
CHAPTER 1
 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND THE UNTRIED OPTION
 
A nation may import to a greater value than it
 
exports for half a century, perhaps, together;
 
the gold and silver which comes into it during
 
all this time may be all immediately sent out of
 
it; its circulating coin may gradually decay,
 
different sorts of paper money being substituted
 
in its place, and even the debts, gradually
 
increasing; and yet its real wealth, the
 
exchangeable value of the annual produce of its
 
lands and labor, may, during the same period,
 
have been increasing in a much greater
 
proportion. The state of our North American
 
colonies, and of the trade which they carried on
 
with Great Britain, before the commencement of
 
the present disturbances, may serve as a proof
 
that this is by no means an impossible
 
supposition.
 
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776)
 
A.  Balance Of Payments
 
Trade with England was the single most determinate
 
factor persuading colonial Pennsylvanians to issue paper
 
money.  Pennsylvania, as with most other British North
 
American Colonies, faced a balance of payments deficit
 
with England, which meant that the province was never able
 
to amass an adequate supply of specie for domestic
 
transactions.  The reason for this failure was the
 
requirement that the bulk of acquired specie was remitted
 
to England to cover the trade deficit.  In other words,
 
the demand for English manufactured goods outweighed the
 
desire for currency.  Since the eighteenth century, most
 historians have concurred with this contemporary
 
assessment.  However, some modern economic historians have
 
now rejected the idea of a balance of payments imbalance,
 
theorizing that while the colonies did experience some
 
periods of currency shortage, overall currency levels were
 
more than adequate.  They feel that the supply of specie
 
was not deficient "since the flow of specie from nation to
 
nation and to their colonies was not unduly restricted
 
[and] the distribution of the total money stock was never
 
heavily skewed in favor of one region or to the
 
disadvantage of another.°  Additionally, currency
 
encompasses more than specie, including little recognized
 
complements such as book credit and the promissory note.
 
These historians suggest that there exists no firm
 
evidence of a shortage of specie.  In fact, what evidence
 
does exist, such as recorded pound sterling price levels,
 
support the conclusion that there existed enough currency
 
in the American colonies to see the price level rise
 
rather than fall as would be expected with a shortage of
 
currency.
 
B.  Chapter Purpose
 
A preliminary discussion of the general economic and
 
monetary conditions Pennsylvania faced prior to her first
 
issuance of paper money in 1723 will be the purpose of
 
Edwin J. Perkins, The Economy of Colonial America.
 
p. 166.
 3 
this chapter.  While it is perhaps beyond this thesis to
 
decide the exact nature and cause of Pennsylvania's
 
monetary disturbances, motivations and/or justifications
 
for the Colony to consider paper money will be considered.
 
C.  Uncertainty Of Coin
 
"Irrespective of the controversy over paper currency,
 
coin were a major component of the colonial money stock."2
 
However, this coin was not primarily English in origin or
 
denomination.3  The uncertain state of England's own
 
monetary system, because of undervaluation of silver and
 
persistent trade deficits, made it impossible to supply
 
all her colonies with an adequate medium of exchange.
 
Additionally, English law prohibited the exportation of
 
sterling coin to the colonies throughout the colonial
 
period, which left Pennsylvania and all the other
 
provinces with the need to acquire coin for internal
 
circulation as well as for remittance to pay for English
 
products.  The colonies were further hampered by the fact
 
that North America did not possess productive silver
 
mines.  Trade became the only viable option to obtain a
 
large enough quantity of silver coin to serve as a medium
 
2lbid., p. 163.
 
3However, English colonists' method of financial
 
accounting consisted of using the British standard of
 
pounds, shillings, and pence.
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of exchange.4  In the case of Pennsylvania, it was the
 
West Indies and, to a lesser extent, Southern Europe, that
 
became the supplier of that silver and gold.  The British
 
West Indian colony of Jamaica, with a valued proximity to
 
Spanish trade and mines, became the main source for
 
Pennsylvania.  A condition which promoted further exchange
 
with Jamaica was the fact that Pennsylvania's main
 
produce, grain and grain products, could not be profitably
 
exported to England since they competed directly with
 
English products.  Pennsylvania was forced to enter
 
alternative markets as a means of redressing the balance
 
with the mother country.  Table 1 shows Pennsylvania's
 
balance of payments with England over a nine-year period.
 
Table 1
 
Pennsylvania Balance of Payments with England5
 
(in pounds sterling) 
Year  Exports  Imports 
1717  4,449  22,505 
1718  5,588  22,716 
1719  6,564  27,063 
1720  7,928  24,531 
1721  8,037  21,548 
1722  6,882  26,397 
1723  8,332  15,992 
1724  4,057  30,324 
4One must note that certain negligible quantities of
 
English coin were available in the colonies through either
 
what was brought by immigrants or English government cash
 
expenditures.
 
5Samuel Hazard, Register of Pennsylvania
 
(Philadelphia, Jan.-July, 1828), I, p.5., as reproduced in
 
Paton Yoder's "Paper Currency in Colonial Pennsylvania
 
Doctoral Dissertation. p. 2.
 5 
The supply of foreign coin in the colonies before
 
1700 appears to have been abundant.  After the turn of the
 
century, scarcity of money was to become one of the common
 
complaints in North America.  "It was estimated by one
 
observer that coin did not circulate in the colonies more
 
than six months until it was gathered up and remitted to
 
England."  For Pennsylvania, this scarcity was due to
 
several factors.  First, the economy was maturing.
 
Philadelphia, with its exceptional harbor facilities and
 
location, .and under the guidance of William Penn,7 was
 
becoming one of the largest trading centers in America.
 
The income derived from trade encouraged a greater
 
division of labor.  Prosperity and the need for labor
 
brought immigrants to the colony.  Pennsylvania's growth
 
increased the developing society's fundamental need to
 
have a medium which would serve as:  1) a unit of account,
 
2) a medium of exchange, 3) a store of value, and 4) a
 
standard of deferred payment.8
 
6Curtis P. Nettels, The Money Supply of the American
 
Colonies Before 1720. p. 13.
 
70n March 4, 1680, the English Crown granted William
 
Penn the exclusive right and title to the Province of
 
Pennsylvania in lieu of a £16,000 debt owed to his father,
 
Admiral Penn.
 
8Douglas Vickers, Money, Banking, and the
 
Macroeconomy. p. 44-45.
 6 
D.  Barter
 
One method to assure a supply of such a medium was
 
continued reliance on an ancient substitute for coin, the
 
barter economy.  Since its inception, Pennsylvania had
 
used the barter economy.  Commonly called commodity or
 
country currency, it consisted of any locally produced
 
commodity including labor traded for other commodities,
 
goods, or services.  Numerous petitions to the
 
Pennsylvania Assembly requested such commodities as corn,
 
tobacco, skins, beef, pork, hemp, flax, wheat, and flour
 
became current or country pay.9  Throughout the colonial
 
period the Pennsylvania assembly was petitioned by the
 
province's agricultural producers to recognize legally
 
these various commodities as a legitimate form of
 
currency.  The following is illustrative of many such
 
petitions.
 
To the Honourable the Representatives of the
 
Province of Pennsylvania in General Assembly met
 
at Philadelphia. the 10th day of the Twelfth Mo:
 
February, Ano Domi. 1717
 
The Petition of the Subscribers on behalf of
 
themselves and others the Inhabitants of the
 
said Province.  Humbly Sheweth.
 
That whereas the want of running cash is
 
generally detrimental to trade and Commerce as
 
this Province do by woeful Experience find
 
occasioned partly by the bringing in of sundry
 
Merchandises and Especially Servants, which when
 
purchased are for the most part paid for in Cash
 
and the same being Carried away in specie drains
 
the Province of the Currant Coyn to that degree
 
9Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, I, 45; II, 1262,
 
1391, 1395, 1399, 1467, 1408, 1424-25.
 7 
That thereby the whole Government in General is
 
depriv'd of the sinews and life of Trade without
 
which no Countrey can Expect to flourish &
 
prosper
 
Now your petitioners Do hereby humbly request &
 
desire That for the preventing of the Carrying
 
away of the running Cash as much as may be the
 
reviving of Trade & Commerce amongst us and
 
redressing the aggrievances consequently Ensuing
 
such unnecessary Exportations of Cash---This
 
Honourable House may make the produce of the
 
Countrey as wheat Flour Bread &c.: such lawful
 
pay in a general way as not to be refus'd or
 
rejected or otherwise that such other
 
restrictions be Enjoyn'd as may be thought most
 
proper and Convenient for redressing the
 
aggrievances aforesaid And your petitioners for
 
that and other manifold favours shall as in duty
 
bound Ever pray &c.10
 
Barter was a vital form of exchange, and it remained an
 
ageless component of all colonial economies.  The
 
importance of barter in Pennsylvania was twofold.  First,
 
the barter economy was an inferior mechanism in comparison
 
to specie, but it was often the only available option to a
 
developing, commodity based economy which needed to
 
reserve specie for export.  Gold and silver were always
 
the easiest form of remittance for British imports.
 
Second, the barter economy was significant because it
 
taught rudimentary economics" of a basic monetary system
 
to the Province.  The colonists realized that any monetary
 
unit had to possess certain fundamental attributes.
 
10E. Gillingham, Counterfeiting in Colonial
 
Pennsylvania, p. 8.
 
11Noteworthy is the fact that economics as a science
 
was just beginning.  After all, it was not until 1776 or
 
sixty years later that Adam Smith wrote The Wealth of
 
Nations.
 8 
First, a currency had to be durable enough to circulate
 
without deterioration.  Currency could not be susceptible
 
to excessive wear or alteration because that would inhibit
 
its transferability and increase its susceptibility to
 
counterfeiting.  Second, a currency should be divisible
 
into either smaller or larger quantities to promote ready
 
exchange.  Third, currency had to be easily transported.
 
The main hindrance of barter and commodity money was ease
 
of not only carriage, but adequate divisibility.  Fourth,
 
the underlying basis for a currency must minimize price
 
volatility, especially depreciation.  The essence of any
 
currency is relative stability in price.  Finally,
 
currency must be acceptable in all trades as legal tender.
 
Currency, as a store of wealth, must be transferable
 
without penalty.  However, commodity money served the
 
Colony well in spite of its many defects.
 
E.  Proclamation Money
 
In order to attract and retain coin, colonial
 
assemblies turned to legislating their valuation in excess
 
of the intrinsic worth.12  "From the beginning Penn's
 
Quaker Colony strove to retain its own supply of coin by
 
establishing a premium for silver."13  Such "current
 
money" was received and disbursed at legal rates in all
 
12More appropriately referred to as devaluation.
 
13John J. McCusker, Money and Exchange in Europe and
 
America, 1600-1775, p. 175.
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public payments.  In 1704, England condoned this action by
 
allowing each colony to overvalue foreign coin by one-

third in domestic transactions relative to English money.
 
To ensure an adequate supply of specie, Pennsylvania often
 
had to offer more than the official "proclamation" rate
 
legislated by England, and was forced to "...change the
 
ratio seven times during the first half of the century. "14
 
Such action prompted England to pass a statute in 1708
 
prescribing penalties for those who traded above the
 
proclaimed rate.. Trading centers, especially
 
Pennsylvania, refused to enforce this legislation,
 
contending that compliance would rob the provinces of a
 
necessary means of attracting coin.  Even with the
 
overvaluation, the colonists complained about lack of
 
specie.  A motion was approved by the Pennsylvania
 
Assembly in 1716 asking "that the Price of Gold,
 
and/Dollars, be raised in Value, in order to supply the
 
present Want of Coin in the Province."15  As would be
 
expected, inflating the value of coin gave Pennsylvania a
 
competitive edge in acquiring coin.  Such a remedy could
 
only be temporary.  "It obviously could not be applied
 
successfully by all the colonies at once...even then the
 
magic ceased to work as soon as the importation of coin
 
UMargaret Myers, A Financial History of the United
 
States, p. 6.
 
15Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, pp. 1164 and
 
1467.
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into the colony applying the expedient had caused a price
 
rise sufficient to equalize the purchasing power of the
 
dollar there and elsewhere.""  In an American Weekly
 
Mercury advertisement," even some Philadelphia traders
 
listed the rates they would accept coin "for the
 
encouragement of trade and commerce.""  Competition for
 
coin between colonies eventually forced each to consider
 
paper as an alternative.
 
F.  Promissory Note
 
One of the first forms of paper money in the colonies
 
can be traced to a source as old as time itself:  the
 
promissory note.  The note was a written instrument signed
 
by the maker unconditionally promising to pay a certain
 
sum of money to the one to whom the note was endorsed.
 
Promissory notes passed locally through a series of
 
endorsers until finally being presented to the maker for
 
payment.  The notes circulated as money, and they were
 
"Leslie v. Brock, The Currency of the American
 
Colonies, 1700-1764, p. 9.
 
""The American Weekly Mercury." #59,  January 31,
 
1721 and #60, February 7, 1721.  As well as these
 
advertisements, others also appear saying payment will be
 
received at the Proclamation rate.
 
This was not the first or the last time "The
 
merchants of Philadelphia [or Pennsylvania in general]
 
several times took in charge the matter of the currency."
 
as quoted in Henry Phillips, Paper Currency of the
 
American Colonies, p. 26.  Eric Newman in The Early Paper
 
Money of America, points out that twice before the
 
American Revolution such merchants even went as far as
 
issuing their own "special issues." pp. 246-48.
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usually backed by the maker's property as well as
 
reputation.  Value of a note very likely varied in each
 
exchange because of a number of factors such as:  a) the
 
perceived credit worthiness and reputation of the maker,
 
b) the quality of the property backing the note, and c)
 
the length of time since issuance.  Promissory notes were
 
a necessary vehicle for drawing credit from assets without
 
destroying the productive integrity of these assets.
 
G.  Sterling Bills of Exchange
 
Sterling bills of exchange or claims on money held in
 
England became another paper substitute for currency.  A
 
producer or merchant generated a fund of money on which to
 
draw by selling exportable commodities abroad.  The owner
 
of the fund had three options for its disbursement.
 
First, all funds could be withdrawn and sent home in the
 
form of specie, although transportation cost was
 
expensive."  Second, the fund could be used by the owner
 
to purchase or charge English goods and services.  The
 
process was accomplished through accounting rather than
 
the physical exchange of currency.  The third option
 
proved the most beneficial for the colonial economy.  The
 
fund's owner was issued sterling bills of exchange which
 
could be sold or traded locally as demands against the
 
fund of money.  Sterling bills of exchange functioned in
 
19As previously stated, English law against the
 
exportation of coin would have proved a further hindrance.
 12 
what today's economy would be demand deposit.  Often the
 
bills would circulate until finally being offered for
 
redemption in London, at which time the account would be
 
credited for the amount of the bill.  These bills
 
represented a more readily acceptable form of the
 
promissory note by being acceptable in a larger geographic
 
region.m  Since these bills were checks drawn on deposits
 
held by the maker's agents abroad, the notoriety of that
 
English agent served as a further guarantee of
 
negotiability.  Thus, bills of exchange were probably
 
subject to less depreciation when they were exchanged than
 
ordinary promissory notes.
 
H.  Book Credit
 
Lack of currency and credit were the two predominate
 
factors affecting colonial commerce.  Merchants assumed
 
what was essentially the role of bankers by providing
 
another form of currency known as book credit.  Book
 
credit was the extension of credit in anticipation of
 
future payment.  Merchants would sell or exchange goods,
 
usually to farmers, acknowledging that payment would not
 
be rendered until the sale of that years' harvest.
 
Merchants also exchanged goods between themselves on
 
account.  "Book credit substantially enlarged the means by
 
NIn contrast to bills of exchange, bills of credit
 
were public forms of debt backed by public land.  (It is
 
unclear whether Pennsylvania issued any such bills.)
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which purchases and sales could be made.  But sooner or
 
later an accounting was necessary. 101
 
Merchants became instrumental middlemen in the
 
economic relations of the New World.  They provided
 
manufactured products and credit while disposing of
 
surplus commodities.  They were the conduit for which
 
credit was transferred and returns were made from England
 
to the colonies.  Book credit formed the backbone of the
 
colonial financial system22 and helped the colonists
 
economize on the use of coin.  Harsh debtor laws
 
constrained the demand for credit as well as helped to
 
insure that all accounts were paid.
 
I.  The Economy's Trade Deficit
 
Colonial commerce progressed to a point where the
 
need for domestic credit became partially satisfied by
 
either the backing of commodities, the mortgaging of land,
 
or the drawing upon foreign holdings or credit.  Paper, as
 
a form of currency, gradually became legitimized.
 
The system of bills of exchange "operated smoothly so
 
long as overseas earnings and the expenditures on imports
 
21Robert Craig West, (1978) "Money in the Colonial
 
American Economy," Economic Inquiry, Vol. XVI, (Oct):  p.
 
11.
 
22West in Money in the Colonial American Economy,
 
suggests that bills of exchange or book credit served  a
 
role similar to demand deposits in the modern economy.  In
 
his view they were a crucial and widely overlooked aspect
 
of the colonial money supply. p.  7
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was roughly equal.un  Communication of market
 
information, especially for the colonists, was scant.
 
Changes in the demand and price of their exports might not
 
reach them until months had passed, and then it would
 
possibly take years to change to a new line of production.
 
Faced with both a communication and a transportation lag,
 
it was often difficult for colonists to capture market
 
advantage.  When the colonies imported more than they
 
exported, a deficit was created with English merchants.
 
If a colonist did not have enough money on account to
 
cover a deficit, British merchants usually became more
 
than willing to extend a certain amount of credit to
 
protect lucrative markets where they sold goods.  In
 
colonial markets, the effect of such a balance of payment
 
deficit was to increase the demand and thus the value of
 
bills of exchange which had become scarce.  Specie became
 
a convenient and cheap method of remittance.  Price
 
increases associated with a higher demand for both specie
 
and bills of exchange, as well as the shortage of specie,
 
eventually reduced imports of British goods and returned
 
the colonies to a more equitable trade position.
 
Concurrently, all this happened when exports to the West
 
Indies continued to produce specie and to replenish the
 
Colonial economy.  Eventually, with decreased imports and
 
normal exports, the colonial money supply returned to
 
Perkins, Economy of Colonial America, p. 165.
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equilibrium.  "Before 1720 it appears that the colonists
 
derived a greater economic advantage by exporting their
 
gold and silver than by keeping it at home as a domestic
 
medium of exchange."24  Each Colony desired a plentiful
 
supply of coin for domestic use, yet the need for foreign
 
capital goods for development was more insistent.  In the
 
interim, the Colony was without doubt deprived of both
 
specie and bills of exchange to conduct commerce.25
 
J.  Legislated Interest Rates
 
The perpetual fluctuation of the supply of specie and
 
other forms of currency because of trade deficits kept the
 
natural rate of interest in the colonies high.  The
 
developing economies lacked banking systems to help
 
mitigate the high demand for credit to finance inputs and
 
improvements.  Both farmers and merchants in Pennsylvania
 
petitioned the Assembly for lower interest rates.26  In
 
1722, the "legal" interest rate was around eight percent,
 
and the petitioners requested a two percent reduction to
 
six percent.
 
In a retrospective account written in 1726 by a
 
"Representation of the Assembly of the Province of
 
24Nettels, Money Supply,  p. 13.
 
25This paragraph was largely drawn from Perkins,
 
Economy of Colonial America, pp.165-167.
 
26Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, II, 1391 and
 
1395.
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Pennsylvania" to the Board of Trade, an account of
 
economic affairs was given:
 
That Gold and Silver being acquired principally
 
by our Trade with the West-Indies, which,
 
depending on Contingencies, that are not in the
 
Power of Man to direct, we therefore, at divers
 
Times, had less or more of those Species in
 
Proportion as our Commodities were in Demand;
 
but the general Damp that was given to Trade in
 
the Year 1720, and the great Fall [in the price)
 
of our Produce, about the same time, we were, in
 
the Years 1721 and 1722, so effectually drained
 
of our Coin, which, for want of other Returns,
 
was generally ship'd off to Britain, that the
 
Inhabitants of every Degree were reduced to the
 
greatest Straits; Debts could not be discharged,
 
nor payments be made; the Rents of Houses fell,
 
many whereof were deserted; and the Value of
 
Lands and Improvements sunk considerably;
 
Families who had lived well could scarce find
 
Means to purchase necessary Provisions for their
 
Support; and therefore both Artificers and
 
Traders were obligated to quit the Country, in
 
Search of Employment and Sustenance elsewhere;
 
But, above all, our Shipping, by which the most
 
advantageous Returns for Britain had been made,
 
was so greatly declined, that our Yards appeared
 
almost empty, and all Trade discouraged.  Such
 
was the distressd Condition to which this
 
Country was at that Time unhappily reduced.27
 
K.  Experience of Other Colonies
 
The lack of currency in Pennsylvania led to the
 
consideration of the methods employed by other colonies to
 
meet the scarcity and drain of specie.  Pennsylvania's
 
first issue of paper money was not without the benefit of
 
the experience of others.  In 1723, the then Governor of
 
the Province commented to the Board of Trade that
 
Pennsylvania had jealously recognized that:
 
27Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 1828 17 
These several colonies, by means of their paper
 
only, do actually carry on three times the
 
business which they ever did, or indeed could
 
possibly do now without it:  that is, by
 
encouraging the planter and manufacturer with a
 
ready market for his commodity, they have
 
increased the quantity of their export, fully
 
employed their shipping, and brought in a
 
greater balance of cash to pay for European
 
goods...than otherwise was practicable to be
 
done.m
 
The Governor had in mind Massachusetts, the first province
 
to issue paper money in 1690, followed by South Carolina
 
in 1703, Barbados in 1706, Connecticut, New York, New
 
Hampshire, and New Jersey in 1709, Rhode Island in 1710,
 
and North Carolina in 1712.  By 1713 the only colonies
 
that had not issued paper currency were Virginia, Maryland
 
and Pennsylvania.
 
Massachusetts, with over thirty years of experience,
 
offered a useful precedent for Pennsylvania.  Bills of
 
Credit or currency could "pay public debt, provide for the
 
support of the government, take care of Assembly grants,
 
and prosecute war" if need be.29  Additionally,
 
Massachusetts was the first in 1711 to begin lending bills
 
of credit to promote business.  After harsh lessons with
 
depreciation, Massachusetts made paper currency legal
 
tender, enabling it to pass in all public and private
 
transactions and payments.  The use of a general property
 
tax to recall the bills came from Connecticut, New
 
28Quoted in Nettels, Money Supply,  p. 250.
 
29Ibid., p. 256.
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Hampshire, New Jersey, and New York.  New York also used a
 
supplement excise tax on liquors to secure its bills.  The
 
colonies of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York and
 
South Carolina, which had experienced considerable
 
depreciation at one time or an other, showed Pennsylvania
 
the close linkage of both the quantity of bills emitted
 
and the security behind them.  Most of these Colonies, by
 
deferring redemption far into the future, promoted
 
depreciation.
 
L.  The Untried Option
 
After devaluating their coin and rejecting further
 
any attempt to make "Produce of our Country lawful Tender
 
in Payments...(having] found (it] too bulky, and soon
 
subject to decay...," Pennsylvania's assemblymen were left
 
with few untried options.  It was now their task to
 
ameliorate the chronic shortage of specie without creating
 
a new problem of inflation.  "After a most anxious Search,
 
fully convinced there was no other safe Method left than
 
the Scheme that, upon the maturest Deliberation, they fell
 
into; which was to strike a Quantity of Bills of
 
Credit. "30
 
30Pennsvlvania Archives, 8th series, p. 1828.
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CHAPTER II
 
PAPER MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE PROVINCE, 1723-1729
 
A.  Battlelines and Objectives
 
The early paper money of America has the unique
 
distinction of being the first authorized paper money
 
issued by any government in the Western World.31  In the
 
English Colonies, it was generally recognized that
 
providing for an acceptable medium of exchange and an
 
adequate money supply were the most pressing economic
 
problems.  As early as 1717, the Pennsylvania Assembly
 
received "The Petition of sundry Persons, praying an
 
Alteration may be made in the Currency of Money, and that
 
Country Produce should be made current Pay at a certain
 
Price."32  How much and what kind was a matter of debate.
 
Many large-scale farmers, prosperous merchants, and some
 
politicians, comprising a group that might be labeled
 
conservative, argued for hard money and stability.  Their
 
interests and those of the Penn family were closely
 
related.  A liberal or radical element in favor of paper
 
money was made up of small farmers and businessmen,
 
artisans and craftsmen, and certain politicians.  Paper
 
money advocates were commoners, but some of the very
 
31Chinese emperors, in the fourteenth century, are
 
considered the first to print paper money.  Massachusetts
 
was the first of the British Colonies to issue paper money
 
in 1690.
 
32 Pennsylvania Archives, 8th Series, p. 1244. 20 
wealthy in high political office also advocated currency
 
issues.
 
B.  Francis Rawle's Pamphlet
 
In an effort to remedy the colony's lack of currency
 
and after attempting various options, from commodity to
 
proclamation money, Pennsylvania was left with no other
 
alternative than to consider an emission33 of paper money.
 
Economic depression, caused by the balance of trade with
 
England, had brought crisis to the Quaker Colony by 1722.
 
Agitation for paper money began to occur.  The Assembly
 
turned to debating whether paper money might be the means
 
to restore Pennsylvania's lost prosperity.  Public
 
deliberation began with a pamphlet entitled Some Remedies
 
Proposed for Restoring the Sunk Credit of the Province of
 
Pennsylvania with Some Remarks on Its Trade.  Published
 
anonymously34 in 1721, its author Francis Rawle was a
 
prosperous Quaker, Philadelphia merchant, and landowner.
 
Rawle's pamphlet "is said to have been the first
 
publication in America on political economy and its
 
33The modern equivalent of the contemporary term
 
"emission" would be "printing."
 
34Anna Janney DeArmond, in Andrew Bradford, Colonial
 
Journalist, noted that Bradford, the publisher of the
 
pamphlet, was warned by the governor and his council that
 
he should "not for the future presume to publish any thing
 
relating to or concerning the Affairs of this
 
Government...." p. 14.
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application to local conditions."35  Rawle, who later
 
became leader of the democratic or anti-proprietary party,
 
provides the intellectual foundation of the paper money
 
plan.  For this reason the pamphlet warrants examination.
 
Rawle began by asserting that the only way a country
 
can "be either rich or happy" is to follow the "primary
 
Maxim in every Trading Country" which is to ensure:  1)
 
only the best produce is sent out, all correctly marked,
 
measured, and weighted; and, 2) all payment is ready and
 
punctual.36  Rawle focused on the unfavorable balance of
 
trade, which was commonly regarded as the key to rectifying
 
the deficiency in coin.  Additionally, and recalling his
 
"primary maxims," he asserted that trade and the shortage
 
of coin could conceivably get worse and be irreparably
 
damaged if Pennsylvania did not ensure that all commodities
 
were of the best quality.  Rawle stated that:
 
almost every one knows, how short we fall in
 
ballancing our Trade with England, and that if
 
some Produce or Manufactory could be found to
 
ballance that Trade, the Advantage we have in the
 
West India Trade would in some time procure us a
 
Stock of Running Cash; but when good Fortune will
 
be pleased to favour us in this last Particular,
 
is not possible for any one at this time to tell,
 
tho' Several Things may be very reasonably
 
offered to our Tryal, which we need not neglect;
 
35Richard A. Lester, (1938) "Currency Issues to
 
Overcome Depressions in Pennsylvania, 1723 and 1729,"
 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. XLVI, (Feb-Dec):  p.
 
332.
 
36Rawle, Some Proposed Remedies,  p. 3.
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But in the mean time the Dying Credit of a
 
Country must not lie unregarded.37
 
Rawle concluded that circumstances made it imprudent
 
to wait for trade to rectify itself, even though the
 
balance of payments was a crucial facet of Pennsylvania's
 
economy and monetary problems.  More than twenty years had
 
lapsed since trade had brought enough specie to accommodate
 
all of Pennsylvania's domestic and foreign payments.  To
 
wait for trade to return, he noted, was "hurtful":
 
It is melancholly to tell the miserable Condition
 
of this Province, occasioned by a Neglect in this
 
last Particular [payment being unavailable].  How
 
deplorable are the lives of the common people!
 
Their Trades and Callings discouraged and valued
 
at nought:  What real Estates they have had are
 
mortgaged, eat out and consumed; and the whole
 
Province look'd upon by all Foreigners, as a
 
Country beggarly and Scandalous, not worth
 
Trading with.  But the melancholly Decay of
 
Credit in this Province requires not much Time to
 
demonstrate...money now wanting is the Cause of
 
our Decay:  The common necessities for (families]
 
brought to the Market are, not to be bought,
 
because Change (as Silver and Copper is commonly
 
called) is not to be had; all our Domestic Trade
 
is become nothing by Discount.38
 
What had become "necessary for the Restoring the Sunk
 
Credit of this Province, is The Pay of the Country must be
 
rendered more ready and punctual than it is at present."39
 
Rawle the merchant saw clearly the economic effect of
 
depressed trade on both customers and vendors.  Desiring to
 
p. 4.
 
mlbid., pp. 6-7.
 
p. 6.
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see Pennsylvania returned to prosperity, he "...proposed a
 
reasonable way for her recovery'  through
 
(as we humbly conceive) some of the best remedies
 
to restore our credit, and encrease our trade
 
both at home and abroad...to restore the same to
 
its former happy state; those happy times, when
 
our produce was preferred...and our payments at
 
home ready and punctual...so good was their
 
credit, and so generous the inhabitants in their
 
dealings one with another, that dunning...was not
 
heard of in Pennsylvania.°
 
Three specific remedies were suggested. All but one had
 
been previously tried.  The first was to "recover the
 
Ballance of a Trade, which may be Said to be lost; or, by
 
forcing some New Trade."42  The second included adjusting
 
the price of silver and gold upward in an effort to attract
 
it to the Colony.  Finally, "to make Money by Public
 
Authority."43  Rawle conceded that neither of the first
 
two options could be effectuated quickly.  Thus, the
 
"making of paper money running stock"44 would offer the
 
surest and "speed[iest]" relief to the Province.
 
While arguing for paper money, Rawle scoffed at the
 
idea of commodity or country money as an alternative,
 
p. 18
 
°Ibid., p. 20.
 
42Ibid., pp. 7-8
 
°Ibid.
 
"Ibid., p. 8.
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asking what good a running stock is that "would be daily in
 
danger of rotting(?)45
 
In order to make paper money comparable with silver or
 
gold, Rawle proposed three necessary features.  First,
 
n ...a real security given for a certain quantity of bills,
 
at an office appointed by Public authority for that
 
purpose; which is no other than like the manner of
 
mortgaging the estate of one neighbor to another; except
 
that here the money belonging to the government, the
 
interest becomes the public advantage.""  Second, "in
 
order to preserve the value of paper money...it exceed not
 
in quantity the running stock of money a country demands in
 
its trade...made lawful tender in all payments...[and) the
 
interest of paper money not be inferior to silver or any
 
other currency of a country."47  Finally, "...a tax had by
 
public authority...for paying public debts...as will sink
 
yearly a certain quantity of the said bills, sometime, one
 
twelfth, one eighth, or one fourth, as the legislators
 
think most easy and advantageous to the public.  The tax
 
being yearly paid in bills into the treasury of this
 
Province, and those bills destroyed as soon as they are
 
received, will evidently...sink the whole sum."48
 
45Ibid., p. 12.
 
"Ibid., pp. 14-15.
 
47Ibid., p. 17
 
"Ibid., p. 15.
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Ultimately, Rawle declared, paper money would be "A
 
thing of advantage to the poorer Sort...who, by some
 
misfortune, had fallen behind in their stocks, by which
 
means they were happily furnished with money to carry
 
forward their sinking trades, or buy food to feed their
 
starving families, till such time as by industry they could
 
mend their sunk fortunes..."49  Rawle suggested that one
 
cannot forget about enabling these poor souls to have the
 
currency needed to pay taxes.
 
It is appropriate to question whether Rawle had an
 
interest beyond philanthropy when writing about the
 
creation of paper money.  One wonders if Rawle did not want
 
average citizens to have enough currency to pay taxes
 
because this would have broadened the tax base and thus
 
possibly reduced his own tax payments to the colony.  This
 
suggestion leads us to question another of Rawle's motives
 
"...that in this Province there is a very great necessity
 
for some public buildings, and to pay public debts.""
 
Perhaps Rawle himself was a creditor of the Province.  He
 
seemed as concerned about the public finance provisions of
 
paper money as with it serving as a medium of exchange for
 
the Colony.
 
One of the most important features Rawle realized
 
about paper money was the legal tender provision.  Paper
 
49Ibid.,  pp. 14-15.
 
"Ibid., p. 15.
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money must be as acceptable as all other currency,
 
especially coin.  He noted also the "convenient Carriage
 
and easy Conveyance," of paper money,  a vital aspect that
 
somewhat hindered silver's use.  Another advantage of paper
 
currency might well be the freeing of silver and gold for
 
export.  Rawle suggested
 
That the running Stock is a thing which every
 
Country wisely covets to preserve; therefore
 
whatforever is the Running Stock of any Country,
 
must be by so much the more valuable, by how much
 
it is capable of being confined to the Business
 
it was designed for:  And herein Silver and Gold
 
cannot be so certainly confined, as Some other
 
Things in Use may."
 
In an attempt to answer criticism of paper money and
 
to explain his conviction, Rawle looked to the experience
 
of several other Colonies.
 
It is to be confessed, that one of our
 
Neighboring Provinces hath met with ill success
 
in their making paper-money; it sunk in its
 
value:  and the Public authority rather
 
encouraging this misfortune, than putting any
 
stop to it, its value entirely vanished, and the
 
whole country was greatly injured by this
 
misfortune.  But this proceeded not from any Evil
 
entailed on Paper-money, but the bad managing of
 
it:  For, in the first Place, they allowed it not
 
to be (as it ought) a lawful Tender in all
 
payments; which thing will even render Paper, or
 
any other Money inferior to that which is
 
unlimited in its payments.52
 
In South Carolina, due to War-experience, they
 
were obligated to make more Paper-Money than, in
 
Time of Peace, their Domestic Trade had occasion
 
"Ibid., p. 9.
 
52Ibid., pp. 12-13.
 27 
for.  And in Boston, this is the fault of their
 
Paper Money (if any) they have too much.53
 
Rawle's pamphlet can be seen as both an exceptional
 
argument for paper money and a compendium outlining the
 
framework for emission.  In his view, "nothing was equal to
 
STAMP'D PAPER."54  However, paper money would only work as
 
a supplement to specie and not as a replacement.  He even
 
went so far as to mention that paper money could be
 
"Stamp'd and figured" to avoid counterfeiting.  Rawle ended
 
his pamphlet by suggesting that  "the Legislators ought to
 
be the best Judges"55 of constructing proper currency
 
legislation.  Such deference came easily to Francis Rawle,
 
since he was ultimately to be "the guiding spirit and
 
chairman of the [Assembly's] committee to draw up the first
 
paper money bill."56  Perhaps no other Pennsylvanian was
 
as influential in convincing the colony that paper money
 
was, without doubt, the only solution to return the
 
province to prosperity.  Rawle and his pamphlet's influence
 
can be seen throughout the legislative record.  It was the
 
ultimate source of discussion and eventual action.
 
p. 11.
 
p. 10.
 
55Ibid., p. 9.
 
54Paton W. Yoder, "Paper Currency in Colonial
 
Pennsylvania," Doctoral Dissertation (1941) p. 28.
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C.  Petition and Debate:  Pennsylvania's Assembly
 
Debate now became centered in the Assembly.57
 
Petitions for and against paper money were received by the
 
House early in 1723.  Petitions advocating relief came from
 
the "several inhabitants of the Province of
 
Pennsylvania,"58 "sundry Freeholders and Inhabitants of the
 
City and County of Philadelphia," the "divers Inhabitants
 
of Chester County," and "several Inhabitants of the County
 
of Bucks."59  All complained of "the Decay of Trade and
 
Credit, and requested] a Paper Currency."  The petitioners
 
realized that any issuance of paper money would require
 
extensive debate and they suggested other more easily
 
attained remedies to their present economic crisis.  These
 
remedies encompassed regulating the production of bread and
 
flour to recover lost West Indian trade, making produce a
 
currency, prohibiting the exportation of money, promoting
 
the production and distillation of domestic beer and
 
spirits while discouraging foreign liquors, raising the
 
price of dollars, placing a duty on imported servants,
 
asking that Negroes be prohibited from seeking work, and
 
57The Pennsylvania Archives, Eighth series, is the
 
most complete record of the legislative votes and
 
proceedings of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives.
 
Debate surrounding such votes and proceedings was not
 
recorded.
 
mPennsylvania at this time was comprised of three
 
counties:  Philadelphia, Chester, and Bucks.
 
59Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, pp. 1461, 1463,
 
1464, 1465, 1466.
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lowering the interest rate in the Province.  Inundated with
 
such alternatives and options suggests the conservative
 
Assembly was on the verge of deciding once and for all the
 
Province's problem of lack of specie and want of a medium
 
of trade.  All petitions were read, tabled, and then
 
referred to the Assembly's Committee on Grievances for
 
further consideration.
 
D.  The Proprietary Party
 
Opponents of paper currency were, as expected, quick
 
to respond by petitioning the Assembly." 'These petitions
 
came mainly from the Proprietary Party61 made up of
 
wealthy residents of Philadelphia who were members of the
 
creditor class and, not surprisingly, strong supporters of
 
the Penn family interests.  Led by James Logan and Issac
 
Norris and supported by the Penn family, they were to form
 
the principle opposition to paper money.  Logan, at one
 
time secretary to William Penn, now served as both
 
secretary of the Province and mayor of Philadelphia.
 
Norris, a wealthy merchant and landowner who had rescued
 
William Penn from debtor's prison, was a member of the
 
60 Pennsylvania Archives. 8th series, pp. 1461, 1465, 
1466, 1467. 
61Note that the author has used the modern term
 
"Proprietary Party" to broadly denote a group of
 
conservative influentials who supported the Penn family
 
and opposed the creation of paper money in Pennsylvania.
 
These conservatives did not form what would be considered
 
typically a "party."
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Governor's Council and an Assemblyman.  By petitioning the
 
Assembly, they tried to counter the arguments of the paper
 
money "radicals."  The Proprietary party, through Issac
 
Norris, was cognizant of the fact that
 
Through the decay of Trade and the forward humour
 
of many People to run into Debt many have failed­
-and one knows not who to trust, And these
 
Indiscreet (and Some of them) Sluggish Idle
 
people---have by Combination begun last year to
 
throw out most of the Usual old members [of the
 
Assembly] and chosen
 
Such an Assembly as would find any means to Ease
 
them tho manifestly Unjust... 62
 
This statement of the opposition attests to the fact
 
that the need for additional currency and the populous
 
demand for such must have been urgent.  They, too, could
 
not have been unaffected by the economic depression.  They
 
saw paper money as the last resort. Other remedies should
 
be exhausted first in an attempt to draw coin.  These
 
included raising the value of silver, using country produce
 
as ready money, and lowering port taxes.  They rejected any
 
law prohibiting the exportation of cash.
 
The Democratic or Anti-proprietary victory over many
 
Proprietary Assemblymen did not dissuade Logan and Norris,
 
but it did keep them mindful of the desires of the voters.
 
The conservative petition's authors, Logan and Norris,
 
suggested that the issuance of paper money could not be all
 
62Norris to Mord Maddock, Sept. 23, 1723, "Letters of
 
Isaac Norris, 1716 to 1731," as quoted in Lester, (1938)
 
"Currency Issues to Overcome Depressions in Pennsylvania,"
 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. XLVI, (Feb-Dec):  p.
 
338.
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that prudent when Great Britain had not seen the need to
 
create an overall paper money system.  On the few occasions
 
when Britain did issue "Exchequer Bills," they were solidly
 
backed by silver, something Pennsylvania would be unable to
 
do.  The opponents of paper money argued that depreciation
 
was inevitable since the paper would be lent out on easier
 
terms than gold or silver.  After all, "credit has its own
 
Laws as unalterable in themselves, as those of Motion or
 
Gravity are in Nature.  . ."63 and credit should be lent on
 
terms just as private individuals would lend money.  The
 
Proprietary party felt that paper money, void of any
 
intrinsic value, could not be legislated simply to have
 
value.  If such paper "proclamation" money were legislated,
 
"it (would] be impractical to strike enough to answer all
 
Demands...(and] because of the Quantity..."" would
 
depreciate.  Besides, they argued, how can the poor be
 
helped under such circumstances when they have nothing to
 
offer as security to receive a loan of paper currency?
 
In perhaps one of the most interesting turn of events
 
concluding their original petition, Logan and Norris
 
accepted that an issue of paper money was inevitable.65
 
They set out to define how the Act must be constructed.
 
First, the small size of the emission should continue for
 
63Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 1470.
 
"Ibid.
 
65Ibid.
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only a short duration with appropriate measures to assure
 
its sinking.  With even the conservatives begrudgingly
 
aboard, paper money became backed by a foundation few would
 
have expected.  Those Pennsylvanians who were "aggrieved in
 
their estates and Dealings, to the great Loss and growing
 
Ruin of themselves, and the evident Decay of this Province
 
in general...,"66 now saw the possibility of the passage
 
of a paper money bill.  All assemblymen appeared to have
 
listened to the petitioners demands.  It was exactly this
 
kind of political pressure Norris feared the most. He later
 
said that if the issue of paper money had been "to help the
 
Defect of Cash" by making "a small sum for the Conveniency
 
of our home market & small payments & we could prevent an
 
Increase, I should like it."  He thought that "the people
 
would never cease" to demand more paper money, and he
 
believed that "a levelling principle was at the Bottom with
 
the Crafty & designing."67  In the end, conservative
 
opposition amounted to little more than an "attitude of
 
caution."68  Clearly, the province's wealthy conservatives
 
became reconciled to the fact that passage of a paper money
 
66Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p.1461
 
67As quoted in Lester, (1938) "Currency Issues to
 
Overcome Depressions in Pennsylvania," Journal of
 
Political Economy, vol. XLVI, (Feb-Dec):  p.349.  Norris
 
to James Logan and Norris to John Penn, April 30, 1729,
 
"Letters of Isaac Norris, 1716 to 1731," p. 523 and 524.
 
mYoder, "Paper Currency in Colonial Pennsylvania,"
 
p. 33.
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act was inevitable.  As such, they decided their political
 
power was better used legislatively by reducing the impact
 
of paper money rather than withdrawing from the process
 
entirely.69
 
E.  Anti-Proprietary Party
 
A response to Logan and Norris was felt necessary by
 
the rural anti-proprietary party.  It came on January 24,
 
1723.70  Point for point, the new petition was a rebuke to
 
the conservative petition.  The radical party asserted that
 
even the all-powerful Great Britain would be driven to
 
accept paper currency if she were faced with similar
 
circumstances as Pennsylvania.  "How are such Schemes
 
destructive to publick Credit, since the Publick is capable
 
of yielding so much Relief to a necessitous People, without
 
hurting itself?"71  Built on a solid foundation of ample
 
security, how could it fall in value or command anything
 
less than gold or silver?  How can paper money not equally
 
support the poor when employers will now have a currency to
 
pay?  "A Medium of Business will run us from the loose Way
 
of Luxury, Idleness and Folly, which often happens from
 
being nonplus'd in a regular Dispatch of Affairs for Want
 
"Not surprisingly, this influence helped insure the
 
success of paper money.
 
70Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, pp. 1481-1484.
 
flIbid., p. 1482.
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of Pay when due"72 and return the Province to industry.
 
Finally, regarding the Norris and Logan proposal of just
 
how paper should be emitted, the radicals, chiefly Quaker
 
assemblymen, could only agree that a proper plan for its
 
sinking was elemental.  The quantity issued had to be
 
sufficient at least to meet the demand for a currency in
 
the Province, and the duration of the issue must be
 
sufficient to see appreciable effects--the longer the
 
better.
 
F.  Lieutenant Governor Sir William Keith73
 
If the Proprietary interests were too conservative for
 
the radical paper money party, Governor Keith ironically
 
saw the Assembly's version as entirely too conservative.
 
Keith adamantly supported Francis Rawle's position, and he
 
became instrumental in helping guide the currency measure
 
through the Assembly.  The measure was hated by the wealthy
 
and the Penn family but acclaimed by the Assembly.74
 
Keith's stance against the proprietary's interest can only
 
be seen as both his regard for Pennsylvania and himself.
 
He considered himself a Pennsylvanian and had no desire to
 
return to England.  As such, he sought to ingratiate
 
72Ibid.,
 p. 1483.
 
73William Keith was most often referred to as merely
 
Governor, rather than his official title of Lt. Governor,
 
since he was the proprietorship's appointed provincial
 
leader.
 
74Charles P. Keith, Chronicles of Pennsylvania, pp.
 
676-679.
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himself with his fellow colonists and capitalize on the
 
return of prosperity any currency issues would bring to the
 
colony.  Writing many years later in 1740, Keith's
 
summarized his views:
 
The laborious, and most industrious Inhabitants
 
of the small Province of Pennsylvania...had
 
successfully carried on all their Affairs without
 
the Use of Paper Money, until the Year 1722, when
 
by the late Increase(?) of their shipping and
 
foreign Trade, the City of Philadelphia labour'd
 
under great discouragement for want of a
 
Currency; many of the labouring, but poorer Sort
 
of Inhabitants, were daily leaving the Place, and
 
transporting themselves and Families elsewhere;
 
the Shop-keepers had no Money to go to Market,
 
and the Farmer, or Planter's Crop was then
 
reduced to the lowest Value; so that all the
 
European Goods imported, as well as the Bread and
 
Flower, or Country Produce, were bought up and
 
engrossed at a low Price, by a Cabel of only four
 
or five rich Men, who retail'd them again on
 
Credit at what Rate they pleased, taking
 
Advantage of the People's Necessities and
 
Circumstances; by which Means they soon got the
 
whole Country into their Debt; exacting Bonds of
 
every Body at 8 per Cent. which was then the
 
legal Interest.
 
This made such a universal Clamour all over the
 
Province, that when the Assembly met, the latter
 
End of the same Year, they hastened to prepare a
 
Bill for establishing a Paper Currency.
 
The Governor, concerned about Pennsylvania's worsening
 
economic condition, urged the Assembly to review the
 
"Multiplicity of expensive and Vexatious Law-suits [that]
 
have been of late commenced..."  Keith felt that the number
 
of lawsuits filed indicated the need for economic relief
 
mAs quoted in Lester, (1938) "Currency Issues to
 
Overcome Depression in Pennsylvania," Journal of Political
 
Economy, vol XLVI, (Feb-Dec):  p. 336.  "Sir William
 
Keith, A Collection of Papers and Other Tracts Written
 
Occasionally on Various Subjects," (London, 1740), p.212.
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through the issuance of paper money.  The number of suits
 
almost doubled in the six years prior to the first emission
 
of paper money.
 
G.  The First Paper Money Act of 1723
 
The record of the deliberations of the House indicates
 
clearly the conservative approach to the problem.  Before
 
passing on a sum of £12,000, the Assembly rejected two
 
bills,
 
Table 2 
Law Suits 
From September,  1715,  to September,  1716,  431 
From September,  1717,  to September,  1718,  588 
From September,  1719,  to September,  1720,  627 
From September,  1721,  to September,  1722,  847 
From September,  1722,  to December, 
1722,  25076 
one emitting £20,000 and the other emitting £15,000.77
 
The interest rate was set at five percent, with one-fourth
 
of the principle and annual interest due each year to
 
retire the total emission at the end of five years.
 
Considered legal tender for the term of the bill, the
 
currency was to be secured by three times the value of real
 
estate and four times the value of the mortgaged home.
 
When notified of the Assembly's passage of the act,
 
76C.W.
  MacFarlane, (1896) "Pennsylvania Paper
 
Currency," Annals of the American Academy of Political and
 
Social Science, Vol. VIII:51; Pennsylvania Archives, 8th
 
series, pp. 1460, 1465, 1510.
 
77Pennsylvania Archives, 8th Series, pp. 1472-73.
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Governor Keith suggested amendments to the bill.  Keith, in
 
a letter to the Assembly dated January 22, 1723,m
 
proposed (and summarized below):
 
1.	  The quantity should be increased, since gold
 
and silver would be remitted to Great
 
Britain, causing an even larger need for a
 
domestic currency.
 
2.	  That whatever amount was redeemed was to be
 
reissued, multiplying the effect of the law.
 
3.	  To encourage circulation, a premium should
 
be given the public in the form of a lower
 
interest rate.
 
4.	  Too great a security for the loan will offer
 
little relief.  Ample security would be one-

half the value of lands and one-third the
 
value of homes.
 
5.	  A longer duration, beyond five years, would
 
be more advantageous.
 
At this time, the Assembly also received a petition
 
from "several Freeholders, and Inhabitants of this
 
Province"80 advancing roughly identical amendments as the
 
Governor with the exception of a recommendation that the
 
new currency be made legal tender for all contracts.
 
After a series of votes, Pennsylvania passed an act on
 
March 2, 1723, authorizing its first emission of paper
 
78Ibid., pp.1474-77.
 
79Yoder, in "Paper Currency in Colonial Pennsylvania,"
 
makes an important observation:  "Very few relations of
 
this kind [that is a provincial governor joining with the
 
Assembly to pass an act contrary to both England and the
 
proprietorship] can be found between colonial governors
 
and assemblies." p. 37.
 
80Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 1477. 38 
M
  money.  Supported by Francis Rawle and Governor Keith,
 
the Act was to become the foundation upon which thirty
 
years of Pennsylvania currency legislation would be
 
fashioned.
 
The preamble of the statute plainly laid out the
 
problem and the objective:
 
Forasmuch as through the extreme scarcity of
 
money the trade of this Province is greatly
 
lessened and obstructed, and the payment of the
 
public debts of this government rendered
 
exceedingly difficult, and likely so to continue,
 
unless some medium of commerce be by law made
 
current instead of money.
 
The Act82 called for emitting £15,000 in bills of credit
 
for eight years at an interest rate of five percent.  One-

eighth the principle borrowed and all per annum interest
 
were to be paid by the mortgagor to the General Loan Office
 
annually.  The bills were not to be recirculated but
 
destroyed.  Earned interest was to be used at the
 
discretion of the Assembly.  Security on property held in
 
good title by the mortgagor would consist of double the
 
value of land and three times the value of houses.  These
 
bills were deemed legal tender, acceptable for payment of
 
all debt.  If refused, the debt would become unrecoverable.
 
Strict fines, between £5 and £30, were to be levied for
 
81Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, pp. 324-338.  See
 
appendix-A for a reproduction of the currency.
 
82In accordance with the proprietary charter, all laws
 
were subject to veto or revocation by the King of England.
 
However, this bill was allowed to "lapse" into law two
 
months later without executive action.  Pennsylvania
 
Archives, 1st series, I, pp. 186-87.
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anyone charging a higher price to those individuals who
 
paid with the new paper currency rather than gold or
 
silver.  To assure that the benefit came to the poor, no
 
one person was to receive more than £100 or less than £12
 
10s.  The Act provided penalties for counterfeiters.
 
H.  Public Finance Provisions
 
As the preamble suggested, the motive for the currency 
emission was twofold.  Pennsylvania's government had need 
for capital, too.  The Provincial treasury was authorized 
the sum of £2,500 to "provide for the support of this 
government [which support has] proved deficient for these 
two years last passed, and sundry debts, claimed as debts 
due from this Province, remain yet unpaid.  . ."83 
Additionally, £1,000 were to be given to the treasurer of 
the county of Philadelphia, £200 to the treasurer of Bucks 
country, and £300 to the treasurer of Chester county.  This 
money was to be used to complete much needed public works 
projects in those locales.  Both the Provincial and the 
local "loans" were to be sunk by specific, newly legislated 
taxes.  In total, £4,000 or 27 percent of the £15,000 Act 
was loaned to government, leaving £11,000 to be loaned for
 
private use.
 
Immediately following this first emission on March 2,
 
1723, another Act" reduced the interest rate from the
 
83The Provincial Debt at this time stood at £2,570.
 
84Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, III, 338-339.
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original official rate of eight percent to six percent per
 
annum.  Governor Keith prompted this change by reminding
 
the assembly of the importance of a lower interest rate to
 
encourage circulation and provide relief to the province's
 
debtors.  The assembly was more than willing to incorporate
 
such a politically popular idea.  Not only would the lower
 
rate spur the economy, but it would also give those who
 
received currency a one percent premium compared to the new
 
legal rate.
 
I.  The General Loan Office
 
The enabling Act created a loan office to be admin­
istered by four trustees appointed by the Assembly as
 
stipulated in the Act.  All trustees were required  to take
 
an oath of office and to provide for a £500 bond.85  The
 
Provincial treasurer was to ensure their full compliance
 
with the explicit provisions of the Act.  The "chief intent
 
of appointing the said trustees is in order to enable them
 
to lend the said bills on security of lands at low
 
interest."86  One trustee, appointed to serve as
 
"principle acting trustee," was required to keep a "true
 
account" of all funds for the legislature.  The remaining
 
trustees acted primarily as loan officers; they were given
 
powers to negotiate loans, ascertain the value of
 
securities, receive mortgage payments and "sell, grant,
 
mLater changed to one thousand pounds.
 
Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, III, p. 393.
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align and dispose of the same [mortgaged property] in
 
default of payment.  "87 
J.  The "Inevitable" Agitation for More
 
In 1726 the Assembly sent its perceptions of the
 
success of the first Pennsylvanian currency issue of 1723
 
to England as explanation or justification for their
 
action.
 
The whole Quantity that was struck thus in a very
 
short Time emitted and diffused into the Peoples
 
Hands, the Face of our Affairs appeared entirely
 
changed; Traders exerted themselves; the Produce
 
of our Country came into demand, and bore a
 
Price, whereby the People were better enabled to
 
pay the Proprietary's Quitrent, and answer other
 
Demands; our City fill'd again with Inhabitants;
 
Artificers found Employment; our British Trade
 
increased; and Strangers, from the Encouragement
 
of finding ready Pay, resorted to us, Ship­
building was vigorously carried on; and both our
 
Ship-wrights Yards, and our Port, were fill'd
 
with Shipping, insomuch, that this Present Year
 
[1723], as appears from the List of Registers,
 
double the Number of vessels have been built at
 
Philadelphia, that had been in any Year before a
 
Paper Currency:  And by the Naval-Officer's
 
Books, we find, that the Tons of Shipping,
 
cleared at the same Port in 1722, have amounted
 
to no more than 3531; this Year there have been
 
already cleared 6655 Tons, besides several large
 
Vessels yet in Port, that are to sail before the
 
Year expires.m
 
It was only a matter of months, when in early May of
 
1723 the Assembly received a petition from the "Inhabitants
 
,  392.
 
mPennsylvania Archives, 8th series, pp. 1827-1831.
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of the City of Philadelphia" desiring "ten or Fifteen
 
thousand pounds more, in bills of Credit."89
 
Even Francis Rawle was shocked by what happened next.
 
Movement on the issue of paper money had not been quick
 
enough for the voters.  Only eighteen of the legislature's
 
twenty-six members were reelected.  "Paper money was the
 
major political issue in 1723.""  In October of that
 
year, the new Assembly had no question of its mandate.
 
Voter impatience at the polls, which was magnified by the
 
severity of depression, translated into a radical victory.
 
Even Francis Rawle lost influence.  David Lloyd, the
 
speaker of the House, took over as legislative leader of
 
the paper money cause.  A petition from the "sundry
 
Freeholders and Inhabitants of the City and County of
 
Philadelphia" illustrates best the perception surrounding
 
the first emission:  "That the Bills of Credit, already
 
struck are found far short of answering as running Cash,
 
&c. and not sufficient to supply one fourth Part of the
 
Inhabitants that are in Want, and have good Security to
 
give, and praying that a further Supply may be
 
struck..."91  In December of 1723, seven months after the
 
first paper money bill, the new Assembly acted with the
 
89Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 1534. 
90/oder, "Paper Currency in Colonial Pennsylvania," p.

42.  Yoder gives an exception analysis of this change in
 
his dissertation.
 
91Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, pp. 1541-42.
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explicit approval of the Governor.  The assembly stated
 
that their first emission:
 
being emitted, their Effect very sensibly
 
appeared, in giving new life to Business, and
 
raising the Country, in some Measure, from its
 
languishing State; but at the same time it was
 
also manifest, that tho' the Method was effectual
 
in its Kind, yet the Currency fell short in
 
Quantity, and was in nowise proportioned to the
 
Occasions of the People, nor sufficient to
 
circulate the Bulk of our Trade; therefore the
 
Legislature on December 12, 1723 being enabled by
 
the first Experiment to form a more exact
 
Judgement of what circumstances of the Country
 
and our Commerce would require, found it
 
necessary to strike Thirty Thousand Pounds more,
 
on the like Securities of real Estate, to be
 
pledged in the same Manner [as in the first
 
paper-money act].
 
K.  The Second Paper Money Act of 1723
 
The language and content of the new currency
 
statute93 closely resembled that of the first.  Notable
 
changes included extending the length of repayment from
 
eight to twelve and one half years and increasing the
 
amount any one individual could borrow from £100 to £200.
 
In addition, the Provincial treasurer was to deliver the
 
sum of £1300 for payment of "any order of Assembly."  The
 
sinking was to be previously levied by taxes and impost and
 
in excise tax on imported Negroes, "persons convicted of
 
heinous crimes," and "an excise on all wines,  rum, brandy,
 
and other spirits."  Finally, £1000 was to be delivered to
 
92Ibid., pp. 1828 and 1829.
 
0
 Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, III, 389-407. See
 
appendix-A for a reproduction of the currency.
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the County of Philadelphia, £300 to the City of
 
Philadelphia, £400 to the county treasurer of Chester, and
 
£200 to the treasurer of Bucks county.  In total, £3,200 or
 
11 percent of the £30,000 Act was loaned  to government
 
which left £26,800 to be lent for private use.
 
L.  The Proprietary Response
 
In March 1724, Hanna Penn," in instructions to
 
Governor Keith, addressed specifically the colony's
 
issuance of paper money.  She did not hide her disdain of
 
the governor's actions regarding the role he played
 
influencing the creation of Pennsylvania's first paper
 
money.  She suggested to the Governor that "...it may be
 
worthy of thy own Reflection to consider Whether much of
 
thy late Conduct, together with so apparent Neglect of us,
 
might not give us too much Reason to doubt whether thou did
 
look upon they Self to be any longer accountable to us..."
 
Regarding paper money specifically, she told Keith
 
As to the Acts for a Paper-Credit, tho the
 
Merchants here inveigh very much against them and
 
the Manner of passing them, has given us Reason
 
to be dissatisfied, and might have tempted us to
 
have had them repeal'd (which was easily
 
practicable) yet upon a mature Deliberation we
 
have resolved to suffer the passing them, yet
 
this full Expectation that all possible
 
(unintelligible] are be taken to Support their
 
Credit by any farther Acts that may be necessary
 
for that Purpose, and all other Means that
 
conduce to that End.  But we hope and expect that
 
thou will never give thy Assent to the passing
 
94In 1718, William Penn died leaving control of the
 
Proprietorship to his wife Hanna Penn.
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any law for the creating any more such Paper­
Credit.95
 
Keith had for some time realized that the best
 
interests of Pennsylvania and the proprietorship were
 
different.  The letter from Hanna Penn was no surprise.
 
Provincial conservatives convinced Hanna Penn that he was
 
no longer an asset to the proprietorship.  Keith wrote the
 
assembly:
 
I have, indeed, sufficient Grounds, in general,
 
to believe that my particular Conduct in passing
 
some Bills [paper money] that were presented to
 
me from your House, has been grossly
 
misrepresented to the Proprietary's Family,
 
which, if not speedily rectified, may probably
 
terminate in a Change of your present
 
Governor;96
 
Keith would not be the last governor to have his tenure
 
jeopardized by the Penn family over the issue of paper
 
money.  But he was the first; he was discharged on July
 
9th, 1726.
 
M.  Remittance and Replacement
 
An Act97 was passed in March 1726 for remitting and
 
continuing the currency of the bills as they came back into
 
the loan office and for replacing any bills which had
 
become too torn or defaced to continue in circulation.
 
This Act provided for a replacement emission of £10,000,
 
95Hanna Penn's Letter of Instruction to Sir William 
Keith, 1724, Evan's Bibliography, #2576. 
96Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 1591. 
97Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, III, pp. 38-51. 46 
which would not change the total amount in circulation,
 
which stood at £45,000.  The obvious logic was to rectify
 
the "daily impairing, many of them [bills of credit which]
 
are scarce fit to pass; which inconveniences increasing,
 
will shortly reduce the people of this Province to great
 
straits and difficulties..."  In this bill, the Assembly
 
noted the fact that especially the "lesser denominations"
 
were affected by wear, a perhaps casual indication of the
 
currency's success.  This Act was to be one of the last
 
approved by Pennsylvania's "champion" of paper money,
 
Governor William Keith.  Hanna Penn, chose to replace the
 
Lt. Governor98 with Major Patrick Gordon in the spring of
 
1726.  Keith's support of paper money was perhaps the major
 
factor in his dismissal.
 
N.  Royal Instructions
 
On May 11, 1726, Governor Gordon received a letter
 
from The Board of Trade which stated that, out of
 
tenderness for those persons whose hands the bills of
 
credit had passed, all Acts previously passed for issuing
 
paper money would not be laid before the King for
 
disallowance.  Still, future bills of credit would be
 
opposed by the Board.  Noteworthy was the relative
 
passivity of England's bureaucracy at this time.  Perhaps
 
this was due to the Assembly's maintaining a Colonial agent
 
98For a more complete account of Sir Keith's dismissal
 
and subsequent career in the assembly please see Charles
 
P. Keith's Chronicles of Pennsylvania, pp. 670-689.
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in London appointed by the assembly to negotiate the Royal
 
allowance of Provincial laws.  The agent may have
 
forestalled any action by the British government having an
 
adverse effect on the paper money experiment.99
 England
 
would never offer a remedy to the currency problems of the
 
Colonies.100  Each colony, like Pennsylvania,  would be
 
forced to formulate and to defend its monetary actions to
 
the King. 101  England "held the deep-seated principle that
 
paper money violated a presumed economic axiom.
 It was
 
inherently unsound and probably corrupt.
  Since it had no
 
underlying base, paper currency was certain to depreciate
 
in value and disrupt, if not destroy, any economy. "102
 
0.  The 1729 Issue
 
In early 1728, business and trade again entered a
 
period of depression.
  "From 1724 to 1729, the amount of
 
"Pennsylvania Archives 8th series., 1591.
 
"°Leslie V. Brock,  Currencies of the American
 
Colonies, 1700-1764,  p. 562.
 
wiThis is probably due to the fact that England
 
herself faced surprisingly similar conditions to those in
 
the colonies, which prompted Roger W. Weiss, (1970) "The

Issue of Paper Money in the American Colonies, 1720-1774,"

Journal of Economic History,  vol. XXX, no. 4 (Dec.):
  770­
784. to suggest that "...American historians have too
 
often overlooked the similarities of monetary problems on
 
both sides of the Atlantic." p. 784.
 
102Perkins, The Economy of Colonial America, p. 168.
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paper money in circulation declined" in Pennsylvania while
 
the rise in population expanded the Province westward."3
 
In February 1728, the Pennsylvania Gazette stated:
 
Money here seems very scarce.
  Trade has been
 
long in a deep Consumption,  her Nerves relax'd,

her Spirits languid, her Joints have grown so
 feeble, that she
 
has had of late so terrible a Fall that she now
 lies bleeding in a very deplorable condition.104
 
Table 3
 
Population, 1715-1722
 
Year  Population
 
1710
  24,400
 
1715
  31,000
 
1720
  31,000
 
1723  40,564
 
1730
  51,7001°
 
This decline set the stage for Benjamin Franklin's
 
political entrance and his adoption of the paper money
 
issue as his primary modus operandi for his entry into
 
politics.
 
103Lester, (1938)
 "Currency Issues to Overcome
 Depressions," Journal of Political Economy, vol. XLVI,
 (Feb-Dec):  pp. 358-59.
 
104Pennsylvania Gazette, No. IX, February 18,
  1728.
 
105This
  table was created from two sources:
  John J.
 McCusker & Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British
 America, 1607-1789,  p. 203. whose original source was the
 U.S. Bureau of Census,  and Leslie V. Brock's,  The Currency
 of the American Colonies 1700-1764, p. 74.
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P.
  Benjamin Franklin's Casual Observation and Pamphlet
 
With the death of Francis Rawle in 1727, Benjamin
 
Franklin became the leading advocate of paper money in the
 
Colony.
  Since Franklin left Boston for Philadelphia in
 
the fall of 1723, he had become a keen observer of
 
Pennsylvania economic and political life.
 He later
 
recounted the conditions he found upon his arrival at
 
Pennsylvania:
 
About this time there was a cry among the people

for more paper money, only fifteen thousand
 
pounds being extant in the Province, and that

soon to be sunk.  The wealthy inhabitants oppos'd

any addition, being against all paper currency,

from an apprehension that it would depreciate,
  as
 it had done in New England, to the prejudice of

all creditors.
  We had discusse'd this point in
 
our Junto,um where I was on the side of an
 
addition, being persuaded that the first small
 
sum struck in 1723 had done much good by

increasing the trade,  employment, and number of

inhabitants in the Province,  and since I now saw
 all the old houses inhabited and many new ones

building:  whereas I remembered well,  that when I
 
first walk'd about the streets of Philadelphia,

eating my roll, I saw most of the houses in
 
Walnut Street, between Second and Front streets,

with bills on their doors, 'To be Let'; and many
 likewise in Chestnut-street and other streets,

which made me then think the inhabitants of the
 
city were deserting it one after another.107
 
By April 1729, Franklin,  "possess'd...so fully on the
 
subject," felt compelled to publish anonymously a pamphlet
 
entitled A Modest Enquiry into the Nature and Necessity of
 
106The
  Junto was a society which Franklin organized

among his youthful friends at Philadelphia for the

discussion of civic problems.
 
107Franklin, The Autobiography, Franklin Writings, p.
 1367.
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a Paper Money advocating another issue of paper
 
currency.108  "It was by far the ablest and most original
 
treatise that had been written on the subject up to 1728,
 
and it was probably the most widely read work on paper
 
currency that appeared in Colonial America. Il109  In his
 
pamphlet, Franklin states concisely:  "There is a certain
 
proportionate Quantity of Money requisite to carry  on the
 
Trade of a Country freely and currently; More than which
 
would be of no Advantage in Trade, and Less, if much less,
 
exceedingly_ detrimental to it. "110  As he viewed it, the
 
correlation that existed between lack of currency and  a
 
high rate of interest were "prejudicial to a Country."1
 
Together they formed the main detriment to investment,
 
production, and trade.  After all, why would "Men be
 
inclined to venture their Money...when they can have a
 
great and certain Profit" through high interest loans.112
 
"A plentiful Currency will occasion Interest to be low"
 
108This  pamphlet has been widely reproduced in a
 
variety of sources including:  Evan's Bibliography which
 
contains a microfiche copy of the original; Herman E.
 
Krooss' Documentary History of Banking and Currency in the
 
United States, pp. 24-36, and J.A. Leo LeMay's Writings of
 
Benjamin Franklin, p. 119-135.
 
109Carey, Franklin's Economic Views, p. 7.
 
110Herman Krooss, Documentary History of Banking and
 
Currency in the United States, p. 24.
 
111Ibid., p. 24
 
112Ibid.
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which will stimulate investment, especially in land.113
 
Produce from that land will "enliven Trade exceedingly,"
 
but "nothing makes more bad Paymasters than a general
 
Scarcity of Money. 014  Scarcity of money discourages
 
labor of all kinds, and it eventually leads to an out-

migration from the Province of men seeking better or
 
prompter pay.  With this out-migration, land will
 
inevitably depreciate through a lack of demand.115  "Want
 
of Money" leads to a greater consumption of European Goods
 
since few investments are made in domestic production.
 
What is produced can only be traded to the merchant rather
 
than sold.  Thus, a "plentiful Currency" lessens the
 
balance of payment deficits by encouraging domestic
 
production and trade as opposed to a reliance on
 
imports.116  Additional currency should not dissuade
 
merchants.  In fact, more currency will cause the Province
 
to increase in population, and merchants will thus see
 
overall demand for imports rise.  It is because of
 
increased trade, Franklin argued, that Great Briton should
 
support the addition to paper money. 117  Even the
 
Proprietorship would benefit by the rise in the value of
 
113Ibid., p. 25
 
luIbid., p. 26.
 
115Ibid., p. 26.
 
116Ibid., pp. 26-27.
 
117Ibid., p. 29.
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land, which was of primary interest in the Province.118
 
Improved land helps the owner, and it also acts as a better
 
form of security against what has been loaned to it by the
 
Province as it rises in value. "If, as a currency, it saves
 
one Fourth Part of the Time and Labour of a Country; it
 
has, on that Account, one Fourth added to its original
 
Value," not to mention being "lighter in Carriage...and
 
therefore safer..."119  Franklin taunts in conclusion:
 
"...And as we all know there are among us several Gentlemen
 
of acute Parts. and profound Learning, who are very much
 
against any Addition to our Money, if it were it be wished
 
that they would favour the Country with their Sentiments on
 
this Head in Print...[otherwise] people knowing the
 
abilities of the Gentlemen...are apt to construe their
 
silence in This, as an Argument of a bad One."120
 
In the early 1770s, while writing his autobiography in
 
England, Franklin reflected on the influence of his
 
pamphlet and its effect on the 1729 issue of paper money.
 
Franklin wrote:
 
It [Franklin's pamphlet] was well receiv'd by the
 
common people in general; but the rich men
 
dislik'd it, for it increas'd and strengthen'd
 
the clamor for more money, and they happening to
 
have no writers among them that were able to
 
answer it, their opposition slacken'd, and the
 
point was carried by a majority in the House.  My
 
friends there, who conceiv'd I had been of some
 
118Ibid., p. 28.
 
p. 33.
 
120Ibid.,
  P. 36.
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service, thought fit to reward me by employing me
 
in printing the money; a very profitable job and
 
a great help to me.  This was another advantage
 
gain'd by my being able to write.121
 
Supporting what Franklin considered the "advantage
 
gain'd by [his] being able to write" was the experience he
 
brought with him from Massachusetts, the first of the
 
British Colonies to issue paper money. 122  From 1720 to
 
1721, Massachusetts saw the publication of seventeen
 
pamphlets dealing with paper money.  In fact, two of these
 
pamphlets were printed by James Franklin, who taught the
 
printing trade to his brother Benjamin. "Benjamin Franklin
 
probably had a hand in the printing of these pamphlets and
 
seems to have obtained ideas on the subject from them."123
 
The pamphlets included comments, for example, on securing
 
the issue of money with mortgaged real estate, on the
 
unfavorable balance of trade that existed with Great
 
Briton, and on what became Franklin's favorite subject, the
 
colonists' extravagant consumption of foreign goods. It is
 
certain he was not unaware of all levels of discussion,
 
debate, and method surrounding Massachusetts' paper money.
 
121Franklin, The Autobiography, Franklin Writings,  p.
 
1368.
 
122The discussion of Franklin's previous experience
 
with paper money has been drawn from Carey, Franklin's
 
Economic Views, pp. 1-36.  Carey's observations may be
 
somewhat biased against both fiat money, and Franklin.
 
This quote nicely illustrates this point of caution:
 
"Franklin's pamphlet may now be severely criticized for
 
advocating what proved to be a most pernicious economic
 
evil." p. 14.
 
123Ibid., p. 1.
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He brought with him to Pennsylvania well-formed ideas
 
regarding currency.
 
It should be noted, of course, that another facet of 
Franklin's interest derived from the "fact that he had 
formed a partnership with Hugh Meredith in the printing 
business at Philadelphia...[and] hoped to gain favor with 
the paper money party so that if an Act to emit more bills 
were passed by the Assembly he might secure the printing of 
the issue. II 124  In the end, Franklin saw the printing of 
money as "especially 
lucrative," but he also saw how desperately important it 
was to the Province as a whole. 
Q.	  1729 Debate in the Assembly and Negotiations with the
 
Governor
 
Beginning in 1728 and continuing through 1729,
 
petitions from "the Inhabitants of the City and County of
 
Philadelphia" and from "Bucks County" were presented to the
 
Assembly, all requesting a "further Supply of a Paper
 
Currency.  025  Newspapers followed the emerging debate
 
closely, mainly by publishing the Assembly's record of
 
correspondence with the Governor. 126
 
124Ibid  p. 6. 
125Ibid., pp. 1867, 1876, 1879, 1914, 1917.
 
126See
  The American Weekly Mercury, March 30th, 1727,
 
No. 379; May 16th, 1728, no. 437; April 17, 1729, no. 484;
 
October 30, 1729, no. 512; November 6th, 1729,  no. 513;
 
February 3rd, 1730, no. 526.
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The Assembly proceeded in a manner similar to the
 
earlier discussions of paper money bills.  Late in 1728,
 
the Assembly proposed and then delivered to committee a
 
plan to emit £50,000 at four percent interest for a period
 
of sixteen years.  The bill, sent to the Governor for
 
approval, contained a clause providing for "five hundred
 
Pounds be the Sum to be given to the Governor, in Part of
 
his Support for this current Year.  "127  Governor Patrick 
Gordon's views on paper money differed from those of former
 
Governor Keith, and he sought a more conservative bill.  He
 
was mindful of the response of England and the Proprietary
 
family to any new paper money Act.  Gordon told the
 
Assembly:
 
That there is Occasion for more of that Currency
 
amongst us, I am fully persuaded; and I heartily
 
wish there were no Objections against making a
 
reasonable Addition to it immediately: But there
 
are some which so nearly affect the very Being of
 
our Currency, that I cannot believe, by the Tenor
 
of this Bill, that they have as yet been
 
sufficiently considered...[But] You cannot be
 
insensible, gentlemen, that the publick Business,
 
in Britain, is transacted by proper Councils or
 
Boards...It is therefore absolutely necessary,
 
Gentlemen, that we should very seriously consider
 
what Means we can use, that a reasonable
 
Expectation of Success can be founded on, to
 
procure any addition, without hazarding the Loss
 
of the Bills...As for my Part, I am so fully
 
convinced of the Conveniences that would attend
 
the further Emission of such a moderate Addition
 
to our Currency, as would not endanger the
 
Sinking of its Credit, that I shall as willingly
 
promote it as any Man...but this can never be
 
127Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 1928. 56 
without shewing a due deference to the Royal
 
Authority...  128 
To this end, the Governor proposed amendments to the 
bill  to reduce the emission from £50,000 to £25,000, raise 
the interest rate to five percent from the proposed four 
percent, reduce the term to 10 years, and add the provision 
that the proprietary quitrent and sterling payments be 
exempt from legal tender provisions, making them payable 
only in silver or gold.  Accompanying the amendments was 
the Governor's qualification that the Assembly should 
expect that any paper money bill would be disallowed by the 
King. 129  A somewhat contemptible consideration of the 
Governor's amendments by the Assembly prompted the Governor 
to respond by declaring "I can scarce express my 
Astonishment, upon perusing the Bill...when I observe there 
is not the least Amendment in any of the material 
points...except the Abatement of the Sum of Fifty to Forty 
Thousand Pounds..."  The Governor concluded that the 
Assembly saw "little danger of a Repeal" in England.  In 
the likely event a repeal occurred, "the peoples 
Disappointment" would not lie, he stated, at his door.138 
128Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series,  pp. 1933-1936.
 
Also see the same series at pp. 1943 & 1963, in which Gov.
 
Gordon states:  "I have openly declared myself a Friend of
 
our Paper Currency..."
 
129Pennsylvania Archives, 4th series,  I, pp. 457-459.
 
130Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, 1943-44. 57 
On May 10, 1729, the Governor conceded to passage of
 
the currency bill131 in direct contradiction of the
 
instructions of the Lords of Trade.  It should be
 
remembered that in 1726 the Board of Trade had warned
 
Pennsylvania's governor and assembly that any future paper
 
money bills would be opposed, and sent to the King for
 
disallowment.  However, both the governor and the assembly
 
chose to ignore such advice.  The 1729 Act authorized the
 
emission of £30,000 paper money at five percent interest.
 
The total issue was £20,000 less than first proposed by the
 
assembly.  The term of the bills was to be sixteen years,
 
with no one individual able to borrow over £300.  Repayment
 
would consist of yearly installments by the mortgagor of
 
one-sixteenth of the principle including the accrual of
 
annual interest.  Of the authorized amount, £26,000 was to
 
be placed on loan.  The remaining £4,000 was for the use of
 
government.  One thousand pounds was loaned to the
 
Provincial treasurer to be repaid in £100 annual
 
installments from the interest money paid by previous
 
emissions.  One thousand pounds went to the City of
 
Philadelphia for an almshouse, to be repaid from a tax.
 
Also, £2,000 was to be loaned to a commission for erecting
 
a building in Philadelphia for the use of the assembly.  It
 
u"Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, IV,  pp. 98-116.
 
See appendix B for a reproduction of the currency.
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was to be repaid in £200 annual installments, again out of
 
the interest money accrued from previous emissions.
 
Benjamin Franklin was given the job of printing the
 
emission, and he secured at the same time appointment as
 
the printer of the laws and votes of the Pennsylvania
 
Assembly.  It is little wonder that his newspaper, The
 
Pennsylvania Gazette, published the following:
 
We have the agreeable News to acquaint our 
Country-Readers with, that our Right Honorable 
Governor has Graciously condescended to pass an 
Act for Thirty Thousand Pounds more of Paper­
Currency,...As this extraordinary Goodness of his 
Honour did more than ordinary affect the 
Publisher hereof [Samuel Keimer], even into Tears 
of Joy, so 'tis earnestly hop'd, (considering the 
Great Opposition made against Paper-Currency at 
home) it will fill every considerate Person with 
the utmost Respect, Honour, Love, and Obedience 
to Him, his Council, &c. and that all our Party-
Feuds will henceforth vanish, and all our Strife 
be to love and assist one another; then while 
other Parts are under the Chastisement of Heaven, 
as several new are, we shall flourish under the 
Blessing of Providence, as formerly.  Tis very 
remarkable and worth Observation by all, that 
during this late Scarcity of Money several 
Gentlemen of the Law have prevented any Actions 
being brought against honest Traders, (to their 
everlasting Honour be it spoken) and that the 
Number of Writs on the Docket have been 
considerably less of late than in distant times 
when Money was more Plenty.  132 
The Assembly, however, thought it worthwhile to report
 
to the Penn family regarding the passage of the Currency
 
Act of 1729:
 
We the Representatives of all the Freemen in this
 
your Province,... found ourselves obligated, by
 
the loud and uncommon Cries of the whole Country,
 
to take into Consideration the State of our
 
132Pennsylvania Gazette, No. XXI, May 15, 1729. 59 
Currency, and the universal Complaints of the
 
Scarcity thereof amongst all Ranks of his
 
Majesty's Subjects here:  And it evidently
 
appeared to us, that by the great Increase of the
 
Inhabitants, the Bills of Credit, which some
 
Years since were issued, being diffused into
 
numerous Hands, fall very far short of being
 
sufficient to answer the Ends of a Medium of
 
Commerce for making the Requisite Payments in
 
Business; by Reason whereof Trade seemed to be
 
almost at a Stand, Manufactures were discouraged,
 
and the whole Country languished.  We therefore
 
finding ourselves under a Necessity, in Discharge
 
of the Trust reposed in us, for removing these
 
heavy Pressures, to make a farther Provision of
 
that Currency, by emitting the Sum of Thirty
 
Thousand Pounds more, to be issued on loan, as
 
formally, on a double Security of a clear Estate
 
in Lands or Houses, at the annual Interest of
 
five per Cent, and to be wholly sunk in the Term
 
of Sixteen Years.
 
We are very sensible, may it please our
 
Proprieties, of the strong Prejudices that have
 
been taken up against this Sort of Currency...But
 
if Experience be allowed to be the surest
 
Instructor, it is now manifest, from nothing has
 
ever so much contributed to advance Trade,
 
Navigation, the Price of Lands, and the general
 
Interest of the whole Colony; for we may very
 
justly say, that the Effects of it were no less
 
visible amongst us, than those of a plentiful
 
Shower of Rain to the Earth, after it had lain
 
long parched and dried up for want of Moisture.
 
Nor from that Experience does it appear, that any
 
one Inconvenience worth mentioning has
 
ensured.133
 
The legislative record does not contain a Penn family
 
response to the assembly's petition.  But it is reasonable
 
to assume that the Penn's were not pleased with either the
 
bill or such an ex-post facto justification.  The
 
disregard, by the assembly as well as the governor, of Penn
 
133Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, pp. 2477-78.
 
Noteworthy about this address is that it was not published
 
in the Votes and Proceedings until 1738.
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and Royal instructions was something that could not be
 
tolerated.  The Penn's resorted to employing a more dutiful
 
and loyal governor to protect their interests against the
 
colonists.
 
R.  Final Remarks of the First Seven Years
 
Thus ended Pennsylvania's initial seven year
 
experiment with paper money.  The relative ease with which
 
the Assembly and the Executive had worked together would
 
soon become ancient history.  Never again would cooperation
 
on this issue or any other be so amiable.  The Penn
 
Proprietary and the Quaker Assembly would begin an intense
 
battle for the very soul of Pennsylvania.
 
What had transpired in the first ten years of
 
Pennsylvania's effort to acquire paper money cannot be
 
underestimated.  Francis Rawle's plan for the issuance of
 
paper money, as fine-tuned and implemented by the assembly
 
and Benjamin Franklin, proved remarkably sound.  In fact,
 
the system worked so well that additional amounts of
 
currency could be injected without threatening the
 
integrity of the entire system.  This was done twice, once
 
with the second issue of 1723 and then the later issue of
 
1729.  The system even accommodated the remittance and
 
replacement of certain quantities of bills.  In less than
 
ten years, a viable, perpetuating, land-backed system of
 
currency had been created and perfected to meet largely the
 
private needs of the developing province.  In stark
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contrast, the next crucial period for Pennsylvania's
 
currency history became that province's demand for large
 
quantities of public rather than private funds.  War would
 
replace trade deficits and economic conditions as the
 
reasons for issuing paper money.
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CHAPTER III
 
THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR AND WAR FINANCE
 
A.  The Interim
 
No additional amounts of paper money were issued in
 
Pennsylvania during the decade after 1729.  In fact, "one
 
looks in vain for any complaints or petitions to the
 
Pennsylvania Assembly about the 'decay of trade' or the
 
`scarcity of money' during the decade following the
 
currency issue of 1729.°34
 
The Assembly did provide for re-lending of all bills
 
in 1731 as they were repaid.135  "As a result, the sum in
 
circulation remained constant at E68,890 until 1739.036
 
In circulation were £45,000 from the two 1723 paper money
 
acts and an additional £30,000 from the 1729 act.137  All
 
outstanding bills were, reprinted in 1739.  An additional
 
£11,110 of new bills were emitted, increasing the overall
 
134Lester, (1938) "Currency Issues in Pennsylvania,"
 
Journal of Political Economy, p. 368.
 
135Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, IV, pp. 197-208.
 
136Brock, The Currency of the American Colonies,
 
p. 81.
 
137Note, the difference between the total issued of
 
£75,000 and the actual amount in circulation of £68,890,
 
represents £6,110 in redemptions or more appropriately
 
mortgage payments that occurred before 1731 when the
 
assembly began re-issuing rather than destroying all
 
redeemed bills.
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Provincial total to £80,000 of paper currency.138  Until
 
1739, every addition to the currency in Pennsylvania was
 
made chiefly for the purpose of combating depression.  The
 
state of the economy was the logic which drove her paper
 
money for over 16 years.
 
The British government was not at all convinced in
 
1740 that all of the Colonies were using their domestic
 
economic conditions as justification to issue paper money.
 
The New England Colonies by ignoring moderation in their
 
emissions were harming British merchants, especially by
 
causing rapid currency inflation.  The English government
 
acted through the Privy Council, which issued Royal
 
instructions to Colonial Governors calling for all future
 
money bills to contain a suspending clause preventing
 
emissions until approval in England.139  "This order in
 
effect prevented any further issues of paper money in
 
Pennsylvania (with the exception of £5,000 for defense
 
allowed by Governor Thomas in 1746) until the demands of
 
war after 1754 opened the gates and forced the Governors
 
to accept paper money legislation without suspending
 
1,140
 clauses.
 
VAPennsylvania Statutes at Large, pp. 344-359.  See
 
appendix-B for a reproduction of the currency.
 
139Leonard W. Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions to
 
British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776, I, pp. 218-219.
 
1"Theodore Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the
 
Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776, p. 26.
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Beginning in 1746 and throughout the next 18 years,
 
paper money and defense were inextricably linked.
 
Pennsylvania's defense became crucial as the Indian Six-

Nations joined the French to stem the westward expansion
 
of the English colonists by driving them from the Ohio
 
Valley.  Governor George Thomas was forwarded a request,
 
in 1746, by the Duke of Newcastle, asking Pennsylvania to
 
"provide a sufficient Quantity of Provisions for the
 
Subsistence of the Troops" who are "to be employed in the
 
immediate Reduction of Canada, in Concert with Troops to
 
be raised in the Northern Colonies. Hui  The Quaker-

dominated Assembly had natural reservations about such
 
"warlike Enterprizes" which they believed were
 
"inconsistent with [their] peaceable Principles."  Out of
 
"loyalty" and "hearty Affection" to the Crown, the
 
Assembly saw fit in this instance to grant "a Sum of Money
 
to the King's use."  Of significance "is the fact that the
 
Quaker Party did not [ever] withhold military defense from
 
the frontier...When the passage of urgent defense bills
 
was delayed in the Assembly, the outcropping of the long-

standing disputes between the proprietors and the
 
province, rather than Quaker pacifism, was
 
responsible."142  But, in this instance, since neither
 
141Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 3093.
 
1 42Theodore Thayer, "The Quaker Party of Pennsylvania,
 
1755-65," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography,
 
vol. LXXI (Jan) 1947, pp. 19-20.
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the Provincial Treasury nor the Loan Office had the 
necessary funds, the only "Way by which a Sum c[ould] be 
speedily raised" was by issuing "a further Quantity of 
Paper Money. if 143  Governor Thomas was reluctant to 
approve an assembly measure for that purpose since:  a) It 
did not contain a clause restraining its operation until 
approved by the King.  And b) It would further lessen the 
value, he believed, of paper money already in circulation. 
He suggested to the Assembly that the best source of funds 
would be either future excise tax earnings or interest 
from bills of credit already issued.  The Assembly replied 
that the Governor should reconsider the Royal instructions 
in this "extraordinary Emergency."  The planned emission 
of £5,000, would not greatly effect the rate of exchange 
as the Governor claimed, since it would only represent six 
percent of the total bills in circulation.  Finally, the 
Assembly stated that neither the excise Act nor interest 
from previously emitted bills was sufficient to defray the 
appropriation.  144  The Governor responded by stating that 
he would approve of the emission, although he preferred a 
larger one, if a "Provincial Tax" was passed sinking the 
amount issued.145  After all, he argued, the Province had 
not seen such a tax in over 20 years. 
143 Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 3094. 
144Ibid., p. 3097. 
p. 3101.
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In the end, Thomas assented to a bill providing for
 
£5,000, to be paid directly to the Governor by the loan
 
office for the purpose of defense.146  The bills of
 
credit were to be immediately drawn from paper money on
 
hand at the loan office and yet to be loaned, and then
 
replaced by a new printing and emission of an additional
 
£5,000.  The Act was to be sunk out of the excise tax.147
 
Several observations can be made concerning the 1746
 
Act.  The statute was to become the first of many
 
instances in which Pennsylvania emitted paper money
 
without the backing of mortgaged land.  In other words,
 
the paper money or, more appropriately, fiat money, became
 
backed solely by the financial integrity of the Province
 
and not by mortgaged land or any other asset.  This became
 
a crucial turning point in the colony's currency history.
 
Pennsylvania's assembly felt that the only politically
 
feasible method of raising the required defense funds was
 
to issue paper money.  The alternatives to such a reliance
 
on paper money, such as a general property or excise tax,
 
were seen as unacceptable.  After all, Pennsylvania had
 
not seen a general property or notable excise tax since
 
the early 1720's.  Thus, Pennsylvania provided for defense
 
through a form of borrowing from her citizenry.  Paper
 
money was issued on the good credit of the province and
 
146See appendix-C for a reproduction of the currency.
 
147Ibid., p. 3098 and 3105.
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repaid at a future date through future taxation.  This
 
meant that wartime expenditures were paid for over an
 
extended period rather than by immediate and excessive
 
method of direct taxation.  Any new issue was thus only
 
recallable by direct taxation rather than through mortgage
 
payments.  Second, the assembly showed that interest
 
proceeds from the General Loan Office were highly coveted.
 
Over the last two decades, the assembly had grown
 
accustomed to spending the reservoir of interest money
 
that accrued to the loan office..  Defense expenditures
 
would have consumed the bulk of the interest funds
 
generated by the loan office and would have left the
 
assembly without a general fund that was constantly being
 
replenished.  Thus, the assemblymen were unwilling to
 
allocate interest payments for defense because not only
 
would this necessitate the need for a general property tax
 
to give the assembly funds, but such action would also
 
require the consent of the governor each time funds were
 
needed.  Through the interest income from the loan office,
 
the assembly had grown quite independent of any fiscal
 
control of the governor and they did not want to
 
jeopardize this luxury.  Third, Thomas and later Governors
 
began to look unrealistically to the loan office as a
 
source of unlimited funds.  All governors would envy the
 
interest fund used by the assembly for appropriations.
 
These governors would continually try to redirect
 
spending, such as with the case of defense, in an effort
 68 
to deprive the assembly of a large part of their financial
 
autonomy.  Fourth, the Province had provided for defense
 
without any contribution from the proprietorship.  They
 
knew taxation of proprietary lands would be improbable.
 
This meant that Pennsylvania's assembly was denied a
 
substantial tax-base by being unable to fairly tax all the
 
provinces lands due to the fact the Penn family was the
 
largest landholders in the province.  This was another
 
reason the assembly could not consider a general property
 
tax since the burden of such a tax would fall primarily on
 
the minority or non-proprietary landholders.  Finally, the
 
assembly would conclude that administration of loan funds
 
and the spending of interest did not need the consent of
 
the Governor.  The assembly viewed the governor's actions
 
as inconsequential when it came to deciding how best to
 
appropriate money.
 
Pennsylvania now had £85,000 of paper money, which
 
represented the largest amount of paper money in
 
circulation during the first half of the 18th century.
 
In June 1751, Pennsylvania's Assembly began to
 
foresee the threat of the French and their Indian allies,
 
which "naturally led to request the [financial] Assistance
 
of the Proprietaries... "148  To this request, which was
 
not answered until two years later in May of 1753, the
 
proprietors wrote that since the Assembly had not seen the
 
148 Pennsylvania Archives, 8th Series, pp. 3808-3826. 69 
need to impose a Provincial property tax encompassing all
 
of Pennsylvania's property owners,149 they saw little
 
need to contribute.  Why should they contribute to the
 
province when its own inhabitants were not required?  At
 
no time would the Penn family want the assembly to
 
consider their family resources as a source of provincial
 
funding.  For the Penns, the reality of the matter was
 
that Pennsylvania was a source of income, and never
 
expenditure.  Besides, the proprietors, as with the
 
governors, saw interest from paper money as more than
 
ample revenue to provide for the Province without any
 
proprietary help.  The notion that the proprietors should
 
be responsible for at least part of the costs of defense
 
revolved around the assembly's persistent view that the
 
Penn's had just as important a stake in Pennsylvania's
 
welfare or defense as ordinary Pennsylvanians.  The
 
Pennsylvania Assembly's insistence on some form of
 
proprietary defense contribution and the Penn's denial of
 
such funds led to a tenacious battle of wills throughout
 
the 1750s.
 
Provincial Pennsylvania faced another contentious foe
 
besides the proprietorship in its quest to print money for
 
the defense of the province.  The English Parliament, in
 
149Noteworthy is the fact that the Royal Charter did
 
not prohibit the Penn family estates from being taxed.
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1751, passed the Currency Act15° which, although applied
 
only to the New England Colonies, essentially put all
 
paper money in the colonies on the defensive with regard
 
to paper money.  Pennsylvania was able to avert this
 
regulation in return for a promise, from the Penns, that
 
the Assembly would not attempt any new expansion of their
 
currency.
151  However, the Currency Act proved
 
instrumental in guiding the paper money instructions set
 
by the Penn family to their appointed governors.  A
 
summary of the provisions of the Currency Act were:152
 
1.	  After September 29, 1751, it was to be
 
illegal for either the Assembly, Governor,
 
or Council to pass any further emission of
 
bills or for extending emissions already
 
outstanding.
 
2.	  All outstanding bills of credit were to be
 
retired at the end of their current term.
 
3.	  Colonies might issue "reasonable sums" of
 
bills of credit provided that at the time of
 
issue sufficient tax funds were established
 
to retire the bills within two years.
 
4.	  In the case of war or other extraordinary
 
emergencies of government, the expiration
 
date of an issue could be extended to five
 
years, rather than two.
 
1513Interestingly, this was an offshoot from "The
 
Bubble Act" of 1719, in which all further issues of bills
 
of credit were forbade in England after the collapse of a
 
"bank" of such funds.
 
151William S. Hanna, Benjamin Franklin and
 
Pennsylvania Politics, p. 41.
 
152The discussion of the Currency Act of  1751 was
 
drawn largely from Brock's analysis in The Currency of the
 
American Colonies, pp. 236-243.
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5.	  All bills of credit subsisting on loan
 
should be called in and sunk at the end of
 
their respective terms.
 
6.	  All borrowers were to be compelled to
 
discharge their mortgages and if need be
 
that would be accomplished by an equitable
 
tax levied to retire all further outstanding
 
bills.
 
7.	  No bills of credit issued after September
 
29, 1751, should be legal tender in private
 
transactions.
 
8.	  All current bills were not to be construed
 
as legal tender.
 
9.	  If any Governor assented to a bill in
 
violation of the Act then the provincial
 
bill was to be null and void and the
 
Governor subject to dismissal.
 
This action of Parliament made it "...doubtful if any 
colonial paper currency act would ever again receive the 
royal approbation" even though it applied only to the New 
England colonies.153  However, both Parliament as well as 
the Penn family "had forgotten the strong willed 
determination" of the Pennsylvania Assembly regarding the 
issue of paper money. 154  Naturally, since Pennsylvania 
was not included in the Currency Act, the assembly chose 
to ignore both the guidelines imposed as well as the Penn 
promise of not issuing any new paper money. 
If such implicit parliamentary overtures as the
 
Currency Act were not enough to worry the Pennsylvania
 
153Brock, The Currency of the American Colonies, 
p. 243.
 
154Hanna, Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics,
 
p. 41.
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Assembly about the future of paper money, something even
 
more ominous was being formulated behind their backs.
 
Penn formulated a plot to regain control of the assembly.
 
The assembly in 1752 began to receive petitions from the
 
"Inhabitants of the City and County of Philadelphia" for
 
an "Addition to our Paper Currency" and for "extending the
 
said Term of Re-emission of our present Paper
 
Currency."155  Petitioners suggested these requests were
 
necessary because of the large increase of inhabitants in
 
the Province and the eventual sinking and destruction.of
 
current emissions.  The assembly responded by crafting a
 
bill emitting £40,000 of new currency to be loaned for a
 
term of 16 years.  The bill also called for the re-

emission of present currency for ten additional years.156
 
However, on March 6, 1752, Governor James Hamilton refused
 
his assent to the bill on the grounds that the Board of
 
Trade might deem it inappropriate in light of the recently
 
passed Currency Act of 1751.157  The attitude of the
 
Board of Trade was decisively anti-paper money.
 
The true reason Hamilton refused the bill rested with
 
an informal set of proprietary instructions.  Governor
 
Hamilton referred to those instructions in a letter to
 
Thomas Penn:
 
p. 3483.
 
156Ibid., pp. 3492-3493.
 
157Ibid., pp. 3500-01.
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You had mentioned to me in a paragraph of your
 
letters of 29 of July 1751, that you did not
 
intend for the future to pass any paper-money or
 
Excise Law but on Condition, that the produce
 
should be either appropriated in the Bill or be
 
left to the Governor and Assembly jointly to do
 
it.  [The practice for sometime hitherto had
 
been to place the funds at the disposal of a
 
committee of the Assembly.]  As this came not to
 
me by way of Instructions, but rather as I may
 
call it, in the way of Conversation, in
 
reasoning upon the Subject...I determined to pay
 
the same regard to it, as if it had been an
 
Instruction.  Then the question was, whether I
 
should propose such a Clause by way of
 
Amendment, or give the Bill the go-by upon other
 
Reasons, till I could be certainly informed from
 
yourself, that you had well weighed the Matter,
 
and were resolved to insist upon such an
 
appropriating Clause in all future Bills for
 
raising of Money.158
 
For the Penn family, the purpose of such an "appropriating
 
clause" was to contest the Assembly's control over
 
Provincial finances.  "Behind Hamilton's rejection lay [a
 
strategy of] delay designed to give Penn time to select
 
his position for the struggle to direct the finances and,
 
ultimately, the government of the Colony."159  To
 
accomplish this proprietary reassertion  of authority
 
would require the Governor to have veto power at least
 
over all Provincial expenditures as well as to be able to
 
appoint the commissioners who spent the funds.  "Another
 
way to hedge the legislative power was to keep the issue
 
of paper money as small as possible...[and] Penn
 
158Pennsylvania Official Correspondence, MMS, V,  p.
 
227.  quoted in Brock's The Currency of the American
 
Colonies, pp. 357-58.
 
159Hanna, Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics,
 
p. 42.
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determined that at all costs the excise acts must be
 
restricted to short terms...this would permit him to
 
review the Assembly's conduct before granting a new
 
mo
 excise.  The only way for the Governor, and thus the
 
proprietorship, to acquire such discretionary power would
 
be to force all old as well as new paper money emissions
 
to include such an "appropriating clause,"  removing from
 
the Assembly its exclusive control over the funds
 
generated from the loan office as well as any excise tax.
 
Thomas Penn, who had the most thorough understanding of
 
all the proprietors of the necessity for paper money in
 
the Colony, attempted to use his knowledge to manipulate
 
the Assembly secretly through such unofficial instructions
 
to the governor.  Governor Hamilton summarized
 
prophetically how he felt the Penn plot would be
 
actualized in Pennsylvania while taking into account the
 
risk involved:
 
As the Cry for Paper Money is once raised, it
 
cannot now be Stilled again.  There is not the
 
least Doubt, but a Bill will be offer'd at least
 
once in every year till it be obtained; and
 
therefore this  appropriating Clause becomes a
 
Matter of great Moment to You, and well deserves
 
your most serious consideration.  In my humble
 
opinion, It should never be proposed unless You
 
are determined at all Events inviolably to
 
adhere to it.  It is certain that at first the
 
Assembly will bounce violently, and be very
 
angry, and the Province will be thrown into a
 
Flame of that Account, and probably You will
 
have but little Money paid into your Receiver's
 
Hands during this Contest.  Added to all this,
 
(and it ought to be well weigh'd) The Assembly,
 
160Ibid.
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by the great funds they have in their Hands of
 
at least 6,000 a year, will be able to
 
accumulate a Vast Sum of Money before the
 
present Acts expire, with which to carry on any
 
Contest, or to gratify their Adherents;... their
 
liberality will be stopped to all others.  On
 
the other hand, when the Remitting and Excise
 
Acts expire, which will be in about four
 
years...and the money begins to sink,...they
 
will be under a necessity of Complying, rather
 
than want a Medium  of Commerce, but that is a
 
long time to carry on a Contest.  And untill
 
they do comply, Every Officer of the Government
 
who relies on the Publick for any thing is held
 
in Bondage...u"
 
Penn's goal was to deny eventually the assembly's fiscal
 
autonomy by depriving it of the interest from paper money.
 
Apparently, Penn thought temporarily gambling the income
 
from his family's Pennsylvania holdings was worth any
 
long-term political gain he might acquire.  Penn's hope
 
was that as existing currency bills expired and thus
 
ceased providing interest income, an impoverished assembly
 
would be forced into a more subservient and respectful
 
position to the Penn family and their appointed governors.
 
It would be the tacit acknowledgement of this strategy by
 
Hamilton, later Governors, and the Penns that would hinder
 
future war appropriations.  It would feed Provincial
 
animosity toward the proprietorship.
 
B.  The Beginning of the Period of Intense Conflict
 
In the period of the French and Indian War, 1755-63,
 
Pennsylvania's Assembly became embroiled in conflict not
 
161Governor Hamilton to Thomas Penn, February 22,
 
1751, POC, V. quoted in Hanna, Benjamin Franklin and
 
Pennsylvania Politics, p. 43.
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only with the French and the Six Indian Nations but with
 
the proprietors and the English government. "Penn turned
 
to the time-honored device of cultivating connections with
 
men of influence in (the English) government "162 as an
 
additional and unknowing ally in his plot to recover lost
 
executive power in his Province.  The ensuing period was
 
destined to be a two front war between Provincial defense
 
and politics of the highest order.
 
C.  Governor James Hamilton
 
When Governor James Hamilton made his first request
 
to the Assembly for defense funds on February 14,
 
1754,163 the stage was set for a two-year battle over
 
appropriations that centered around paper currency.  The
 
Province was well situated geographically outside the
 
immediate dangers of the emerging war which afforded the
 
Assembly the time to concentrate on repelling what was
 
rightly perceived as proprietary intrusion into charter
 
provisions and their constitutional rights as Englishmen.
 
In a special session called by the Governor in April
 
1754, the Assembly found it could not agree upon an amount
 
for defense, while it could agree that an appropriation
 
was needed for the King's use.164  After a month's
 
adjournment and consultation with their constituents, the
 
p. 44.
 
163Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series,  pp. 3637-40.
 
p. 3690.
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Assembly voted, in May of 1754, to emit £30,000 in bills
 
of credit, £10,000 of which would be for the king's use
 
and the remaining £20,000 for exchanging torn and worn
 
bills in circulation.165  A ten year excise tax would
 
retire the emission.  On May 15, 1754, the Governor
 
returned the bill to the Assembly with several objections.
 
First, he objected to the length of the retirement, seeing
 
it as a violation of the Currency Act.  Hamilton's main
 
concern, however, was to uphold his confidential
 
proprietary instructions limiting any prolonged revenue
 
raising ability of the Assembly.  He saw "no Reason for
 
extending the Act of Excise longer than four Years...11166
 
He also objected to the fact that, as Governor, he was not
 
given any control over the appropriation of the money,
 
which was left to a legislative committee and to the
 
commander of the British forces.  But, the Assembly
 
insisted on this key provision.167  The Governor retorted
 
that, since he was "invested with one Half of the
 
Legislative Powers" of the Province, assemblymen should
 
pay due respect to "My principal objection...the Extension
 
of the Fund, whereby the Money is proposed to be repaid,
 
to an unnecessary Length, by which a Tax is to be laid and
 
continued upon the People, without the least apparent
 
165Ibid., pp. 3700-03.
 
166Ibid., p. 3705.
 
167 Ibid., pp. 3706-07.
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necessity. "1M  Further, such a tax would provide a
 
stream of income three times the actual need to retire the
 
debt.  Governor Hamilton suggested that uncollected funds
 
from the loan office would perhaps be a better source of
 
income than squabbling over another emission of paper 
money.  If the Assembly disregarded any of his 
suggestions, he was then "...obliged soon to lay this 
whole Transaction before his Majesty.  I/169 
In the most important of thirteen resolves directed 
to the Governor, the Assembly declared: 
That the Right of Judging and Determining,  not 
only the Sum necessary to be raised for any
public Service, but of the Time and Manner of 
raising it, and Term for paying it, is solely in
the Representatives of the People;  and that the 
Governors of this Province have not,  not ever 
had, nor can have, any Right to interfere...1" 
The Assembly further resolved that the Currency Act of 
1751 could not in any way be imposed on or bind the 
currency issuances of Pennsylvania when the British 
Parliament expressly did not include Pennsylvania in the 
Act.fi"  In a final resolution, the Assembly asked the 
Governor to lay before the House any instructions 
prohibiting him from passing the bill under consideration. 
168Ibid., pp. 3709-10.
 
169Ibid., p. 3712.
 
lnlbid., p. 3714.
 
171Ibid., p. 3714.
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By August 1754 the escalating military situation
 
again compelled the Governor to ask the Assembly for
 
supplies."7  The political situationlm led the
 
Assembly to increase the amount granted for the King's use
 
to £15,000 on the exact same terms as the originally
 
proposed emission the previous May. 174  The Governor
 
responded that he was "...extremely mortified at finding
 
the Bill now presented him for that Purpose, to be not
 
only formed on the [same] said Plan, but to be nearly of
 
the same Tenor with that to which he refused his Assent at
 
their last Meeting [in May of 1754).115  Governor
 
Hamilton did not "recede from his Amendments."  He
 
rejected this "new" bill.  The Governor did so knowing
 
that soon "public disputes" which for so long had become
 
"private Animosities" would fall to a new Governor.
 
D.  Governor Robert Hunter Morris
 
In October 1754, Robert Hunter Morris quickly
 
established himself as the new Governor of Pennsylvania
 
and as an ardent supporter of proprietary instructions
 
regarding paper money.  To advance proprietary goals of
 
scaling back Assembly power without revealing proprietary
 
172Ibid.  ,  p. 3720-23.
 
lmIbid.  ,  p. 3724, At this time new petitions pressing
 
for defense appropriations began to be received by the
 
assembly.
 
,  p. 3728.
 
,  p. 3731.
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instructions, the Governor brought with him a legal
 
opinion from England outlining the 1740 Royal
 
instructions.  Those instructions had stated that all
 
Colonial paper money Acts should contain a suspending
 
clause "...declaring that the same [Acts concerning bills
 
of credit] shall not take Effect, until said Act shall be
 
approved by his Majesty. "176  It must be remembered that
 
"The Governor had not been absolutely prohibited from
 
passing any currency bill, but the many conditions
 
required tobe met in any such bill made passage of the
 
bill an impossibility."7
 
The Assembly, in December of 1754, passed a new
 
billm striking the sum of £40,000, £20,000 of which was
 
for the King's use, and £20,000 for exchange with worn
 
currency.  All were to be retired over a 12-year period.
 
Governor Morris concluded, predictably, that he could not
 
approve any such law.  Royal Instructions, he insisted,
 
required such paper money Acts to have a suspending clause
 
which clearly this one did not.  He also argued that a
 
broad reading of the Currency Act of 1751 further barred
 
the Province from emitting any bills for longer than five
 
years.m The Assembly was not convinced of the
 
fi% Pennsylvania Archives,  8th series, p. 3778.
 
177Yoder,
 "Currency of Colonial Pennsylvania," p. 123.
 
118Pennsylvania Archives,  8th series, p. 3768.
 
179Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 3771.
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frankness of the Governor's statement, and it expressly
 
asked him "...whether the Royal Instruction is the only
 
Impediment; or whether he has any further Instructions
 
from our Proprietaries, which influence him in refusing
 
his Assent to our Bill? "180  The Assembly even petitioned
 
the King, to no avail, to have all proprietary
 
instructions revealed.181  By November 1755, the Assembly
 
had become so frustrated with the inability of the
 
Governor to "prevent the fatal consequences" of failing to
 
support a defense appropriations and to re-emit currency,
 
that it threatened to call for his removal.182 In the
 
eyes of the populace, "The Assembly was blamed almost as
 
much as the Governor.  If this was not time to delay,
 
neither was it a time to keep up an obstinate animosity to
 
the proprietors" and, one may add, to the Governor.183
 
E.  Credit of the House
 
The debate over defense appropriations soon
 
stalemated forcing the Assembly into exerting the power
 
the proprietary family feared.  In early January of 1755
 
and then again in April of that same year, the Assembly
 
chose to borrow funds on the credit of the house and
 
without the consent of the Governor, thus averting the
 
UWIbid., P. 3791.
 
p. 3842.
 
182ibid.
 
,  p. 4121.
 
183Carl Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin,  p. 243.
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frustration of an executive veto.184  First, they 
resolved to borrow £5,000 for the provision of British 
troops.185  The second resolution186 passed issuing 
£15,000 bills of credit from the General Loan Office for 
the King's use.  The bills were to be re-paid using the 
earned interest from other emitted bills.  By law, the 
Assembly had every legal right to make such an 
appropriation from earned interest.  These appropriations 
did little more than please British military commanders 
and displease the proprietorship.  The British military 
was desperate for funds and was glad to see even a small 
contribution from Pennsylvania.  However, the Penn family 
saw such an appropriation as an example of just how far 
the assembly's fiscal power had grown out of proportion to 
their own.  In fact, "this may seem like a small matter 
but it really was revolutionary" since this was the 
Assembly's first experiment with asserting  financial 
independence from the Governor and the proprietorship. 
187 
14The Governor asserted that without his assent, this
 
step by the Assembly was extra-legal, and should be
 
brought to the attention of the King.  The Governor felt
 
that "this power was not inherent in the House, and that
 
while he understood...that no money should be levied from
 
the people without their consent, he nevertheless had the
 
privilege of exercising his judgement to approve or reject
 
bills of supply." See Shepherd, Proprietary Government in
 
Pennsylvania,  pp. 426-427, 446.
 
185Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 3841.
 
p. 3877, 3894.
 
187Yoder, "Currency of Colonial Pennsylvania," p. 135. 83 
F.  Fall of Fort Duquesne
 
The military defeat of British General Braddock in
 
July 1755 was a crucial event prompting movement in the
 
political stalemate that held the Province.  Without the
 
protection of Braddock's army, Pennsylvania became
 
increasingly vulnerable to attacks by the French and
 
Indians.  The Assembly's action, in the form of a new and
 
enlarged currency bill, materialized as more of a
 
political counter-offensive against the proprietorship
 
than as an altruistic concern for defense.  The assembly
 
proceeded by using the Governor's, as well as his
 
predecessors, own tactics, which consisted of trying to
 
force a compromise on paper money by invoking the dire
 
need for Provincial defense.
 
In early August, 1755, the Assembly, without its
 
usual deliberation or consultation with constituents,
 
acted decisively by resolving "to grant Fifty Thousand
 
Pounds for the King's Use, by a Tax on all the real and
 
personal Estates within this Province."u18  At this
 
crucial military juncture, the Assembly skillfully by­
passed a previous objection the Governor had to a war-time
 
appropriation:  the length of emission or tax.  The
 
duration of the proposed property and income tax was to be
 
two years, which allowed the Assembly to extend the
 
concept of property taxes to including taxing the vast
 
188Pennsylvania Archives, 8th Series, pp. 3934,
 
4072-76.
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tracts of land held by the proprietorship.  Additionally,
 
all quitrent and other income earned by the proprietorship
 
in Pennsylvania was to be taxed.  One provision from
 
previous bills was retained, a stipulation that all the
 
£50,000 would be spent by a legislative committee with the
 
consent of either the Governor or the commander-in-chief
 
of the British forces.
 
It will be remembered that in May of 1753, the
 
proprietary had already rejected any suggestion that it
 
would contribute to the defense or administration189 of
 
the colony.  Additionally, on August 6th, 1755, Governor
 
Morris was under strict proprietary instructions not to
 
allow such taxation, and he refused his assent to the bill
 
by offering amendments exempting the Penn family from
 
taxation .190
 
The Assembly and the proprietorship were caught in a
 
"Catch 22."  Now the Governor and the proprietary were
 
seen as the main culprits obstructing Provincial defense.
 
For them to assent to such terms as the Assembly put forth
 
would be virtually impossible.  It would mean opening all
 
Penn estates to taxation.  The Assembly, on the other
 
hand, realized that "To exempt the proprietors [from
 
taxation] was certain to be an unpopular step with the
 
189However, the proprietorship did make some financial
 
provisions to provide for certain minor facets of colonial
 
administration.
 
WO Pennsylvania Archives,  8th series, p. 4078-80.
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voters and to delay longer [defense funding) was certain
 
If 191 also to be unpopular.  It would take a calculated
 
concession by Thomas Penn to return the political football
 
of defense to the Assembly, thereby establishing an
 
advantage.  As will be shown, a concession by Penn did not
 
translate into a victory for the Assembly.
 
G.  The Penn Contribution
 
Thomas Penn came under increasing political pressure
 
in England because he did not see to it that Pennsylvania
 
contributed to its own defense.  The Governor's veto of
 
the defense bill was taken quite seriously on both sides
 
of the Atlantic.  On November 24, 1755, Penn granted
 
£5,000 for defense, payable out of quit-rent arrears owed
 
the proprietors by provincial renters.m  The grant was
 
meant to stifle criticism at home while giving the
 
Pennsylvania Assembly a politically convenient way out of
 
taxing proprietary estates.
 
The way was now clear for Pennsylvania to pass its
 
first substantial defense billy° of the war period on
 
November 27, 1755, almost two years after Governor
 
Hamilton first requested funds. The House concluded that
 
"...it would not be reasonable or just, at this Time, to
 
191Yoder, "Currency of Colonial Pennsylvania," p. 130.
 
192 Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, pp. 4150-51. 
10Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, V, 210-212.  The
 
act was later confirmed by the King-in-Council, July 7,
 
1756.  See appendix-D for a reproduction of the currency.
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tax the Proprietary Estate, in order to raise Money
 
therefrom, over and above the said grant from the
 
proprietaries...and proceeded] to form a new Bill for
 
granting a Sum of Money to the Use of the Crown, and
 
therein omit the Taxation of the said Estate."194
 
Earlier in November, "the presence of several hundred
 
enraged and threatening men from the frontier who had come
 
to Philadelphia to protest the inaction of the government,
 
was also a factor causing the Assembly to forego taxing
 
the Proprietors for the time 195
 
Instead of omitting any mention of a proprietary tax,
 
the Assembly's bill chose to state that "...real and
 
personal [taxes of]...the Estates of the Honorable Thomas
 
Penn and Richard Penn, Esquires, proprietaries of the
 
Province of Pennsylvania, only excepted in consideration
 
of their free gift..."196  In other words, the Assembly
 
saw the Penn's "free gift" as prepayment of Provincial
 
taxes and not in lieu of any taxes, which was clearly
 
contrary to Governor Morris' instruction.
 
In its final form, the Act emitted £55,000 of paper
 
money in addition to the £5,000 Penn gift.  The currency
 
became legal tender until 1760 and was then retired over a
 
194Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 4159.
 
195The mob was commonly referred to as the "Paxton
 
Boys."  Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of
 
the Democracy, pp. 45, 84-87.
 
196Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, V, p. 202.
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four year period by the taxes.  A special Appropriations
 
Board was appointed to spend the allotment, but only with
 
the consent of either the Governor or the British
 
Commander-in-Chief.  Also, the Act set into motion the
 
mechanism by which such a tax would be assessed as well as
 
collected.197  Finally, "no other paper money Act of
 
Colonial Pennsylvania can claim the honor of being the
 
product of as many bitter disputes with invectives, or of
 
such a legislative deadlock, as the Act of November 27,
 
1755."198  The below table summarizes the extent of
 
Pennsylvania's war emissions up to that point.  It should
 
be remembered that the first £15,000 was emitted strictly
 
on the credit of the assembly.  Together, both issues
 
almost doubled the money in circulation in Pennsylvania
 
which had stood at £85,000 of land-backed mortgages.
 
197It is well to remember that from before 1723
 
Pennsylvania did not have a personal or property tax and
 
derived most governmental revenue from the general loan
 
office and an excise tax.
 
198Yoder, "Currency of Colonial Pennsylvania," pp.
 
143-44.
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Table 4
 
Pennsylvania War Issues of Bills of Creditm
 
DATE  ISSUE  SINKING FUND  RETIREMENT DATE 
04/02/1755  15,000  Assembly issued  Payable after 
"Provincial  1-year 
Notes" 
11/27/1755  55,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1756-1759 
personal estates  inclusive 
Total  £70,000 
H.  Govenor William Denny
 
In August 1756, Governor Robert Hunter Morris was 
succeeded by William Denny.  Upon appraisal of the 
military situation, Denny determined that the Province was 
"...exposed to the immediate Attacks of a successful and 
implacable Enemy"200  and requested immediate funds for 
defense.  The Assembly was more concerned with the new 
Governor's proprietary restraining instructions regarding 
paper money than it was with current defense measures. 
When the Assembly asked for such instructions, a request 
never fulfilled by any previous governor, Denny responded 
15 %rock,
 Currency of the American Colonies, p. 387,
 
table XVIII. 
20°Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 4293. 89 
by saying he was "Agreeable to your [Assembly's]
 
Request. 
ig 201 
Upon inspection of the instructions, 202 the assembly
 
found the Governor empowered to approve money bills
 
conforming to the following criteria:
 
1.	  The £80,000 already in circulation could be
 
re-emitted upon retirement.
 
2.	  Up to an additional £40,000 could be issued
 
if necessary.
 
3.	  All money bills must contain an "enacting
 
clause" designating the exclusive purpose
 
and use of interest money accrued.
 
4.	  If proprietary lands had to be taxed for
 
defense, they were to be for a maximum term
 
of one year at three percent or in its place
 
a maximum income tax rate of four percent.
 
All unimproved, unoccupied, and proprietary
 
quitrent was to be exempt from taxation.
 
5.	  There was to be no extension of an existing
 
excise tax or no new excise tax without the
 
aforementioned "enacting clause."
 
The Assembly, feeling somewhat dejected that neither
 
the Penn family nor the Governor had sent over a more
 
"sympathetic" set of instructions, proceeded to construct
 
a defense bill completely contrary to the Governor's
 
instructions.  The Assembly was motivated by the fact the
 
instructions revealed two important details:  First, that
 
mThayer, in Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of
 
Democracy, states:  "Denny's showing of his instructions
 
to the Assembly proved to be a serious blunder in more
 
than one way.  Coming not long before the annual
 
elections, it afforded the Quaker Party with no end of
 
political fuel to use against proprietary supporters."
 
p. 58.
 
202Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 4298-4306.
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the proprietorship realized taxation of their estates was 
inevitable, and second, an increase in the supply of 
currency was necessary to continue defense expenditures. 
The Assembly resolved to issue £60,000 in bills of credit 
to be "...sunk by an Extension of the Excise Act for 
Twenty Years.  I; "203  Governor Denny primarily objected to 
the bill on the grounds that its terms was too long and 
that it did not contain an "enacting clause" stipulating 
the "disposition of surplus [interest] money.  11204 
Although the Assembly considered compliance with the 
proprietary instructions "tyrannical, cruel, and 
oppressive," in light of defense needs they "wave[d] their 
Rights on this present Occasion" and conformed to the 
instructions out of duty to the King and only to alleviate 
the "distressed Country."205  On September 31, 1756, a 
compromise bill206 to which the Governor eventually 
agreed, emitted £30,000 or one-half the original amount 
proposed by the Assembly, paid for by an excise tax on 
alcohol, for a term of ten years.  The table below shows 
Pennsylvania's wartime currency had increased to £100,000. 
This translated into a 125% increase in currency over the 
20Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 4308.
 
axibid.
  pp.  4317-18.
 
205Ibid.,  p. 4327.
 
206Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, V, p. 243-261 and 
Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 4330.  See appendix-
E for a reproduction of the currency. 91 
original £80,000 of paper money in circulation at the
 
beginning of the war in 1754.
 
Table 5
 
Pennsylvania War Issues of Bills of Credit207
 
DATE  ISSUE  SINKING FUND  RETIREMENT DATE 
04/02/1755  15,000  Assembly issued  Payable after 
"Provincial  1-year 
Notes" 
11/27/1755  55,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1756-1759 
personal estates  inclusive 
10/21/1756  30,000  Excise on alcohol 10-years, 1756-66 
Total  £100,000 
I.  Paper Money in the Year 1757
 
Before the year 1756 was out, the military situation 
demanded additional funds.  Again, the Assembly submitted 
a bill to Governor Denny which included taxing proprietary 
estates.  208  The proposed tax was to total £100,000.  The 
Governor found such a bill "so repugnant to his 
[proprietary] Instructions" that he refused assent on
 
January 25, 1757.209  The Governor later rejected another
 
similar bill for "the same Reasons which induced me to
 
refuse my Assent to this bill [the previous bill]
 
2"Brock, Currency of the American Colonies,  p. 387,
 
table XVIII.
 
amPennsylvania Archives, 8th Series, p. 4459, 4476,
 
4484.
 
p. 4497.
 
210Ibid., p. 4501.
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By February of 1757, a third bill was brought forth
 
for £100,000 to be used for defense.  The assembly
 
realized that rather than including language in the bill
 
explicitly exempting the Penn estates2" from taxation,
 
they would simply attach the bill as a supplement to the
 
November 1755 war-time paper bill instead of passing an
 
entirely "new" Act.212  The assembly hoped that if passed
 
by the governor, and if they were eventually able to tax
 
proprietary land, they would have some recourse in using
 
proprietary tax revenues to reduce the outstanding
 
balance.  After all, the act was the largest emission in
 
Pennsylvania's history and rather than further burdening
 
the present tax-base, the assembly was merely looking for
 
ways to include rather than exclude taxing the Penn
 
estates.  It was obviously a gamble for the assembly, but
 
one that needed to be taken.  Yet, Governor Denny, "with
 
the strictest Care and Attention; and from the best
 
Judgement," refused his assent claiming his duty to King
 
and obligation to the proprietary instruction outweighed
 
any benefit of such a bill to the Province.213  His main
 
objections were:  a) The bill was a supplement to a
 
211Ibid., p. 4504-05.
 
212Yoder in "Currency of Colonial Pennsylvania,"
 
states:  "By referring to this earlier act which exempted
 
the proprietary estates, from taxation, it was not
 
necessary to make a direct statement to that effect in the
 
present bill." p. 155.
 
213Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, pp. 4516-119.
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previous Act, b) The emission was too large and would
 
cause depreciation, c) The term of the Act was over one
 
year.  d) The tax included unimproved lands. The
 
Assembly's ruse of a supplemental bill proved
 
unsuccessful.
 
The lure of the £100,000 was simply too great for the
 
British military to allow perpetuation of a stalemate.
 
Roughly one month after the rejection of the supplemental
 
bill, on March 21, 1757, Governor Denny, "Being convinced"
 
of the need for such a bill, requested the bill "might be
 
returned to his Honour. "214  Three days later, the
 
Governor was forced by the military into relenting to the
 
demands of the Assembly.  The largest paper money emission
 
in the history of Pennsylvania was passed.  (The table
 
below indicated, the bill was completed in two phases.)
 
First, £45,000 of bills of credit were issued on March 3,
 
1757.215  The remaining balance of £55,000 was issued
 
June 17, 1757.
216  In just over two years Pennsylvania's
 
total currency emissions amounted to £200,000 or almost
 
two and one half times the amount in circulation before
 
the war.
 
p. 4549-50.
 
215Pennsvlvania Statutes at Large, V,  pp. 294-302.
 
See appendix-F for a reproduction of the currency.
 
pp.  303-308.
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Table 6
 
Pennsylvania War Issues of Bills of Credit217
 
DATE  ISSUE  SINKING FUND  RETIREMENT DATE 
04/02/1755  15,000  Assembly issued  Payable after 
"Provincial  1-year 
Notes" 
11/27/1755  55,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1756-1759 
personal estates  inclusive 
12/21/1756  30,000 Excise on alcohol  10-years, 1756-66 
03/23/1757  45,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1756-1759 
personal estates 
06/17/1757  55,000  Tax on real and  4- years, 1757-1761 
personal estates 
Total  £200,000 
J.  The Paper Money Debate of 1758
 
The Assembly put forth another resolution on March
 
25, 1758 for £100,000 including a provision fully taxing
 
the Penn estates.  Perhaps the assemblymen were encouraged
 
by the military's intervention into the earlier defense
 
appropriation.218  Upon consideration, the Governor
 
returned the bill stating:
 
You will find that I have struck out such Parts
 
as relate to the Assessing and Taxing the
 
Proprietary Estate in common, and in the same
 
Mode with the rest of the Inhabitants of this
 
Province.  You are not, however to understand by
 
this, that I mean or wish to exempt their
 
217Brock,
 Currency of the American Colonies, p. 387,
 
table XVIII.
 
218Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series,  pp. 4734, 4759.
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Estates from being taxed.  This is what they 
themselves do not 219 
Governor Denny's main objection was again taxation of 
proprietary estates.  As Denny's remarks indicate, he did 
allude to a solution or compromise by suggesting that 
taxation of Penn holdings still remained a possibility. 
But, as governor, he would only agree to such taxation if 
it were possible for the proprietor to appoint "impartial" 
assessors.  Penn and Denny had indicated that Provincial 
Pennsylvanians were incapable of unbiased assessment of 
Penn estates.  The Assembly, considering the Governor's 
solution, the next day resolved the question in the 
affirmative: "Whether the Clause in the said Bill, taxing 
the Proprietary Estate in common with the other Estates of 
this Province, shall be continued as a Part thereof? "22° 
The affirmation was by a "great Majority" of House members 
who rejected any idea of an un-elected, or Penn appointed 
assessor. 
The Assembly contentiously sent the same bill to the 
Governor for his signature no less than three times during 
the first eight days of April, 1758.221  The Governor 
immediately rejected each bill, concluding that if "...any 
Charge of Delay (in defense funds] should be imputed to 
this Province, it is a great Satisfaction to me, that no 
219Ibid.,  p. 4767-69. 
2201bid.,  pp. 4769-70, 4780. 
2211bid.,  pp. 4762, 4767, 4769, 4780, 4789-90. 96 
part of the Censure can justly lie at my Door. Ian  The
 
Assembly was quick to retort "That the Mode proposed by
 
your honour of taxing the Proprietary Estate [i.e.:  Penn­
appointed, "impartial" assessors for proprietary estates],
 
is without Precedent in our Mother Country, anti-

constitutional, and inconsistent with the Rights of the
 
People...therefore we can only look on this Proposal as
 
calculated to exempt the Proprietary Estate from bearing
 
an equal and just Proportion of the necessary Taxes at
 
this critical and important Juncture..."45
 
Military considerations, especially repeated calls
 
for supplies, induced the Assembly to conciliate their
 
taxation demands.  "The House then resumed the
 
Consideration of the unhappy Necessity, by which they had
 
been compelled, contrary to Equity, and the Usage of their
 
Mother Country, to continue and extend an Exemption of the
 
Proprietary Estate, by the Bill now sent up to the
 
Governor, from its just Proportion of Taxes... 
1114.1/4
 
Governor Denny waved minor material objections on April
 
22, 1758, and gave his assent to the
 
42Ibid.,  pp .  4784-86.
 
p. 4788.
 
224Ibid., pp. 4793-94.
 
p. 4795-97.
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For the second time in less than two years,
 
Pennsylvania emitted £100,000 of bills of credit.m The
 
Act called for the extension of the property tax for three
 
additional years.  The funds were to be disbursed in
 
accordance with a Commission previously appointed by the
 
supplemental Act of 1755.  Such appropriations were to be
 
valid only "with the consent and approbation of the
 
Governor or commander-in-chief."227  "The House...strove
 
in every way to free itself from the Governor's control of
 
11228 these funds,  and he was seldom consulted as to the
 
disposition of funds.  As the proprietary diligently
 
strove to restrict the funds available to the Assembly by
 
forestalling  taxation of its estates, the Assembly worked
 
even harder to retain its autonomy over all Provincial tax
 
revenues.
 
The year of resolve for the anti-proprietary Assembly
 
was 1759.  The Colony, further pressed for defense
 
appropriations by the British commander-in-chief, aimed to
 
tackle what had eluded it for six long years:  the
 
taxation of proprietary lands.  The Assembly in part was
 
motivated by the fact that "by 1758 the cost of the war
 
was bearing down heavily...and the tax load was assuming
 
dangerous proportions."  Pennsylvania's western tax base
 
226Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, V, pp. 337-352.
 
See appendix-G for a reproduction of the currency.
 
227Ibid., p. 350.
 
mYoder, "Currency of Colonial Pennsylvania,"  p. 162.
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was removed because of the tide of war, leaving only the
 
eastern counties as a source of stable revenue.m Table
 
7 shows that Pennsylvania up to 1758 had issued almost
 
four-times the currency as compared to pre-war levels.
 
Table 7
 
Pennsylvania War Issues of Bills of Credit230
 
DATE  ISSUE  SINKING FUND  RETIREMENT DATE 
04/02/1755  15,000  Assembly issued  Payable after 
"Provincial  1-year 
Notes" 
11/27/1755  55,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1756-1759 
personal estates  inclusive 
12/21/1756  30,000  Excise on alcohol  10-years, 1756-66 
03/23/1757  45,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1757-1761 
personal estates 
06/17/1757  55,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1757-1761 
personal estates 
04/22/1758  100,000 Tax on real and  3-years, 1760-1764 
personal estates 
Total  £300,000 
K.  Paper Money in 1759
 
The Assembly resolved on March 15, 1759, to issue
 
£100,000 for the King's use to be sunk by a tax on all
 
estates within the Province.231  It was the third year
 
229Thayer,  Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of
 
Democracy, p. 72.
 
23 °Brock, Currency of the American Colonies, p. 387, 
table XVIII. 
231Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 4947-48.
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the assembly put forth a £100,000 bill expanding the 
currency of Pennsylvania.  But, what had become an annual 
appropriation bill for military supplies, funded in part 
by taxing proprietary estates, begot a perennial return by 
the Governor objecting to such a tax.232  The Governor 
pointedly stated while rejecting this bill that  he was 
"willing to pass a Bill, of the same Tenor with one passed 
last Year."  In other words, he would approve any bill 
which did not tax proprietary estates.  The continued 
expansion of war-time debt left the assembly with little 
alternative but to press for proprietary taxation.  The 
Assembly "resolved unanimously in the negative" a 
resolution exempting proprietary estates from 
taxation.233  They decided, on April 3rd, 1759, to 
prepare a bill "wherein the Proprietaries shall be taxed 
in their full proportions of the Sums already 
granted.  It 234  Once drafted, the bill called explicitly 
for retroactive taxes on proprietary lands above any 
assessment that the "free gift" of £5,000 from the Penn 
family did not cover.  The bill meant property tax arrears 
dating back to 1755.  The "exemption" the Penn's enjoyed 
seemed in peril. 
232Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 4965, 4966,
 
4967.
 
mIbid., p. 4971.
 
234Ibid., p. 4972.
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On April 12, 1759, the Governor refused the bil1,2255
 
while the Assembly continued to stand behind its
 
"unanimous resolve."236  The Governor and the Assembly
 
laid the responsibility for such a political deadlock,
 
which jeopardized the lives of their Pennsylvania
 
constituents, at each other's door.
 
British commanders were, to say the least, agitated 
by the political squabbling of the governor and assembly. 
Attempting to defend Pennsylvania's frontier without 
adequate provisions and pay proved difficult.  In an 
effort to remedy the situation, William Pitt and the 
British Commander-in-Chief General Jeffrey Amherst wrote 
the Assembly in an attempt to force a compromise.  Yet, 
the assembly, as a political combatant, was unwilling to 
ameliorate their demand for proprietary taxation.n7 
This left Amherst and Pitt no choice but to pressure the 
governor into seeking concessions with the assembly, for 
the sake of frontier military necessity.  Thus, "after 
receiving an urgent letter from General Amherst, who 
failed in his earlier efforts to prevail with the 
Assembly, Governor Denny assented... 
1g 238  The bridgehead 
p. 4980-82.
 
asIbid., p. 4982.
 
237Yoder,
 "Paper Currency in Colonial Pennsylvania,"
 
pp. 165-166.
 
238Brock, The Currency of the American Colonies, p.
 
380.  As for the governors assent, refer to Pennsylvania
 
Archives, 8th Series, pp. 4984, 4985.
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to proprietary taxation was finally breached on April 17,
 
1759, and the estates of the proprietary were not to be
 
exempted.239  For the pleasure of giving his support to
 
the bill ,240 the Assembly "presented the Governor with
 
their Order on the Trustees of the General Loan-Office for
 
the Sum of One thousand Pounds. 11 24  While seen as an
 
outright bribe by the Penn family, such a practice of
 
"rewarding" a governor for the passage of important
 
legislation was considered standard practice in the
 
colonies.  Governors were always forced to rely upon
 
assemblies for their salaries and other financial support.
 
As would be expected, salaries became a political
 
instrument by which assemblies tried to manipulate the
 
governor's actions.  In this instance, Governor Denny just
 
happened to "earn" his past-due or accrued salary at the
 
most inopportune time and could only have done so by
 
violating his instructions.
 
239Henry Phillips, Paper Currency of the American
 
Colonies, p. 25, wrote:  "When, however, it came to be
 
presented to the King in June, 1760, for his approval, it
 
was declared to be null and void.  The law of April, 1759,
 
would have shared the same fate had not Benjamin Franklin
 
and Robert Charles, who were at that time in London,
 
acting as the agents for the province, engaged that the
 
legislature should expunge the objectionable features, and
 
alter the law to a proper nature."
 
240Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, VI, pp. 379-396.
 
Passed April 17, 1759.  See appendix-H for a reproduction
 
of the currency.
 
241Pennsylvania Archives,  8th series, p. 4985.
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As of March, 1759, Pennsylvania currency had expanded
 
five-fold from pre-war levels.
 
Table 8
 
Pennsylvania War Issues of Bills of Credit242
 
DATE  ISSUE  SINKING FUND  RETIREMENT DATE
 
04/02/1755  15,000  Assembly issued  Payable after 
"Provincial  1-year 
Notes" 
11/27/1755  55,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1756-1759 
personal estates  inclusive 
12/21/1756  30,000  Excise on alcohol  10-years, 1756-66 
03/23/1757  45,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1757-1761 
personal estates 
06/17/1757  55,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1757-1761 
personal estates 
04/22/1758  100,000 Tax on real and  3-years, 1760-1764 
personal estates 
04/17/1759  100,000 Tax on real and  3-years, 1764-1767 
personal estates 
Total  £400,000 
L.	  Urgent Request from General Stanwix and Colonel
 
Hunter
 
In June of 1759, the Assembly and the Governor
 
received two letters from Brigadier General John Stanwix
 
and Colonel John Hunter requesting an appropriation of an
 
additional £100,000 because the "...Money to pay the
 
immense Expense of the last Campaign, and what will be
 
wanting for the current Service, is so great, and no Money
 
242Brock,
 Currency of the American Colonies, p. 387,
 
table XVIII.
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yet come over from England..."243  Capitalizing on the
 
recent "concessionary" mood of the Governor, the Assembly
 
submitted a bill for the striking of £36,650 as well as
 
re-emission of the £80,000 bills of credit already emitted
 
by the Province prior to the war and which were due to
 
expire within the year.
244  The new money coupled with
 
over £13,000 bills of credit already on hand at the loan
 
office, totaling slightly under £50,000, was to be loaned
 
to General Stanwix and Colonel Hunter and repaid by funds
 
forthcoming from the English government.m  The Assembly-

saw the re-emittance provision as a guarantee for another
 
sixteen years of sufficient circulating medium during
 
which time all wartime emissions would be retired by
 
taxation.  Coupling these two distinctly separate goals
 
forced the Governor into an all or nothing proposition:
 
supplying the request of the King's officers or upholding
 
243Pennsvlvania Archives, 8th series, p. 5020.
 
Additionally, the Governor was granted two more one-

thousand pound appropriations by the assembly for support
 
of paper money legislation.  Ibid., p. 5028.
 
244Prior to the French and Indian War, Pennsylvania
 
had £80,000 of property-backed paper money in circulation
 
and another £5,000 in fiat money that was issued in 1746.
 
It was the non-war issues of £80,000 that the assembly
 
wanted re-issued.  The assembly felt this was important
 
since eventually all war-issues would be recalled and
 
destroyed.  Without an extension of the pre-war paper
 
currency, which was about to expire, Pennsylvania would be
 
deprived of paper currency after the war.
 
245This issuance can be seen more as a secured loan
 
rather than fiat money since repayment was guaranteed by
 
England and the possibility of the mother country's
 
default was remote.
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proprietary instructions. The request meant leaving to the
 
Assembly the exclusive control of interest monies from
 
such a re-emission of bills.  Both the Governor's assent
 
and his receipt of another order by the Assembly granting
 
him an additional £1,000 came as no surprise.
24$5  The
 
bill247 passed June 20, 1759.  Table 9 shows, as of June
 
1759, that the total Pennsylvania currency issued stood at
 
£435,000 or almost five-times her per-war level.  The act
 
was destined to be repealed by the King one year later on
 
September 2, 1760.  It was an affront to the implicit
 
wishes of the English parliament, not to mention the
 
explicit wishes of the proprietorship.
24a
 
M.  Governor James Hamilton
 
The culminating events of the passage of the paper
 
money bill taxing proprietary lands and the Assembly's
 
monetary "bequest" to Governor Denny led to his dismissal
 
by the Penn family.  The re-appointment of James Hamilton
 
for his second term and his arrival at Philadelphia on
 
November 20, 1759, was meant to frustrate Provincial
 
actions taxing proprietary lands.  In what can only be
 
seen as a preemptive move, the Assembly quickly resolved
 
to soften the new Governor's predisposition against paper
 
p. 4996-98.
 
247 Pennsylvania  Statutes at Large, VI, pp. 427-443.
 
248See footnote 236.
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money by granting him £500 payable out of "the first Money
 
that shall be raised for the public Use."249
 
Table 9
 
Pennsylvania War Issues of Bills of Credit250
 
DATE  ISSUE  SINKING FUND  RETIREMENT DATE
 
04/02/1755  15,000  Assembly issued  Payable after 
"Provincial  1-year 
Notes" 
11/27/1755  55,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1756-1759 
personal estates  inclusive 
12/21/1756  30,000  Excise on alcohol  10-years, 1756-66 
03/23/1757  45,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1757-1761 
personal estates 
06/17/1757  55,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1757-1761 
personal estates 
04/22/1758  100,000 Tax on real and  3-years, 1760-1764 
personal estates 
04/17/1759  100,000 Tax on real and  3-years, 1764-1767 
personal estates 
06/20/1759  35,000 Loan to Colonel  By bills of on 
Hunter  contract in 
England 
Total  £435,000 
By early 1760, the war situation had drastically
 
improved for Pennsylvania, to the extent even that the
 
Assembly contemplated the "disbanding" of Provincial
 
forces.251  Such an action was seen as premature by
 
249Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 5082.
 
250Brock, Currency of the American Colonies, p. 387, 
table XVIII. 
p. 5081.
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British field commanders and Governor Hamilton.252  The
 
Assembly saw the payroll of troops, which had fallen in
 
arrears, as the only pressing financial obligation faced
 
by the Province at this time.253  Governor Hamilton
 
learned from British military commanders as well as Crown
 
officials that additional Pennsylvania financing and
 
troops were imperative to secure complete victory.
254
 
On March 4, 1760 the Assembly began preparing a bill
 
to grant £100,000 for his Majesty's use to pay troop
 
payroll arrears and to provide for Provincial troops.  The
 
bills of credit were to be sunk by a tax "levied on all
 
Estates, real and personal...within this Province".255
 
The bill and events surrounding its consideration proved
 
quite similar to earlier appropriations.  The first
 
version of the bill was amended and returned to the
 
assembly by the new governor.  The Governor then "was not
 
a little surprized at having the Bill returned [a second
 
time] to me, with a Message, that the House unanimously
 
adhered to it, and had rejected all my Amendments."  Also,
 
Governor Hamilton became more concerned with the issue of
 
taxation of proprietary lands per se than with "the Mode
 
and Manner of assessing them."  He voiced the same concern
 
mIbid.,  pp.  5085,  5090, and 5091.
 
p.  5084.
 
254Ibid.,  pp.  5099,  5103-5108.
 
255Ibid.,  pp.  5110,  5113,  5114.
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as the previous Governor about whether proprietary land
 
could be fairly and justly assessed by locally elected
 
provincials.  Finally, the Governor questioned why the
 
Provincial commissioners did not seek in the current
 
version of the bill the "Consent and Approbation of the
 
Governor" when disposing of the Act's funds.  They had
 
deprived the Governor of his constitutional right .256
 
Still, the Governor felt obliged "to yield to the
 
Necessity of the Times [i.e. defense], and give my Assent
 
to a Bill, by which not only the Estates of the Honourable
 
Proprietaries may be greatly injured, but the just and
 
legal Powers of Government certainly will be very much
 
prejudiced and wounded."257  The Act258 provided taxes
 
for a term of three years, assessed after 1767 and retired
 
before March of 1770, and it resulted in the last issuance
 
of bills of credit during the French and Indian War.259
 
By mid-April, 1760, Pennsylvania printed the last paper
 
256Ibid., 5122-25.5128.
 
p. 5120.
 
258Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, VI, pp. 7-22.  See
 
appendix-I for a reproduction of the currency.
 
259Two additional acts were passed in 1762 and 1763
 
totaling around twenty five thousand pounds each.  These
 
cash appropriations were drawn from funds the British
 
government had paid to Pennsylvania as partial
 
reimbursement of wartime expenses.  For additional detail
 
see the Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 5353, 5478,
 
5484, and The Pennsylvania Statutes at Large VI, pp. 226­
229, 311-19.
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currency issue of the war which meant that over £535,000
 
or almost seven-times the
 
pre-war level of bills of credits had been issued to
 
finance the province's war effort.
 
Table 10
 
Pennsylvania War Issues of Bills of Credit260
 
DATE  ISSUE  SINKING FUND  RETIREMENT DATE 
04/02/1755  15,000  Assembly issued  Payable after 
"Provincial  1-year 
Notes" 
11/27/1755  55,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1756-1759 
personal estates  inclusive 
09/21/1756  30,000  Excise on alcohol  10-years, 1756-66 
03/23/1757  45,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1757-1761 
personal estates 
06/17/1757  55,000  Tax on real and  4-years, 1757-1761 
personal estates 
04/22/1758  100,000 Tax on real and  3-years, 1760-1764 
personal estates 
04/17/1759  100,000 Tax on real and  3-years, 1764-1767 
personal estates 
06/20/1759  35,000 Loan to Colonel  By bills of 
Hunter  exchange on 
contract in 
England 
04/12/1760  100,000 Tax on real and  3-years, 1767-1770 
personal estates 
Total  £535,000
 
mBrock, Currency of the American Colonies, p. 387,
 
table XVIII.
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Certain persistent themes are present throughout the
 
period surrounding Pennsylvania's involvement in the
 
French and Indian War.  First and foremost would be the
 
Assembly's attempt to tax proprietary lands.  As noted,
 
the assembly was resolute in its notion that the Penn
 
family must contribute to the defense of the colony.  With
 
each appropriation, the assembly became convinced further
 
that Pennsylvanian's were unfairly subsidizing the war to
 
the benefit of the Proprietorship.  Colonists were forced
 
into both protecting and paying for the defense of large
 
quantities of Pennsylvania's land in which they did not
 
hold an interest.  The second major theme of this period
 
is inextricably linked to the first.  The Penn family was
 
equally as resolute in denying taxation of their lands on
 
the grounds that such action would result in a further
 
loss of their provincial influence.  From its inception,
 
Pennsylvania's paper money had given the assembly fiscal
 
freedom which was thought contrary to the family's
 
interest and idea of proprietary prerogative.  For the
 
Penns, Pennsylvania was not England and Pennsylvanians
 
were not Englishmen.  The province was their charge
 
irregardless of the rights guaranteed all Englishmen by
 
the constitution or colony charter.  As such, it became
 
the dutiful privilege of Pennsylvanian's to obey the
 
proprietary and defend the province.  To insure this type
 
of loyalty, and to stifle the growth of assembly power,
 
the Penn family set out to restore the province to a
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dependant or subordinate role in relation to the
 
proprietorship.  This was attempted by striking at the
 
heart of the assemblies power, paper money.
 
Thus ended a period when "Pennsylvania's currency
 
history was largely determined by the hazards of
 
if 261 proprietary scheming, restraint, wartime necessity
 
and growing Assembly Republicanism.
 
261Leslie V. Brock, The Currency of the American
 
Colonies 1700-1764, p. 390.
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CHAPTER IV
 
AN EXAMINATION OF SUCCESS
 
A.  Questions of Success
 
To evaluate Pennsylvania's paper money during the two
 
periods 1723-29 and 1755-60, it will be helpful to examine
 
how the emissions were administered, how each fared
 
economically, and what elemental factors set them apart or
 
made them similar.
 
B.  The General Loan Office
 
If the question were asked:  "What was the single
 
most important key to the emission of paper money in
 
Pennsylvania," the answer would center on the Provincial
 
General Loan Office.
262
 
And I will venture to say, that there never was
 
a wiser or a better measure, never one better
 
calculated to serve the uses of an encreasing
 
country, that there never was a measure more
 
steadily pursued, or more faithfully executed,
 
for forty years together, than the loan office
 
in Pennsylvania, formed and administered by the
 
assembly of that province.263
 
Thomas Pownall (1768)
 
Created by the first paper money Act of 1723,264 the loan
 
office became the primary conduit through which
 
262Loan offices were also referred to as Land Banks.
 
The work "bank" was used to describe a set amount of paper
 
money rather than a financial institution.
 
263Thomas Pownall, Administration of the American
 
Colonies, p. 185.
 
264Pennsvlvania Statutes at Large, III, pp. 324-338.
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Pennsylvania issued a paper currency in an effort to
 
alleviate the problem of scarcity of hard money.  In the
 
absence of private institutions, "its history to a large
 
degree comprises the history of currency, money values,
 
inflation, credit, public finance, and economic
 
development...  "6 in Pennsylvania.  The loan office system
 
embraced every phase of Pennsylvania's economic life.
 
Essentially unchanged before 1764, the Provincial
 
"bank" became the avenue whereby real property was
 
converted into a circulating medium.  Between 1724 and
 
1756, over 3,500 laborers and farmers looked to paper
 
money and to the loan office for relief from the tight
 
credit market.266  Money was available on good security,
 
and overall interest rates were forced down by this new
 
supply of credit.  In this primarily agricultural economy,
 
paper money mortgages encouraged new investment and
 
increased productivity.  It helped thousands of ordinary
 
provincials obtain capital for economic ends.
 
Merchants, too, looked forward to the maintenance of
 
trade and industry.  Paper money expanded consumer's
 
purchasing power, enabling them to pay off old debt and
 
also pay for new purchases promptly.  The paper money
 
reduced credit purchases and transactions costs, thus
 
265Theodore Thayer, (1953) "The Land-Bank System in
 
the American Colonies." Journal of Economic History, vol.
 
XIII, no. 2,  (Spring), p.145.
 
266Perkins, The Economy of Colonial America, p. 173.
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lowering merchant expense by partially alleviating credit
 
risks and possible litigation.  Overall, merchant support
 
for paper currency rested chiefly on the fact that little
 
inflation existed.
 
Several factors promoted the success of
 
Pennsylvania's loan office or land bank.  First, the
 
activities of Pennsylvania's General Loan Office derived
 
from the moderation267 in the quantity of bills issued,
 
which averted severe depreciation.
 
Second, as the following table of representative
 
cases suggests, the trustees seldom allowed land to be
 
mortgaged up to the appraised value.  As a point of
 
reference, the average loan in Pennsylvania was £65.  This
 
conservative posture assured both the loan office and
 
citizens that ample security would remain to foreclose the
 
debt in case of default.  The Delaware River region
 
contained some of the best agriculturally developed land.
 
The table below, of selected foreclosures cases, suggests
 
the security margin required of the mortgagee by the loan
 
office.  Trustees kept loans well within half the value of
 
the property to be mortgaged, and they were not tempted to
 
overvalue land.
 
&aIn comparison; "Of all the thirteen colonies, Rhode
 
Island probably sinned most in her abuses of paper money.
 
In all, during the period before 1751 (prior to the
 
Currency Act of 1751]...The total issued [by Rhode Island]
 
amounted to £820,000..."  Brock, in The Currency of the
 
American Colonies, pp. 37-38.  Rhode Island's pre-war
 
currency was thirty-five percent greater than even the
 
post-war total of Pennsylvania (£535,000) in 1763.
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Table 11
 
Certificate of Trustees Showing Allowable Loan Amounts
 
(In Pound Sterling)
 
VALUE OF LAND  LOAN ALLOWED
 
£232  £76
 
681  200
 
587  192
 
642  200
 
453  100
 
616  148
 
420  120
 
368  120
 
415  100
 
433  144
 
347  112
 
409  136
 
461  152
 
577  192
 
684  200
 
421  132
 
600  200
 
220  68
 
800  200
 
500  152
 
600  152
 
300  100268
 
This reflects the wide personal autonomy each trustee used
 
to issue and recall loans.
 
Benjamin Franklin expressed the importance of
 
security or backing as it related to all the Pennsylvania
 
issues before the French and Indian War:
 
For as Bills issued upon Money Security [specie]
 
are Money, so bills issued upon Land, are in
 
Effect Coined Land.
 
...So, in case no Bills are emitted but what are
 
upon Land Security, the Money-Acts in every Part
 
punctually enforced and executed, the Payments
 
of Principal and Interest being duly and
 
strictly required, and the Principal bona fide
 
268Yoder, "Paper Currency in Colonial Pennsylvania,"
 
p. 256.
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sunk according to Law, it is absolutely
 
impossible such Bills should ever sink below
 
their first Value, or below the Value of the
 
Land on which they are founded.269
 
Table 12
 
General Loan Office Foreclosures
 
(In Pound Sterling)
 
SALE PRICE  DUE TO THE LOAN OFFICE  BALANCE TO OWNERS
 
218  34  184
 
282  81  210
 
100  33  67
 
150  136  14
 
450  10  440
 
513  79  434
 
115  94  20
 
200  23  196
 
60 40  20
 
151  82  69
 
191  111  80
 
260  40  220
 
66  22  44270
 
Further, Franklin "...maintained that credible and backed
 
money would not be inflationary, in part because its
 
creation corresponded to the earmarking of a set of real
 
assets which backed it."m  For the most part,
 
Franklin's observations can be supported by the actions of
 
the General Loan Office.  Conservative lending policies
 
ensured ample assets to retire paper money emissions while
 
269Benjamin Franklin, A Modest Enquiry into the Nature
 
and Necessity of a Paper-Currency, p. 32.
 
270Thayer,
 (1953) "The Land-Bank System," Journal of
 
Economic History, Vol. XIII, no. 2,  (Spring):  p. 154.
 
271Charles W. Calomiris, (1988) "Institutional
 
Failure, Monetary Scarcity, and Depreciation of the
 
Continental." The Journal of Economic History, vol.
 
XLVIII, no. 1 (Mar), p. 51.
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allowing production to continue without having the
 
collateral withheld as security against default.  It seems
 
clear that the trustees were free to set their own loan
 
policy within the guidelines stipulated by each currency
 
enactment.  The one major guideline the trustees had to
 
adhere to was set by the assembly.  Each currency act
 
specified the maximum loan amount on the various forms of
 
security.  Usually, this amount was less than fifty per
 
cent of the value of the mortgaged asset.  So, while the
 
assembly did not prescribe a set formula or ratio between
 
land mortgaged and money received, it did set a maximum.
 
The fiscally conservative nature of the assembly had to
 
have been another factor influencing each trustee's loan
 
policy.  Trustees were answerable to the assembly for the
 
default rates in their loan portfolios.  This could
 
account for some of the apparently harsh foreclosures as
 
reflected in the previous table.  By combining trustee
 
demands for such a strong collateral base the emission of
 
paper money was actually broadly dispersed throughout
 
Pennsylvania because individuals could not borrow an
 
amount equal to the total assessed value of their land.
 
The currency enactments provided for limits on the
 
total amount anyone could mortgage which helped more of
 
the "poor, industrious" people who sought credit.
 
"Surviving records testify that Pennsylvania fulfilled its
 
promise to the common man.  The great majority of all
 
loans granted in 1774 under the new loan act were made to
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n 272
 yeoman farmers and mechanics. There was almost
 
always a waiting list to for loans.
 
One of the reasons the Loan Office worked remarkably
 
well was the fact that the initial Act of 1723 required "a
 
committee of the Assembly...once every year or oftener, as
 
the Assembly shall think fit, be appointed to audit the
 
accounts..."m  In August 1724, House Speaker David
 
Lloyd appointed a committee of five, including Francis
 
Rawle, to inspect the accounts of the General Loan Office.
 
The inspection revealed that the paper money experiment
 
was working quite well.  The evaluation helped instill
 
confidence with foreign and domestic merchants as well as
 
with the public.274
 
C.  The Malfeasance of William Fishborune
 
Nevertheless, the loan office was not without
 
scandal.  In late October, 1730, the Pennsylvania Gazette
 
reported a burglary:
 
...the House of William Fishbourne, Esq; late
 
one of the Trustees of the loan Office, was
 
broken open; and 'tis said that near 2000 of the
 
272Thayer,
 (1953) "The Land-Bank System in the
 
American Colonies," Journal of Economic History, Vol.
 
XIII, no. 2,  (Spring), p. 155.  Note that Thayer (and
 
Yoder) reveal that the only "surviving" records showing
 
who received loans came from a much later period in the
 
mid-1770s.  The lack of earlier historical records led
 
both historians to consider later data representative of
 
earlier periods.
 
273Sparks,  The Works of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 2,
 
p.332.
 
274Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, pp. 1594-1595.
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Public Money is missing which was to have been 
delivered to the new Trustees the next day.275 
Even before, the auditing committee of the Assembly had 
reached the conclusion that William Fishbourne was guilty 
of "malfeasance.  "276  Fishbourne defended his conduct 
declaring:  "That the said Money had been feloniously 
taken from him; but that he was not willing to trouble the 
House with a detail of Particulars...[but] he was willing 
to give Security for the Payment of the said Money in some 
reasonable Time..."217  The Assembly soon passed "An 
Act278 to Disable William Fishbourne from Holding an 
Office of Trustee...and [to] Secure the Payment of a 
Provincial Debt Due From the Said William Fishbourne." 
William Fishbourne, successful businessman and former 
Provincial treasurer, the assembly asserted:
 
...during his continance in said office  of
 
[ "Principle acting"] trustee of the general loan
 
office...had fraudulently concealed and applied
 
to his use a considerable sum of the said bills
 
of credit in high violation of his trust and in
 
open breach of the duty of his office, contrary
 
to the tenor and directions of said laws, to
 
great damage of the public and to the great
 
disappointment of many of the inhabitants of
 
mOct. 22, 1730. Pennsylvania Gazette. as quoted by
 
Yoder in Paper Currency in Colonial Pennsylvania, p. 236.
 
276Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 2058.
 
p. 2057.
 
278Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, IV, pp. 226-228. 
279Mr.  Fishbourne, served as Principle Acting trustee
 
from 1723 until 1730.
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this province who had occasion to borrow the
 
said bills of credit...m
 
For such a breach of law and ethics, the Assembly demanded
 
a mortgage281 from Fishbourne, rather than any criminal
 
action, in the amount of paper money he was guilty of
 
"misappropriating."  Ironically, the judgment of £1,779
 
18s. 3d. was to be administered by the General Loan Office
 
on terms of five percent interest with the total being
 
repayable in five years.  In 1733 the terms of the
 
trustees were set at four years instead of good
 
behavior.282
 
D.  Public Administration
 
The public finance provisions of each currency
 
emission became highly coveted by the assembly.  Interest
 
paid by mortgagees into the loan office was to be used at
 
the discretion of the Assembly.  "For more than twenty-

five years before the French and Indian War, the interest
 
received by the government supported [provincial] expenses
 
without the necessity of direct taxes.  Relative freedom
 
from taxation probably contributed to Pennsylvania's
 
280Pennsylvania Statutes at Large, IV, p. 226.
 
281Pennsylvania Archives, 8th series, p. 2056.
 
282Although the General Loan Office can be seen as
 
very successful, another account of misappropriation of
 
funds in 1751 can be found in The Pennsylvania Magazine of
 
History and Biography, vol. LXXV, no. 4 (Oct):  400-415,
 
"The Disgrace of John Kinsey, Quaker Politician, 1739­
1750," by Edwin Bronner.
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remarkable growth."283  This form of taxation also
 
reduced the Province's reliance on excise and import
 
duties, and promoted trade and immigration.
 
The Assembly functioned as a valve controlling the
 
quantity of paper money emitted.  The Assembly's levying
 
of taxes acted as a device to control the quantity of
 
paper money and its value.  This ability to tax suggests
 
that paper money acted as a deterrent upon government to
 
accumulate public debt since the value of all paper money
 
would be affected, to the likely dismay of the citizenry.
 
Additionally, paper currency enhanced the Province's
 
ability to collect taxes since the populous had more
 
access to money.284
 
E.  Economic Perspective of the First Seven Years
 
An inspection of Pennsylvania's currency issues in
 
the dynamic periods of depression and war, permits one
 
major conclusion:  Pennsylvania's monetary policy remained
 
consistent throughout forty years of operation.  Notable
 
inflation was avoided.
 
From the onset in 1723, Pennsylvania's paper money
 
Acts were carefully conceived.  The first issues injected
 
£45,000 into the economy and answered the need for a
 
283E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse, p. 6.
 
Additionally, in a footnote, Mr. Ferguson states:  "No
 
general property tax was enacted after 1717 until the
 
outbreak of the French and Indian War."
 
284E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse, p. 7.
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medium of trade and debtor relief.  Business recovered,
 
and the experiment was judged a success.  Governor Keith
 
commented later:
 
It is inconceivable to think what a prodigious
 
good Effect immediately ensued on all the
 
Affairs of that Province; the Shipping from the
 
West of England, Scotland, and Ireland, which
 
just before used to be detain'd five, six, and
 
sometimes nine Months in the Country, before
 
they could get in the Debts due to them and
 
load, were now dispatch'd in a Month or six
 
Weeks at the farthest.  The poor middling People
 
who had any Lands or Houses to pledge, borrow'd
 
from the Loan-Office, and paid off their
 
usurious Creditors; and to render them more easy
 
for the future, as well as to bring Things
 
nearer to Par, lawful Interest was at this Time
 
reduced from eight to six per Cent, by which
 
means the Town was soon filled with People, and
 
Business all over the Province increased at a
 
great rate.285
 
Francis Rawle concurred in the general approval of policy,
 
declaring "How far it [paper money] has answer'd the Ends
 
proposed, is obvious to all judging Men, who do not
 
wilfully shut their Eyes...But he may See, if he'll please
 
to open his Eyes, that Paper Money will at this Time build
 
Vessels, purchase Goods, and Serve the other Uses of
 
Money, as well as while the Project was young...the
 
Planter and Tradesman in a concording Harmony will tell
 
285Sir William Keith, "A Collection of Papers and
 
Other Tracts Written Occasionally on Various Subjects," as
 
quoted in Lester (1938) "Currency Issues to Overcome
 
Depressions in Pennsylvania, 1723 and 1729." Journal of
 
Political Economy, vol. XLVII, no. 1 (Feb-Dec): p. 399.
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him, that Paper-Money reviv'd Trade and freed them from
 
great Difficulties."m
 
From 1723 to 1724 Pennsylvania's imports doubled287
 
in terms of British pound sterling while exports to
 
Britain decreased by over 50 percent, suggesting that
 
Pennsylvania's recovery was based upon domestic activity
 
rather than upon export.m After the December 1723
 
currency issue, trade increased remarkably.
 
Three further conclusions are illustrated in the
 
table of imports below.  First, "Gresham's Law" was in
 
effect.  Stated simply, bad money drives out good money,
 
or, put differently, "an undervalued money [specie] will
 
be driven out of circulation and an overvalued money
 
[paper money] would stay in circulation."289
 
Pennsylvanians after 1723 had the use of a viable domestic
 
mRawle, A Just Rebuke to a Dialogue betwixt Simon
 
and Timothy, pp. 5, 11-12.  Between 1722 and 1724 ship
 
construction doubled from 10 to 19 ships.
 
287Lester, (1938) in "Currency Issues in
 
Pennsylvania," Journal of Political Economy, vol. XLVI,
 
(Feb-Dec): p. 344,  states:  "The total imports of
 
Pennsylvania from Great Briton increased more rapidly
 
during the two decades following the first issue of paper
 
money there than did the imports of any other colony from
 
Britain."
 
mThe following discussion of the economic effects of
 
paper money in Pennsylvania is largely drawn from Lester's
 
Monetary Experiments, Early America and Recent
 
Scandinavian, and "Currency Issues to Overcome Depression
 
in Pennsylvania, 1723 and 1729." Journal of Political
 
Economy, (1938) vol. XLVI, (Feb-Dec):  324-375.
 
289Douglas Vickers, Money, Banking, and the
 
Macroeconomv, p. 59.
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currency, and they believed that coin could be exported to
 
pay for imports without harming domestic trade or
 
transactions.  Second, the volume of imports supports the
 
contention that renewed immigration brought  settlers to
 
the Province.290  Third, the lower interest rates or cost
 
of money spurred both domestic and foreign purchases.
 
Table 13
 
Imports and Exports of Pennsylvania
 
(in Pounds Sterling)
 
YEAR  IMPORTS  EXPORTS 
1720  24,532  7,929 
1721  21,548  8,037 
1722  26,394  6,882 
1723  15,993  8,332 
1724  30,325  4,057 
1725  42,210  11,981 
1726  57,635  5,960 
1727  31,980  12,823 
1728 
1729 
37,479 
29,800 
15,231
7,435291 
As some twentieth century scholars have observed, the
 
relief from depression caused by paper money was not
 
without some rise in the sterling exchange.  A
 
depreciation of the currency by nine percent resulted by
 
1725.  Over the same period, the prices of twenty
 
wholesale commodities rose thirty-one percent.292  It has
 
290See the population table on page 55.
 
mLester, (1938) "Currency in Pennsylvania," Journal
 
of Political Economy, vol. XLVI, (Feb-Dec), p. 341,
 
Table 1.
 
292Leslie V. Brock, The Currency of the American
 
Colonies, Richard A. Lester, Monetary Experiments, Early
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been suggested that "Part, at least, of the price rise may
 
more aptly be thought of as the result of re-inflation,
 
rather than of inflation."m  In other words, the lack
 
of specie reduced prices to such an extent that when paper
 
money was introduced, it was not paper money that
 
inflated, but prices returning or increasing to a normal
 
level.  This result (increased price level) can be
 
confirmed further by the fact that the price trend was
 
downward during 1720, 1721, 1722, and then leveled during
 
1723.  (See table below)
 
Table 14
 
Indexes of Prices  in Philadelphia
 
YEAR  WHEAT  FLOUR 
1720  100.0  100.0 
1721  99.0  95.4 
1722  96.4  96.4 
1723  88.6  95.0 
1724  109.1  118.3 
1725  125.6  130.9 
1726  124.0  135.1 
1727  106.2  123.8 
1728  110.1  108.2 
1729  120.1  115.0294 
"After the initial issues of 1723, there appears no
 
marked relationship between fluctuations in the amount of
 
American and Recent Scandinavian, both reached this
 
conclusion.
 
mBrock, The Currency of the American Colonies,
 
p. 80.
 
294Lester,(1938) "Currency Issues in Pennsylvania,"
 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. XLVI, (Feb-Dec.), p.
 
354, 356, table 6.
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paper money in circulation and fluctuations in wholesale
 
commodity prices and the rate of sterling exchange."295
 
The absence of a relationship suggests that the amount
 
emitted came close to meeting Provincial demand for a
 
medium of trade, a remarkable feat in itself.
 
The revival of business late in 1729 and in 1730,
 
from a downturn beginning in late 1727, is reflected in
 
the figures for imports of British goods in Pennsylvania,
 
and it parallels the earlier 1723-24 issue.  Imports
 
increased no less than sixty-three percent, which
 
represented an increase exceeding that in any other
 
Colony. 296  Prices in 1729 rose eight percent immediately
 
after the addition in currency.297  Pennsylvania's initial
 
seven year experiment (1723-30) issuing paper money ended
 
with resounding success.  The issues were moderate in
 
quantity, and the overall plan and implementation were
 
well conceived and administered.
 
F.  Economic Perspective of the Seven Years' War
 
The period of warfare between 1755-63 became the
 
harshest test for the colony's paper money.  As noted, it
 
became imperative during this period that Pennsylvania
 
295Brock, The Currency of the American Colonies,
 
p. 82.
 
296Lester,  (1938) "Currency Issues in Pennsylvania."
 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. XLVI, (Feb-Dec.), p.
 
366.
 
297Yoder, "Currency of Colonial Pennsylvania," p. 341.
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issue almost five times the province's pre-war currency
 
for defense purposes.  Such a substantial increase, from
 
£85,000 to £500,000, does raise questions, including, why
 
they issued fiat money and what effect such a large
 
expansion of paper money had on the economy.
 
Previous scholars have made the inference that 
Pennsylvania succumbed to the temptation of easy money and 
then entered a period of inflation.  But as Robert Craig 
West points out "...strong evidence [exists] that any 
generalization about inflationary effects of paper money 
issues will probably be incorrect.  "298 
G.  The Conversion to Fiat Money
 
Why Pennsylvania converted to fiat money to finance
 
their war appropriations and how citizens responded to the
 
issues are perhaps the critical questions that should be
 
asked about this period.  Pennsylvania, like all the other
 
Colonies, found "it was difficult or impossible for
 
governments to borrow from their own citizens.  The wealth
 
of the country did not exist in liquid form.  Private
 
capital was tied up in land or commodities, and no banks
 
or business corporations had yet been formed.  When war or
 
other emergencies required large outlays, colonial
 
governments discovered no alternative to paper money."299
 
298Robert Craig West, (1978) "Money in the Colonial
 
American Economy," Economic Inquiry, XVI, (Oct), p. 6.
 
299E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse, pp. 7-8.
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Pennsylvania adapted paper money from what had originally
 
been a means of alleviating depression to a system of
 
financing war.  This logical step revealed that
 
Pennsylvania was unable to produce anywhere near the
 
quantity of interest income from paper money to meet the
 
demands of war while  it had a "public bank" or General
 
Loan Office available to finance most governmental
 
operations.  The private economy could not realistically
 
absorb such a large amount of paper money and provide even
 
partial security.  The supply of money demanded by war
 
simply out-paced private demand for mortgages.  No
 
alternative was left for the government but to resort to
 
fiat money.  Pennsylvania embarked fully upon a system of
 
"Currency Finance"m° whereby paper money was issued to
 
meet government expenses and redeemed through taxation.
 
"The truth is, that in a struggle of the magnitude of the
 
French and Indian War, the colonies' only means of timely
 
and adequate exertion was the issuance of bills of
 
credit.301  No colony succeeded in supplying the funds by
 
any other method."3°2
 
30 °See  E. James Ferguson, (1953) "Currency Finance:
 
An Interpretation of Colonial Monetary Practices," The
 
William and Mary Quarterly, vol. X, Third Series:  153­
180.
 
mFiat money is now the rule in the present modern
 
economy.  Governments manipulate currency as a means of
 
controlling the economy.
 
302Brock,
 Currency of the American Colonies,
 
pp. 466-467.
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H.  The Backing of Fiat Currency
 
If war-time paper money issues were not backed or
 
supported by land, as was the case with all previous
 
Pennsylvania issues, what then upheld the value of the
 
currency in the eyes of the citizens?  The answer lies in
 
the fact that "The issue of paper money was deliberately
 
linked to the imposition of current and future tax
 
liabilities for its early redemption.  The implication of
 
this expenditure/tax arrangement was that the decision to
 
issue paper money implied a simultaneous decision to
 
tax."m  Paper money can be defined as an instrument of
 
indebtedness or a liability of the government.  "Its
 
value depended] on its future backing by real assets
 
through its usefulness as a means of extinguishing real
 
tax obligations which otherwise would be paid in specie,
 
and the interim flow of liquidity services it
 
303Elmus Wicker, (1985) "Colonial Monetary Standards
 
Contrasted:  Evidence from the Seven Years' War." Journal
 
of Economic History, vol. XLV (Dec), p. 870.  However
 
economist Ron Michener, (1988) in "Backing Theories and
 
the Currencies of Eighteenth-Century America:  A Comment."
 
Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3,  (Sept):
 
682-698, refutes the "Backing theory" on the grounds that
 
a) the money supply data is not an accurate reflection of
 
the total circulating medium in the colony, and b)
 
inadequate attention was paid to the exchange rate regime.
 
w'Somewhat remarkable is the fact that the
 
inhabitants of Pennsylvania retained their faith in
 
themselves as a sufficient tax-base to retire these paper
 
money emissions, especially since "it [was] virtually
 
impossible to estimate correctly in advance the amount of
 
funds needed for war finance."  Elmus Wicker, (1985)
 
"Colonial Monetary Standards Contrasted," Journal of
 
Economic History, vol. XLV, (Dec), p. 872.
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provides."3°  The concept of backing can be seen as
 
fundamental to the success of Pennsylvania's paper
 
currency in both depression and war.  The importance of
 
land backing in determining the value of money is
 
"extended by analogy to the government's use of its assets
 
(future taxes) as a means of redeeming and giving value to
 
its debts, including currency."306  Even Adam Smith
 
concurred with the conclusion that paper money was
 
supported by its ability to be received in payment for
 
Provincial taxes.w
 
Between 1755 and 1760, Pennsylvania backed its
 
currency by specifically legislated provisions for
 
redemption via either a property and income tax or an
 
excise tax.  All of the emissions after 1755 with the
 
single exception of 1756, which required an excise tax,
 
were to be retired from property/tax revenues within three
 
to four years.
 
I.  The Loan Office Revisited
 
An important remaining question is how the
 
administration of the large war issuances was carried out.
 
The answer lies with the Assembly's utilization of the
 
305Charles W. Calomiris, (1988) "Institutional
 
Failure, Monetary Scarcity, and the Deprecation of the
 
Continental," Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLVIII,
 
No. 1,  (Mar), p. 65.
 
p. 51.
 
30TAdam Smith,  An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
 
of The Wealth of Nations, p. 312.
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General Loan Office.  The Loan Office was able to act as a
 
parallel administrative body to the war commissioners by
 
accounting for paper emissions and commission expenditures
 
to the Assembly.  Legislative oversight of the Loan Office
 
served as a check against possible fraudulent activity by
 
both the Commission and the Loan Office.
 
The Loan Office was charged with carrying forward the
 
actual administration of the issuances in conjunction with
 
the legislative appointment of commissioners.  The
 
commissioners authorized wartime appropriations and acted
 
with the consent of either the British commander-in-chief
 
or the Governor.  The commissioners instituted an agency
 
on which government relied to print, release, and redeem
 
all paper money issuances.  The Loan Office continued to
 
be the central clearing house for Provincial money
 
creation and destruction during the war.  As a clearing
 
house it handled both forms of money in circulation:  the
 
approximately £85,000 issued before the war and secured by
 
mortgages, plus the fiat additions made during the war.
 
With the King's repeal of the 1760 re-emission Act and the
 
gradual redemption of the mortgaged paper money, the Loan
 
Office ceased to function in its previous capacity as a
 
Provincial source of capital.  Printing of fiat money
 
ended nearly forty years of interest income the Assembly
 
had used to finance Pennsylvania's government.
 131 
J.  Economic Observations
 
Pennsylvania's need, administration, and methodology
 
for financing her wartime emissions have been discussed.
 
The next question to be asked is how effective was this
 
system economically.  The first test would be stability of
 
prices.  As the backing theory suggests,308 it must be
 
asked if the Province's price level remained unaffected by
 
the quantity of money emitted because of the fact
 
legislation provided for the appropriate fiscal policies
 
for retirement.  Was the value of paper money determined
 
by fiscal policy?
 
To answer the question, we may refer to Robert Craig
 
West's regression models constructed "to measure the
 
degree of correlation between changes in the price level
 
measured in paper money and changes in the stock of paper
 
money."309  West's research found that by using price data
 
from Philadelphia between 1723-60 "inflation and the issue
 
308The backing theory suggests that the price level
 
should remain unaffected since the government at the time
 
of issuing paper money also provides for its redemption at
 
a future date, thus the fiscal "balance sheet" of
 
liabilities [paper money] and assets [future taxes)
 
remains equal.
 
309Robert Craig West, (1978) "Money in the Colonial
 
American Economy," Economic Inquiry, Vol. XVI, (Oct),
 
p. 2.
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of paper money [appear] unrelated.n°  One can place
 
great confidence in these results since the price data for
 
Philadelphia are very good."311
 
"The Bezanson index of wholesale prices of 20
 
commodities in Philadelphia shows only a 20 percent rise
 
in price between 1755 and 1760, a surprisingly small
 
annual increase for a colonial government that had
 
expanded the stock of paper money fivefold."312  This
 
judgement is further confirmed by Paton Yoder:  "There was
 
more paper currency circulating in 1760 than at any other
 
time in the Colonial history of Pennsylvania, yet...prices
 
had risen only 20 points or about 18 percent.  Prices had
 
arisen another 17 points by 1763 after the amount of paper
 
money had very materially been reduced."313
 
310Elmus Wicker (1985) in "Colonial Monetary Standards
 
Contrasted:  Evidence from the Seven Years' War,"Journal
 
of Economic History, Vol. 45, (Dec), p. 884, states that:
 
"The economic consequences of effectively linking the
 
issue of paper money and the imposition of current and
 
future tax liabilities in the Currency Act of 1751 have
 
been insufficiently appreciated, and thus the distorting
 
effects of currency issue on the rate of inflation have
 
been exaggerated."
 
311Ibid., p. 5.  West, (1978) "Money in the Colonial
 
American Economy," Economic Inquiry, Vol. XVI (Oct): pp.
 
11-13 also addresses the fact that his regression may be
 
somewhat imprecise due to the fact that by being unable to
 
include such important facets of the money supply as book
 
credit his findings may be somewhat impaired.
 
312Elmus Wicker, (1985) "Colonial Monetary Standards
 
Contrasted:  Evidence from the Seven Years' War," Journal
 
of Economic History, Vol. 45,  (Dec): p. 880.
 
313Yoder, "Currency of Colonial Pennsylvania," p. 343.
 133 
For the period 1755-1759, Pennsylvania's exchange
 
rate with England appreciated nine percent.  Dr. Elmus
 
Wicker surmises that the reason for such appreciation was
 
because of substantial wartime British spending in the
 
Colonies for supply of their North American and European
 
troops, an amount estimated at £7.9 million.  Prior to the
 
termination of the war, between 1759-62, Pennsylvania's
 
currency depreciated only 14.8 percent.  Even though
 
Pennsylvania had moderate depreciation, Edwin J. Perkins
 
identifies one "positive" ramification resulting from any
 
amount of depreciation.
 
The depreciation of currencies can also be
 
viewed as an alternative method of taxation.
 
Legislatures frequently issued new paper in
 
financial emergencies to avoid sharp hikes in
 
current taxes.  To the extent that the currency
 
depreciated and was never fully redeemed, the
 
real tax burden fell on all those who held the
 
paper over the years.  In many ways, this became
 
a relatively painless tax system, for the
 
incidence was spread out over a long period of
 
time.  The recipient of paper merely lost a few
 
percentage points in the value of the money when
 
the next transaction occurred.  This net effect
 
was analogous to a modern excise tax.314
 
Paper currency contracted thirty-eight percent
 
between 1760-65 because of a combination of three factors.
 
First, Provincial redemption or taxation of approximately
 
£25,000 per year resulted in approximately fifty percent
 
of the paper currency being redeemed by 1763.  Second,
 
termination of the war reduced British government spending
 
314Edwin J. Perkins, The Economy of Colonial America,
 
p. 179.
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in America for military supplies.  Finally, Parliamentary
 
reimbursement of colonial military expenditures also came
 
to an end.  Total reimbursement for the Province amounted
 
to £75,311 or 24 percent of her total £313,043 wartime
 
expenditures. When paid, colonial money was essentially
 
changed for specie.315  The end of such British
 
expenditures and payments drastically curtailed the influx
 
of specie in the Province.
 
K.  Broad Economic Observations
 
The history of Pennsylvania's paper money experience
 
has been interpreted via a broad array of positive remarks
 
made by historians and economists.  A sampling leaves
 
little doubt as to her success.  Adam Smith concluded:
 
"Pennsylvania was always more moderate in its emission of
 
paper money than any other of our colonies.  Its paper
 
currency accordingly is said never to have sunk below the
 
value of the gold and silver which was current in the
 
Colony before the first emission of its paper money."316
 
Richard Lester stated:  "In Pennsylvania a little currency
 
inflation did not lead to extreme currency inflation, and
 
the price level during the fifty-two years prior to the
 
315Elmus Wicker, (1985) "Colonial Monetary Standards
 
Contrasted:  Evidence from the Seven Years' War," Journal
 
of Economic History, Vol 45,  (Dec), table 3, page 877.
 
However, Brock, Currency of the American Colonies, states
 
the amount at £110,083, table XX, p. 390-91.
 
316Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
 
of The Wealth of Nations, p. 311.
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American Revolution that Pennsylvania was on a paper
 
standard was more stable than the American price level has
 
been during any succeeding fifty-year period."317  Lester
 
further asserted that "...the exchange value of the
 
currency seems not to have fallen more than about 30
 
percent in terms of gold and silver for any year during
 
the period of fifty or sixty years that the Colonies were
 
on a paper standard prior to the Revolutionary War."318
 
Theodore Thayer remarked:  "...there was in the middle
 
Colonies a shunning of inflation and a greater effort to
 
find paper money a sound and adequate currency necessary
 
to a healthy economic structure."319  These remarks,
 
spanning over two centuries of research, reveal that
 
Pennsylvania understood the total ramifications of
 
currency and how success followed moderation.
 
L.  The Assembly, Proprietorship and the Governorship
 
Paper money contributed to "single issue
 
politics "320 for the period 1723 to 1763.  While paper
 
money "did not engender any great conflict between the
 
317Richard A. Lester, (1938) "Currency Issues to
 
Overcome Depressions in Pennsylvania," Journal of
 
Political Economy, Vol. XLVI, (Feb-Dec), p. 325.
 
m8Ibid.
 
3 19Thayer,  (1953) "The Land-Bank System in the
 
American Colonies,"Journal of Economic History, Vol. XIII,
 
No. 2,  (spring), p. 146.
 
320Thomas L. Purvis, Proprietors, Patronage, and Paper
 
Money:  Legislative Politics in New Jersey, 1703-1776,
 
p. 144.
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broad classes of the population, "321 it became, as has
 
been shown, a significant source of contention between the
 
Assembly, the Executive, and the Proprietorship.  The
 
political comparison indicates that the Assembly's makeup
 
differed significantly in the two periods.  By 1755-63,
 
distrust in the proprietorship gave rise to the anti-

proprietary party and its firm control of the Assembly.
 
In contrast, between 1723-30, an equitable mix of
 
conservative proprietarians and anti-proprietary members
 
held power with a small fringe of the radical paper money
 
party.  Gradually, through efforts from such men as
 
Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania began pressuring the
 
English government to revoke the Penn proprietorship and
 
make the province a Royal Colony.  Although Pennsylvania
 
was never to become a Royal Colony, paper money set the
 
stage for a far more important transition.
 
321E. James Ferguson, (1953) "Currency Finance:  An
 
Interpretation of Colonial Monetary Practices," William
 
and Mary Ouarterly, Vol. X, Third Series, p. 157.
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CHAPTER V
 
CONCLUSION
 
A.  Convergence
 
Pennsylvania's issuance of paper money brought her
 
salvation from depression, war, and to a large extent the
 
proprietorship.  Paper money signalled the maturing of
 
both her political and economic thought.  The two periods
 
under discussion show how the convergence of economic and
 
public finance policy decisions created a political
 
confidence in the province's elected officials and their
 
ability to remedy problems and act decisively in the
 
interest of the colony.  Thus, for Pennsylvania during the
 
eighteenth century, the politics surrounding paper money
 
can be viewed as a movement decidedly away from
 
proprietary and, eventually, from English control.
 
In the final analysis, the evidence supports the
 
beneficial aspects of Pennsylvania's paper money and the
 
key role it played developing the colony economically and
 
politically.
 
B.  Economics
 
Pennsylvania experienced significant periods of
 
inadequate specie throughout the colonial period.  For
 
this trading Colony, currency of all forms was the
 
lifeblood.  When an insufficient supply of currency
 
existed, the result a was sharp reduction in trade, both
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domestic and foreign.  "This could lead in turn to rapid
 
declines in output and employment and to consequent price
 
deflation, resulting in widespread insolvency...  022
 
Population growth was another factor.  Without a means of
 
monetary settlement, population diminished through
 
migration to other colonies.  Trade was unable to sustain
 
the burgeoning domestic demand for currency.  "Domestic
 
economic activity was increasing relative to the foreign
 
sector."323  But Pennsylvania suffered less from an
 
overall excess of imports over exports than from an
 
inadequate supply of money to serve as a medium of
 
exchange.  The colony demanded a more efficient
 
"mechanism" for economic growth.  The economy had
 
developed to a stage where its most effective substitutes
 
and supplements for specie, barter, and proclamation money
 
could not efficiently fulfill the requirement of a medium
 
of exchange.  A specie substitute became an economic
 
imperative.  The specie substitute was to act as a
 
supplement to pre-existing mediums such as specie, bills
 
of exchange, and book credit. It was meant to bring
 
monetary demands into equilibrium with supply.  Private
 
liquid capital did not exist in sufficient quantity to
 
322Robert Craig West (1978) in "Money in the Colonial
 
American Economy," Economic Inquiry, Vol. XVI, (Oct), p.
 
11, quoting Glower and Leijonhufvud, "The Coordination of
 
Economic Activities:  A Keynesian Perspective, American
 
Economic Review, May 1975.
 
p. 13.
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establishment a viable financial alternative.
 
Additionally, the lack of ready currency to pay even taxes
 
prohibited the public sector from creating a comparable
 
capital fund.  Taxation proved to be pivotal and
 
provincial government was able to supply a sufficient
 
volume of credit through the issuance of paper money.
 
Charles W. Calomiris has written:
 
The motivation for government intervention in
 
the creation of paper money must rest on a
 
comparative advantage which the government
 
enjoys in supplying liquidity relative to
 
private citizens.  Typically, the government's
 
claim on the future through taxation is viewed
 
as the source of that advantage.324
 
"Instead of creating financial institutions to solve
 
this problem...a new type of means of settlement" was
 
utilized.325  Government pledged future tax revenues, the
 
only asset it had at its disposal, to create paper money.
 
Pennsylvania helped to implement a currency system far
 
more advanced than any country in the world, and that
 
system emerged as a basic structure of modern money and
 
banking .326  Pennsylvania's paper money system helped to
 
foster long-run economic growth by lowering transaction
 
costs, interest rates and taxation.  Lower transaction
 
324Charles W. Calomiris, (1988) "Institutional
 
Failure, Monetary Scarcity, and the Depreciation of the
 
Continental," Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLVIII,
 
No. 1,  (Mar):  p. 65.
 
325Robert Craig West, (1978) "Money in the Colonial
 
American Economy," Economic Inquiry, Vol. XVI, (Oct), p.
 
13.
 
326Meyers, A Financial History of the U.S., p. 6.
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costs meant merchants charged cheaper prices because
 
payment was more readily assessable as taxes.  Taxes were
 
lowered.  Farmers saw land prices increase as they made
 
investments through lower interest and tax rates.  Trade,
 
especially critically needed manufactured inputs, was
 
encouraged because of low excise taxes at port facilities
 
and the colonists' ability to use specie for exports.  It
 
is apparent that "Without it [paper money], internal
 
growth during the colonial period might have been severely
 
retarded."327
 
C.  Public Finance Provisions
 
Paper money became a crucial element in public
 
finance during both periods under consideration.  The
 
interest that accrued to the General Loan Office from
 
mortgages provided substantial revenues for governmental
 
operations and investment in the Province.  Overall taxes
 
were lessened as a result.
 
Paper money paid Provincial expenses and also
 
financed war.  The additional currency paid for war
 
appropriations while expanding the tax base by making it
 
easier to assess and collect taxes because of the
 
prevalence of money.  So successful was war finance that
 
further confidence was instilled in the paper money
 
system.  Even England saw the wealth generated.  England
 
came to the conclusion that such a rapid repayment of
 
p. 13.
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wartime debt was justification to impose English taxes
 
eventually.
 
Pennsylvania did not lose sight of the link between
 
government fiscal policy and monetary value.  The
 
recognition of the relationship imposed fiscal restraint
 
on the government which was instrumental in achieving
 
paper money's success.
 
D.  Political Ramifications
 
Beyond the economic success of paper money was
 
Pennsylvania's deep-seated belief that the Provincial
 
Assembly through powers invested by the free men of the
 
Colony had the unequivocal right to determine fiscal and
 
monetary policy.  The Assembly saw the success of paper
 
money as both a demonstration and the evidence of the
 
unquestionable power assigned to the Assembly by the
 
English constitution.  For the Assembly, the Governor and
 
the proprietorship's sole purpose was to facilitate the
 
exercise of this inherent right of the House.  Paper money
 
became a significant source of contention between the
 
legislature and the executive/proprietorship.  The
 
political winner would control the Province completely.
 
The Governor and the proprietary were pitted against a
 
formidable foe.  The Assembly's Anti-proprietary or Quaker
 
party...
 
...had experienced no difficulty in maintaining
 
its popularity.  Nothing, in fact, could better
 
recommend it to all classes and sections of the
 
province than its championhip of paper money.
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So great was the desire for more paper money
 
that it became inseparably bound to the French
 
and Indian question and the whole problem of
 
defense.  The obstruction of the paper money
 
legislation by the Proprietors, their governors,
 
and the Crown, had the effect of greatly
 
widening the breach between the people and the
 
executive branch of government.  The controversy
 
was a fitting one to open the ensuing quarter-

century struggle for popular government in
 
Pennsylvania. '5'=8
 
Proprietary interests were battling the most "cherished
 
rights" of Englishmen and not only the Assembly.
 
Pennsylvania's assembly thought nothing as important as
 
their guaranteed freedom to legislate in the best
 
interests of the province.  For the majority of these
 
legislators, frontier enemies could always be vanquished,
 
but the inherent rights of government, representative
 
taxation and expenditure, once compromised or lost, were
 
far more difficult to recapture.  "No matter what the
 
emergency...their constitution was not less important to
 
them than their soil.  If they were to protect the
 
Province they must keep it worth protecting.  It was as
 
much their duty to defend their liberties as to resist the
 
French."329  Ultimately, the Assembly was able to
 
reinforce substantially Pennsylvania's financial autonomy
 
from the Governor and the proprietorship.  The battle was
 
worth fighting, for it was an experience incalculably
 
invaluable in the Revolutionary War.
 
3213Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of
 
Democracy, p. 33.
 
329Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin, p. 227.
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E.  Concluding Remarks
 
Pennsylvania's Assembly did what few Assemblies have
 
ever done by grasping the importance of an economic
 
concept.  It tenaciously fostered, protected, and followed
 
currency through to a significant political end.  All
 
American currency, but especially Pennsylvania's,
 
highlighted the triumph of a new monetary experiment in
 
paper money.  Conceived, developed, and administered by
 
the Province, the issue of currency certainly became no
 
small consideration in convincing Pennsylvanians that
 
their fate was tied to their own determination and
 
resolve, not to the proprietorship
 
or England.
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APPENDIX A
 
1723 AND 1726 PAPER CURRENCY
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PENNSYLVANIA 
April 2,1723 
£15,000 in indented legal tender Loan Office Bills ap- plate at 5% interest with principal repayable in eight 
proved by the Act of Mar. 23, 1723 and dated April 2,  equal annual installments. Cast cuts including Arms of 
1723. They were redeemable by April 2, 1731 and were  the Penn family, otherwise typeset. Blank backs. Signers 
to be invalid after Aug. 2, 1731. Of this total £11,000  are Anthony Morris, Francis Rawle, Charles Read, and 
was to be loaned on security of land, houses, or silver  Benjamin Vining. 
iShglitiek  * ..... Set 
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5s [6,000) © 
10s :6,000; 
15: (4,000) 
20s [6,0001 155 
PENNSYLVANIA
 
January 17, 1723141 
£30,000 in indented legal tender Loan Office Bills approved 
by the Act of Dec. 12, 1723. Originally due July 17, 1736 but 
accelerated to Mar. 1. 1731(2) by the Act of Jan. 4, 1730(1). 
Of this amount £26,500 was to be loaned on security with prin­
cipal repayable over 121/2 years. On bills of Ss and over the  r r s.  FL LING S. number of crowns equivalent to the denomination was included
 
in the text to prevent raising the bills by alteration. Elaborate  itfrS  nuitj par& aa.
 
ten( for prentr 51:at-my, in All cut for indenture. Blank backs. Signers arc Samuel Hudson.  Prirnnrs
Anthony Morris, Frank Raw le, and Charles Read.  int mattw rvr /avert 
tsattia  tttr,4  Csf  erer,texth i,v 
at r 
tb-e Yr.0 01 nut I ,xtl, Is  7,000;  +16;  (Me rbsoyandSevrtt I sad  14,0001  bed Ark Trocra Zirer.
2s  [6,000]
 
2send  16,0001
 
51  [6,0001  (c1.
 
103  [5,0001
 
15s  [8,000]
 
20s [18,0001
 
March 25, 1726 
£10,000 in indented legal tender Bills issued to replace  the General Loan Office, expend them and repay by Jan. 
worn bills of prior issues pursuant to the Mar. 5, 1726  16, 1730(1), Signers are Evan Owen, Thomas Tresse, 
Act. Remission of prior issues was authorized by the  and John Wright. 
same Act so that the Province could borrow bills from. 
Is [9,000]  1,6d [10,000)  2* [3,000]  2s6d [8,000]  58 [20,000}  10: [5,0001 156 
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1729 AND 1739 PAPER CURRENCY
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PENNSYLVANIA
 
September 15, 1729 
£30,000 in indented legal tender Loan Office Bills approved 
by the Act of May 10, 1729 and due on Sept. 15, 1745, by 
which date the 16 year secured loans for which the bills were 
issued were to be repaid. Printed by Andrew Bradford, al- 2Vo,  ,  . 
though Benjamin Franklin erroneously claimed that he printed  k cive fperumazo.  .terry ftur TaWCt the hills. Blank backs. Signers arc Abraham Chapman, Ed- t Tito Mega .ftilly1;41 
t	 
h ward Home, John Parry, and Thomas Tresse.  Peittlivat .ss rig%a  4è4 Ofted/Ith DR/  Sr,ft. 
f n . - :tract, fa the )ror  *ar., 
Is [10,500]  5s [16,000]  '1  L.11 Ow nostfese goveviV1 
1s6d 07,0001  1 Os [12,000]  Iliad, rot aid Tirmsty 
2s [12,000]  15s  12,0001 
2s6d  ,[4,0001  20s [15,0001 
April 10, 1731 
£40,000 in legal tender Bills approved Feb. 6, 1730(1) along 
with authority to reemit £45,000 in prior issues. Printed by 
Benjamin Franklin. Signers are Job Goodson, Thomas Griff­
iths, Joseph Kirkbride, and John Parry. 
1s [4,000]  Ss [12,000] 
116d  [4,0001  105 [10,000) 
2s [5,C00;,,  15s  [8,000] likt 
2s6d [8,0001  20s [24,000] C 
August 10, 1739 
.f.50.000 in legal tender Bills issued pursuant to the May 
1, 1739 Act primarily to replace prior issues which had 
been extensively counterfeited. All prior emissions were 
made uneurrent after Aug. 10, 1740. Only 111,110 5s of 
the issue were to be used for 16 year loans. Approved 
by the Crown on May 12, 1740. This style of bill gener­
ally continued in use through 1776. The number of 
crowns is keyed to each of the four highest denomina­
tions which have Pensilvania deliberately misspelled  to 
Is  ;10,0001 
18241	  11 0,0003
 
110,000]
 
26d  [10,0001 
Ss  A & B Plate letters 
[30,000] 
10s  A, B, C, & 0 Plate 
letters [40,000) © 
151  A & B Plate letters 
[20.0001 
20s  A & B Plate letters 
[34,000] CO 
act as a secret check to detect alterations from the lower 
denominations. The backs of the four highest denomi­
nations contained an identical nature print in various 
positions. Benjamin Franklin in printing this issue intro­
duced nature printing on Pennsylvania paper money as 
a major deterrent to counterfeiters. Signers are Abraham 
Chapman, Joseph Harvey, Thomas Leech, William 
Monington, and Samuel Smith, 
I WENT  -RI I L  4-1  ,
+4?  Cc,,zitr-i.ife.tt, 1;5  ;;Ir 
'4 
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-- ....II 
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1746 PAPER CURRENCY
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August 1, 1746
 
£5,000 in legal tender Bills authorized by the June 24,
 
1746 Act to replace worn bills of prior issues and to be 
current until Oct. 15, 1762. Pence denominations arc 
small in size and contain type set in curved lines. Bills of 
20s arc similar to the Aug. 10, 1739 issue, and have the 
4d  [30.00:"; 
6d  130,000) 
9e1  [30.000] 
20s  Plate letters I., E. C, 
same nature print on the back.  Printed by Benjamin 
Franklin. Signers arc John Hall. Joseph Harvey, James 
Mitchell, James Morris, and Joseph Trotter. Three sign­
ers arc on the 20s and two signers on the others. 160
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1755 PAPER CURRENCY
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October 1, 1755 
£10,000 in legal tender Bills authorized June 2S, 1755 to exchan:e for 
torn bills of prior issues. The four lowest denominations are small in 
size. Only the 5s and lOs base printed backs which are complex nature 
prints later used on Continental Currency. Variations in the spelling of 
the provincial name (Pensylvania. Pensilvania. Pennsylvania and Penn­
silvania) continue to be used to detect alteration of denominations. The 
number of crowns is keyed to each of the two highest denominations. 
Printed by Benjamin Franklin and David Hall. Signers are inuMded 
under the May 1, 1760 issue. One signer for the four lowest denomina­
tions and three signers for the others. 
),i. iv.'.
,ss cr.:.-?..  r"\17:1 .7, - ,!  .-­
.. i;  f-,. -1,
HIS  BILL by Law Ihall pals  ,-.2  ...\1:..f 
current for FIVE SI-I ILLIN GS  ,--,:. 
:  ; within the Province 
iV Dated. the Firft 
A /yr, 1755
...* "  -,- f-
.!:.
a"  ir.11:1 r,'';'1,;,...1,­
re-v6 t - 10 
....-. 347 
3c1  Plate letters A. E.  S. 
4d  Plate letter!.  E.  S. C 
bd  Plate letters 
9d  Plate 
Is  Plate 
18d	  Plate letters  6 E 
1: 2s  Plate letters A 
2s6d  Plate letters  .:­
5s  Plate  . 
10s	  Plate 
Reversed S 
of  Pen.blvania.t.,,  -5E.-..--, 
Day of Otto- ?
r-7-!------1  cn ;:::..:::; 
-,,--r -,..­
)  . .. ,..).;, ,  - ..st"t,,,.; 
- r4  re 
.1--------.=.e.)-:':1  ;:e. 
1:	  At 
Good 
200 
kr:",Li  , IV 1: S II1LLINGS- e.'-v­
.2.7.:.-, ---,--,  - --- ---: t4-7-1--f-..-1--i -.---i 4.r4. .0 1. C.....40Pa, Is 04,FAct!. 0 Eli tkl, 
Fcur I 'cnce. 
THIS BILLby 
Law (ball pats current 
101  R PEncr, 
in titePro­
vince  of P­
Penblz.alr 
ada.. Dar­
cd 01-1. 
1755. 
C  4 Groat. 
1*"
0. 
1.11;6 
IK..-:. 
44:0 
iti);:g . , 
)1'; C'43 
,) .;. Pr:r.:e.i 
-..'  4::S 
P:i 
,aciN 
Q1. 
.,,,­
.y  B. -F R.1 NIC L Ilse; 4,­ M),
..,.d D. 11 .1 L D.  ri 
..-.- :2 ::.. ....-17, 
trz,,k;.-...........,...  ............., A  . . ..X.....)414.
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PENNSYLVA  A
 
January 1, 1756 
rice operations. Penn Arms arc on the face and a nature £55,000 in legal tender Bills authorized during the Ses­
print on the back. The number of crowns is keyed to sion ended Nov. 3, 1755 and good until Jan. 1, 1760. 
each of the four highest denominations. Printed by Ben- This emission and those in the four subsequent years 
jamin Franklin and David Hall on "good strong paper." were primarily to support military expeditions during 
Signers arc included under the May 1, 1760 issue. the French and Indian War. These emissions were to be 
redeemed by tax levies, as distinguished from Loan Of-
IGFITEEN PENCE.
wartwurvarsIn  r s. trt Avr4  riogit  11,
IS BILL (hail paft 
At EIGHTEEN FENCE 
with,! tit Pray:set if Penal.. 
varia. istertrhoz 1* a* .41.1 of Gisital' 
2 mil,  tk Jud Prsuisstt, malt is 
.194  ikt Pols  of  Xs: 
G  OR GE If.  1)&011411,s, 1756,, 
fiTEZI1 iittri 
Good  V.G.  f in* 
Is  Plate letters A & B. Penn:Norsk, [20,000)  100.00  150.00  200.00 
18d  Plate letters A & B. Pensilvania  [30,000)  100.00  150.00  200.00 
2s  Plate letters A & B. PenslIvonia  [30,0001  100.00  150.00  200.00 
2s el  Plato letters A & B. Pennsylvania [30,0001  100.00  150.00  200.00 
5s  Plate letters A & B. Pensllvania  [20,000)  100.00  150.00  200.00 
10s  Plate letters A & B. Pernsilvonia. 
Reversed S on columns  [20,000)  75.00  100.00  150.00 
15s  Plate letters A & B. Pennsylvania [20,000]  75.00  100.00  150.00 
20s  Plate letters A & B. Ponsylvonio  [15,000)  75.00  100.00  150.00 
October 1, 1756 
£30,000 in legal tender Bills authorized by the Sept. 21,  assignment of nature prints to the back of each de­
1756 Act and good until Oct, 1, 1766, Similar in form  nomination. The number of crowns is keyed to each 
denomination. Printed by Benjamin Franklin and David if to the Jan. 1, 1756 issue and having the same variations 
in the spelling of the name of the Province and the same  Hall. Signers arc included under the May I., 1760 issue. 1 
Good  Y.G.  fee 
5s  Plate letters A & B. Pensilvonia  (12,000)  100.00  150.00  200.00 
10s  Plate letters A & B. Pennsilvernia. 
15s 
20s 
Reversed S on column,  P2.0001 
Plato letters A & B. Pennsylvania 112,0001 
Plate letters A & B. Pensylvanio  000 [12,) 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
200.00 
200,00 
200.00 164 
PENNSYLVANIA 165
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March 10, 1757 
£45,000 in legal tender Bills authorized at the Session be- the same assignment of nature prints to the back of each 
gun Oct. 14. 1756 and good until Mar. 10, 1761. Similar  denomination. The number of crowns is keyed to each 
in form to the Jan. 1, 1756 issue and having the same  denomination. Printed by Benjamin Franklin and David 
variations in the spelling of the name of the Province and  Hall. Signers are included under the May 1, 1760 issue. 
1. 
,, -Ao..,  r. 1  .4/4  diati*,^6e
aftt  'CO., 
- -:­ .ritt 
-.'lle'ai:r.**);:a,e  ,11g4tArci%%e,:', pit 
7, 
741 ,:t?'2.'  "'.:01."47;1:7.ia;'
 
'''''  ';4!',',',f
 
- 4* i  -.."".fe ....,te.:..G.,. rher 
4 WelfirYtklht 
2,404  Minb  : 47,1:-.',, 
t vi  7:; 
...4. . , 
... .  - ­ 1 ,I3; F ltd.:m.43x, 
iiii...1.­ te.:44V. 
-t. 
tf$1.7474W5711 
Good  V.G.  fir* 
5$  Plate letters A 8. B. Penslivania  [18,0001  75.00  100,00  150.00 
lOs  Plate letters A & B. Pennsilvania. 
Reversed S on columns  [18,000)  75.00  100,00  150.00 
15$  Plate letters A & B. Pennsylvania 118,000,1  73.00  100.00  150.00 
20s  Plate letters A & B. Pensylvanio  [18,000]  75.00  100,00  150.00 167 
PENNSYLVANIA
 
July 1, 1757 
assignment of nature prints to the back of each denomi­ /55,000 in legal tender Bills authorized by the June 17,
 
1757 Act and good until Mar. I. 1761. Similar in form  nation. The number of crowns is keyed to each de-

to the Jan. I. 1756 issue and having the same variations  nomination. Printed by Benjamin Franklin and David
 
in the spelling of the name of the Province and the same  Hall Signers are included under the May 1, 1760 issue.
 
,  .4-,,,,,  1,- 0,04pti+eta1/44 1-',..%
- 40 414 ,,'' . .4. ,, ,
-.SOL 0 St 
1' E AT 5:ti il, ir-j, AT G .5.., v t * TEN  ­
4,4,,ap.404:74,401111. O4:;
is 
I 53 61 - Ts CtitinCtir. i,r  ...-:ie:rt.st.i..  -.I i1i1;kII7f::  .,
TLEI  LLT ncf. x .t:..in  7 ;..7  441%4  Xi 
..,  4,.. 
,  ...v,...,!.4,:.,.  :, al47:17,,,::liz..,::,-1,il::.7.2:iii." 1-'...,:..'. 4 bit,.
.:;.',' .­
;1,..,,1
Vtx:  Il',4`  co:Tit,iy,:itt,,..;,,,:,..,1.c. 4, ...-6::11t,.,, ,,,,,,,t... 
,,RY:,ga, ,cr,:  ....6,......,%1..., 2:,,,,-: 
, 
' "' 
' T ted'ir:f  5 7­ r-
- 1;,,"  :::": '>1..:""-,;
 
"?  telltk.,:"­
,,;1 
l'rn'ted kv B: 'FRAN KL I N, 
:,  .  a  1, H LL 
Good  VA,  firm 
5s  Plate letters A & B. Pensilvania  [22,000]  65.00  85.00  125.00 
10s  Plate letters A & B. Perinsilvania, 
Reversed 5 on columns.  [22,0001  6500  85.00  125.00 
151  Plate letters A & B. Pennsylvania [22,000]  65.00  85.00  125.00 
20*  Plate letters A & B. Pensylvania  [22,000]  6500  85.00  125.00 168
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May 20, 1758 
1, 1756 and intervening issues. The number  of £100,000 in legal tender Bills authorized by the April  Jan.
 
22, 1758 Act and good until Mar. 1, 1764. Similar in  crowns is keyed to each of the  highest denominations.
 
Printed by Benjamin Franklin and David Hall. Signers form to the Ian. 1, 1756 issue, The four lowest denom­
inations have blank backs. The four highest denomina- are included under the May 1, 1760 issue. 
tions bavc the same assignment of nature prints as the 
Is  [14,290]
 
18d  [14,28.5]
 
2s  (14,285)
 
Good  V.G.  Fine 2s6d  114.23.51 
5s  Plate letters A & 8. Pernilvania  [38,000]  75.00  100.00  150.00 
lOs  Plate loners A & B. Pennsilvania, 
75.00  150.00 Reversed S on columns  [38,000]  100.00 
15s  Plate letters A & 8. Pennsylvania [38,000]  .  75.00  100.00  150.00 
150.00 201  Plate letters A & 8. Pensylvania  [38,000]  .  75.00  100.00 
PENNSYLVANIA 
t'd FIVE.  1-11,1,L1N.G.S. 
-TO Co:vier/AI,  k  4, 
rm. ?e
 
Kiss OkuRGE Ili As!
 
7o,
 
C R  NV N. 
4 * 444 4444,' 
Printed by  F RANK L 
j and  HALL.  753. 
<4 
- ...Oa. 170
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April 25, 1759 
£100.000 in legal tender Mils issued pursuant to the 
April 17, 1759 Act and good until Mar. I, 1767. This 
and all prior issues were extended until Oct. 15, 1769. 
Similar in form to the Jan. I, 1756 issue. The two highest 
denominations are printed on both toot and back in red 
and black by Benjamin Franklin and David Hall. The 
number of crowns is keyed to each of the four lowest 
denominations. Signers are included under the May I, 
1760 issue. 
F 17 E /.1) 0 t; 
zih-41 k. FIVE, POUND t 
r  tt Ce ifPeari.ylvao 
t,g to tot At
- cf Aateibli, 
74 tie  :11 N't t elf 
Iteio. et 
G E 
Dated it -e'aph 
ti 
Pounds.  . 
mitit 'is  a-Ilk. 
LB: 
Lt.':  /759"; 
TIN:"  (-1 #  \-)i740+!1 
V.G.  Fiew
 
5s  Plate letters A & B. Pensilvania  110,0001  100.00  150.00  200,00 
lOs  Plate letters A &. B. Pennsilvania. 
Reversed S on columns  100.00  150.00  200.00 [10,000]

15s  Plate )(suers A & B. Pennsylvania [10,0001  75.00  100 00  150,00
 
201  Plate letters A & B. Pensylvania  (10,0001  75.00  100.00  150.00
 
501  Plate letters C &  Pensylvanio  [10,000)  75.00  100.00  150.00
 
£5  Plate letters A & B. Pennsylvania [10,000)  75.00  10©.00  150.00
 172 
PENNSYLVANIA
 
June 2L 1759 
£36,650 in Bills approved by the Act passed at the Ses­
sion ending May 21. 1759, but repealed by the Crown 
in June 1760. The bills were issued before the repeal 
occurred and were withdrawn when the repeal was 
known. Similar in style to the high denominations of 
the April 25, 1759 issue and with the corresponding 
nature prints. Printed on both face and back in red and 
black by Benjamin Franklin and David Hall. Signers 
are included under the May 1. 1760 issue, 
£5  Plate letters A &  Pennsylvania [4,886] 50s  Plate letters C & D. Pensylvanio [4,888] 173
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May 1, 1760 
1100,000 in Bills authorized by the April 12, 1760 Act. 
The two highest denominations are printed in red and 
black on both face and back by Benjamin Franklin and 
David Hall. The pence denominations arc small in size 
and have typeset backs. The number of crowns is keyed 
to the denominations from 5s through 20s. Detector 
specimens on blue paper. An Act of April 17, 1761 for 
an additional 130,0(X) in 50s and 15 bills was disap­
proved by the Governor, Signers of issues from Oct. 1, 
1755 through May I, 1760 are John Baynton, Daniel 
Renew, James Beneret, Thomas Bourne, George Bryan, 
Robert Bully, Samuel Burge, Stephen Carmick, Thomas 
Carpenter,  Peter Chevalier, James Child, Matthew 
Clarkson, Thomas Clifford, Redmond Conyngham, 
Thomas Coombe, Jacob Cooper, Thomas Crosby, 
Thomas Davis, Matthew Drawn, Jacob Duche, Edward 
Duffield, James Eddy, George Em len, Jonathan Evans, 
William Fisher, Plunket Reason, Enoch Flower, Joseph 
Fox, Joseph Galloway, Thomas Gordon, William Grant, 
Isaac Green leak, William Griffiths, Henry Harrison, 
Samuel Hazard, Joseph Hatboro, William Hopkins, 
Joshua Howell, Samuel Howell, John Hughes, Charles 
Humphreys, James Humphreys. Abel James, John Jer­
vis, Charles Jones, Isaac Jones, Owen Jones, Edmund 
Kearney, Joseph King. Jacob Lewis, William Logan, 
John Lynn. Joseph Marriott, Charles Meredith, Thomas 
Moore, Evan Morgan, Joseph Morris, Luke Morris, 
Samuel Morris, William Morris, Jr., George Morrison, 
Samuel Neave, George Oki 11, John Ord, Joseph Parker, 
Isaac Paschall, Richard Pearne, James Pemberton, Ed­
ward Penington, Francis Rawic, Joseph Redman, Peter 
Reeve, John Rayne II, John Rhea, Samuel Rhoads. Jr., 
Joseph Richardson, Daniel Roberdeau, Hugh Roberts, 
Daniel Rundle, Samuel Sansom, Joseph Saunders, 
Thomas Say, John Sayre, William Shipipen, Atwood 
Shute, Buckridge Sims, John Smith, Samuel Smith, 
Thomas Smith, Charles Steadman, Joseph Stretch, Amos 
Strettell, John Swift, John Taylor, Charles Thomson, 
Thomas Tilbury, William Vanderspiegel, James Whar­
ton, Joseph Wharton, Jr,, Samuel Wharton, Thomas 
Wharton, Daniel Williams, Richard Wister, Stephen 
Woolley, and Thomas Yorke. 
PENNSYLVANIA
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)01.. 
toumics',
of  ,jai
 
tr_ordi  to
 
E o  (4- E
teC fair 
3d  Plate letters A, B, & C [10,9091 
4d  Plate letters A, B, & C 110,9091  t 
6r1  Plate letters A, B, & C :10,909]  u 
9d  Plate letters A, B, & C [10,9092 (it)  Gos=d  V.G.  Prla 
5s  Plate letters A & B. Pensilvania  19,900]  100.00  150,00  200.00 
lOs  Plate Letters A & B. Pennsilvanio, 
Reversed $ on columns  19,900;  .  100.00  150.00  200.00 
151  Plate letters A & B. Pennsylvania [9,900]  ...  100.00  150.00  200.00 
20s  Plate letters A & B. Pensylvania  [9,900) ©,  75 CO  100.00  150.00 
50s  Plate letters C & D. Pensylvania  19,900)  ,  .  , .  75.00  100,00  150.00 
LS  Plate letters A & B. Pennsylvania 19,900] ®  75.00  100.00  150.00 